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INTRODUCTION
Over fifty years ago, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA").1 One of the NLRA's articulated purposes was "to remove ob-
structions to the free flow of commerce [by] promot[ing] equality of bargain-
ing power between employers and employees."2 Congress also hoped that the
NLRA would "even the power balance between manager and worker by al-
lowing each to bring certain economic weapons to the negotiating table."'
Although Congress enacted the NLRA "to encourage.the normal flow of
commerce by avoiding or minimizing industrial strife,"'4 it has been suggested
1. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1988)).
2. S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 1295 (1985).
3. Mikva, The Changing Role of the Wagner Act in the American Labor Movement, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 1123, 1129 (1986).
4. See Comment, Alleluia, The Buck Stops Here: The Parameters of Individual Protected
Concerted Activity Under the National Labor Relations Act, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 370
656 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:653
that the Act's major proponents were concerned primarily with "union organi-
zation."' A careful examination of the NLRA's legislative history and hear-
ings clearly demonstrates that unionization was indeed a major concern of
many members of the 74th Congress.' Senator Wagner, for example, who was
one of the bill's primary sponsors, repeatedly emphasized throughout the hear-
ings the importance of unions in the world of commerce.7 He stressed that
unions were needed to help individual employees compete with the vast eco-
nomic and political resources of corporations and business associations.'
Following the NLRA's enactment, unions grew in number, size, and
strength. As union influence grew, some employers and corporate managers
began to perceive organized labor as too powerful.9 Thus, twelve years after
the NLRA's promulgation, Congress again was called upon to address what
some viewed as another serious problem in labor-management relations.
Consequently, in 1947, Congress significantly overhauled the NLRA by
passing the Labor-Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). 0 Ostensibly, the
LMRA was enacted to protect the interests of the individual employee, both
union and nonunion." Some considered the LMRA to be "far more the
(1985).
5. Mikva, supra note 3, at 1127 (emphasis added) ("Congress correctly saw that the main
battle at the time was one of organizing unions in the first place, and deciding whether unions
would have any rights or legal protection at all.").
6. See 79 CONG. REC. 7565 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT. 1935, at 2321 (1985) [hereinafter 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE NLRA].
7. 79 CONG. REC. 7565, 7565-73 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA,
supra note 6, at 2321, 2321-42 (statement of Sen. Wagner).
8. 79 CONG. REC. 7565, 7970 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA,
supra note 6, at 2321, 2333. According to Senator Wagner:
Business men are being allowed to pool their information and experience in vast trade
associations in order to make a concerted drive against the evil features of modern
industrialism. If employees are denied similar privileges, they not only are unable to
uphold their end of the labor bargain but, in addition, they cannot cope with any
issues that transcend the boundaries of a single business.
Id.
9. Mikva, supra note 3, at 1127 ("Congress passed Taft[-]Hartley to counteract what many
saw as the excessive power of the post-Wagner [Act] unions.").
10. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988)).
11. See 93 CONG. REC. 5117, 5291 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1459, 1509 (1985) [hereinafter 2 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA]. In the words of Senator Kem:
The . . . legislation grants to the individual workingman freedom from abuses, by
imposing reasonable restrictions and requirements on employers and union .... All
the restrictions placed on employers by the National Labor Relations Act are re-
tained. The important features of this legislation ... are ... the right to be free from
restraint or coercion by [one's] employer and ... union[, and the right to] file charges
of unfair labor practices against [one's] union for misconduct as well as against
[one's] employer ....
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Magna Carta of American working men and women than.., the ... Wagner
Act." An analysis of congressional debate prior to the LMRA's enactment,
however, suggests that protecting individual union or nonunion employees was
not the legislature's true goal.
For example, Representative Hartley, a major proponent of the LMRA,
readily admitted that the amendment's primary purpose was "to make the
relationship between labor and management equitable, to place them on an
equal basis."18 Furthermore, considering that the LMRA "retain[ed], without
limitation, the power of collective bargaining, the power of employees to
choose their own representatives . . . [and] the power [of employees] to deal
with their employer as one man," 14 one may reasonably infer that the 80th
Congress was significantly more concerned about expanding protection for the
employer rather than increasing individual employee rights.
This Article does not focus on whether Congress enacted the NLRA and its
amendment to protect individual employees, the union hierarchy, or manage-
ment. A careful reading of each Act reveals some independent protection for
the interests of all three parties.15 Rather, this Article is concerned with ex-
12. 93 CONG. REC. 5117, 5147 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA,
supra note II, at 1459, 1497 (statement of Sen. Ball); see also 93 CONG. REC. 3521, 3535 (1947),
reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,
1947, at 601, 615 (1985) [hereinafter I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA]. According to
Representative Hartley:
In 1935, the New Deal brought forth the National Labor Relations Act ... and by
it surrendered to the labor barons sovereign powers over the working man and woman
.... This year, this Congress gives to these working men and women their bill of
rights. And whom do we hear complaining of our purpose? . . . We hear the labor
barons [who have] gathered . . . to fight this bill, the worker's bill of rights ....
id.
13. 93 CONG. REC. 3521, 3535 (1947), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA,
supra note 12, at 601, 617; see also Note, Section 8(b)(l)(A) from Allis-Chalmers to Pattern
Makers' League: A Case Study in Judicial Legislation, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1409, 1411 (1986) ("In
the Taft-Hartley amendments, Congress sought to circumscribe union power because of a per-
ceived imbalance between the powers of union and employer."). But see Mikva, supra note 3, at
1127 ("Taft-Hartley did not repeal the Wagner Act[;] it amended it. It did not remove [protec-
tion] given to labor, it simply outlawed unfair tactics by both sides. . . . Taft-Hartley aimed to
equalize bargaining power, not to return workers to a primal state of vulnerability." (emphasis in
original)).
14. 93 CONG. REc. 4310, 4318 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA,
supra note 11, at 1090, 1098 (statement of Senator Taft).
15. Although it is fairly apparent, we must remember that the interests of union leaders and of
the individual union and nonunion employee are not necessarily the same. This point needs
stressing at this juncture to ensure the appreciation of the pro-worker arguments and of the empir-
ical evidence advanced in this Article. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 4549, 4558 (1947), reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA, supra note 11, at 1182, 1198 ("[T]he opponents of the
[NLRA] amendment seem to confuse the rights and welfare of the individual employee with the
rights and welfare of the union. They are two different things." (statement of Senator Ball));
Gould, Black Power in Unions: The Impact upon Collective Bargaining Relationships, 79 YALE
L.J. 46, 67 (1969) ("[T]he Board should not strain to discover a rapport between the union and
the worker, for in most cases no such rapport exists in fact."); Schatzki, Some Observations and
Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer- "Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEX. L. REV. 378,
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ploring the extent to which both the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
and the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 have protected individual
employees' rights in administrative and judicial proceedings.
In recent years both labor law scholars16 and laypersons 7 have exhibited a
keen interest in reforming the NLRA again.18 A close scrutiny of various re-
form proposals, however, strongly suggests that revisions are being advocated
primarily to strengthen the protection of either the interests of management 9
or the interests of union officials. 20 Indeed, these proposed reforms only express
marginal concern for adequately protecting the individual rights of both non-
union and union workers."'
402 (1969) ("The American experiment of exclusive representation of unit employees in collective
bargaining generally has been considered a success. One of the unfortunate by-products of the
exclusivity doctrine, however, has been the forgotten interests of the individual worker."); Simpson
& Berwick, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures and the Individual Employee, 51 TEX. L. REv.
1179, 1179 (1973) ("In theory the union stands as the worker's sword and shield. In practice this
protection may be ephemeral, particularly when the interests of the union entity collide with the
interest of the individual or coincide with those of the employer.").
16. See, e.g., Gould, Some Reflections on Fifty Years of the National Labor Relations Act:
The Need for the Labor Board and Labor Law Reform, 38 STAN. L. REV. 937, 941 (1986) (dis-
puting arguments calling for the repeal of the NLRA); Mikva, supra note 3, at 1124, 1135-40
(arguing that the NLRA is obsolete); Comment, supra note 4, at 375.
17. See Lipset, America's Labor Federation Turns 100: Why Do Canada's Unions Prosper?,
Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1987, at 17, col. 6; Freedman, Can American Unions Rebound?, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 8, 1987, at 26, col. 4; de Bernardo, Public Sector Sees Organized Labor Boom, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 18, 1986, at 17. col. 5.
18. The National Labor Relations Act has had two major revisions: The Labor-Management
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), and the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519
(1959).
19. See Mikva, supra note 3, at 1136 ("It is time to consider overhauling the Wagner Act....
The first step Congress might consider is the codification of the mandatory-permissive subject
distinction."); de Bernardo, supra note 17, at 18 (advocating reforms that would spur private
enterprise and would decrease unionization among public employees).
20. See Gould, supra note 16, at 939-43 (supporting an amendment that would allow (1)
greater protection for the freedom of association, (2) collective bargaining outside the traditional
arrangement between an exclusive bargaining agent and 'an employer, and (3) union officials to
have a greater voice in plant-closing decisions); Mikva, supra note 3, at 1139 (supporting propos-
als that "impose monetary sanctions against employers who fail to bargain in good faith" and a
proposal that would "create a private right of action for ... unions"); see also Jaffe, The Individ-
ual Right to Initiate Administrative Process, 25 IOWA L. REV. 485, 493 (1940) (advocating a
private right of action for unions).
21. See Jaffe, supra note 20, at 530-31 (supporting a private right of action for the individual
employee); Mikva, supra note 3, at 1139 (advocating an amendment that would allow workers to
be reinstated pending the resolution of an unfair labor practice and that would "create a private
right of action for [union] workers"); Note, Individual Control over Personal Grievances Under
Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE L.J. 559, 561 (1968) (advocating amending the LMRA to allow the
individual union employee to press his own grievance under the collective bargaining agreement).
See generally Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Au-
thority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 631 (1959) (arguing for granting the
individual union employee greater control over "critical job interests" and claims under the
LMRA).
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As mentioned, this Article examines how favorably the organized or unor-
ganized worker 2 has fared under the NLRA and LMRA when forced to de-
fend his individual interests against the encroachment of management and
union leaders. Part I outlines and critiques the protected rights of individual
employees under the respective Acts. Part I also analyzes the legislative his-
tory which purportedly fosters those rights. Part II discusses historical
problems associated with the administrative enforcement of individual rights
under the NLRA.
Part III appraises the quality of both administrative and in judicial enforce-
ment of the individual union and nonunion employees' rights under the
NLRA. Part IV then discusses and analyzes judicial enforcement of individual
rights under the LMRA. Parts II, III, and IV argue that widespread adminis-
trative problems, a progression of inconsistent Supreme Court decisions, and
many unresolved intracircuit and intercircuit conflicts are undermining the ef-
fective enforcement of individual employees' rights under both Acts. It is fur-
ther argued that these major problems have existed for more than fifty years
and will continue to exist until Congress amends the NLRA.
Finally, Part V reports some of the more significant findings that were un-
covered from an analysis of 1,249 labor law cases. The statistical findings of
this study are reported in the Appendix to this Article. Part V also presents an
empirical examination of the disposition of individual complaints in adminis-
trative forums and of their private causes of actions in federal appellate courts.
This Part assesses the effect of inconsistent decisions and extralegal variables
on the outcome of union and nonunion employees' disputes. Lastly, after ex-
amining 200 National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") decisions and 1049
private action suits under both the NLRA and LMRA, 23 the Article calls for
major labor law reforms that would ensure less cumbersome, more timely, and
more consistent enforcement of individual rights under these Acts.
I. INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS AND THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION
UNDER THE NLRA AND, AS AMENDED, UNDER THE LMRA
A. Section 7-Scope of Protection and Congressional Intent
The enormity of the burden an individual employee must overcome to pro-
tect his interests, in both administrative and judicial proceedings, originates in
the very section of the NLRA that creates individual rights. Section 7 of the
NLRA guarantees workers "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
22. Some employment establishments are unionized and others are not. In unionized plants,
some employees may be union members while others are not. In a nonunionized plant, some work-
ers may belong to a union that is not the representative of workers in that particular plant. For
purposes of this article, an "unorganized" and a "nonunion" employee are synonymous; and a
"union" and an "organized" employee have identical meanings.
23. The author's database is available at the office of the DePaul Law Review.
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"124collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....Whether Congress intended section 7 to create a very broad or narrow
range of protection for individual rights is unclear; the legislative history of
section 7 is fairly limited. 5 It is very clear, however, that section 7: (1) "im-
poses no enforceable obligation upon employees"; 26 (2) does not protect every
employee in the labor force;" (3) protects an individual's conduct whether it is
or is not inspired by a union; 6 (4) "protects a broader range of activities than
[union-related] activities"; 29 (5) does not protect individual conduct which is
"contrary to the terms or spirit of the National Labor Relations Act or allied
federal legislation"; 0 and (6) fails to create "any specific economic rights that
employees [may] demand from the employer."'
Section 7, on its face, protects individual behavior arising for the "mutual
24. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) (emphasis added); see also Note, supra note 13, at 1409 ("The
amended section 7 gives employees the right to refrain from union activity: 'Employees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organization, . . . and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . (emphasis in original) (citing 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1982))).
25. Note, Individual Rights for Organized and Unorganized Employees Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 58 TEX. L. REV. 991, 1006 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Rights for Organized
and Unorganized Employees]; see also S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1935), re-
printed in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA, supra note 6, at 2300; Note, National Labor
Relations Act Section 7: Protecting Employee Activity Through Implied Concert of Action, 76
Nw. U.L. REV. 813, 816 n.20 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Protecting Employee Activity] ("The
legislative history of the Act indicates that section 7 is based on section 7(a) of the National
Industrial Recovery Act.").
26. 79 CONG. REc. 2332, 2338 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA,
supra note 6, at 2430, 2444 (statement of Senator Boland).
27. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988). Section 152(3) provides:
The term 'employee'. . . shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural
laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individ-
ual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a
supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor
Act ....
Id.
28. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 812-13 (9th
ed. 1981) [hereinafter BOK] ("[Niot all concerted activity is union inspired .... [T]he language
of Section 7 makes rather clear on its face, it is not necessary to have a union sponsoring con-
certed activity, or anywhere on the scene, in order that such activity be protected .... .
29. Note, Protecting Employee Activity, supra note 25, at 813 n.3.
30. See BOK, supra note 28, at 822.
31. Barron, A Theory of Protected Employer Rights: A Revisionist Analysis of the Supreme
Court's Interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act, 59 TEX. L. REV. 421, 421 n.4 (1981).
According to Barron:
Congress, while setting forth the rights of collective action, did not designate ... any
specific economic rights that employees were entitled to .... The obvious theory was
that the collective unit of employees, once established, would use whatever strength it
had achieved to obtain specific economic rights directly from the employer in a
contract.
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aid or protection" of workers as a group. 2 However, the 74th Congress' in-
tended meaning of "mutual aid" and "mutual protection" is less apparent.
One commentator argues that "activities directed at a dispute over terms or
conditions of employment [and] pursued on behalf of all employees satisfy the
'mutual aid' requirement." 3 Another commentator asserts that "activity for
mutual aid or protection means all acts reasonably related to the employees'
jobs or to their status as employees. '" In contrast, the Supreme Court has
refused to interpret the clause definitively. In Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB,35 the
Court asserted: "It is neither necessary nor appropriate . . . for us to attempt
to delineate precisely the boundaries of the 'mutual aid or protection' clause.
That task is for the Board to perform in the first instance as it considers the
wide variety of cases that come before it."3 6
Significantly, a review of relevant case law strongly suggests that the "mu-
tual aid or protection" clause has not been an insurmountable barrier for the
individual employee to overcome in either administrative or judicial delibera-
tions under the NLRA and LMRA. Among the several competing explana-
tions for this occurrence, one stands out: the National Labor Relations Board
has "read[] the 'mutual aid or protection' language [very] liberally. '37 Also,
"[t]he Court of Appeals ... themselves ... [have taken] a broader view of the
[scope of protection under] the 'mutual aid or protection' clause."38 More im-
portant, the Supreme Court has refused to read the language narrowly. In the
Court's view, a narrower reading "could frustrate the policy of the Act to
protect the right of workers to act together to better their working condi-
tions."3 9 Thus, the mutual aid or protection clause has not been an insur-
mountable barrier for individual employees to overcome. Unlike the mutual
aid or protection clause, however, it is clear that section 7's "concerted activi-
ties" language40 is a major obstacle for a union or nonunion employee in both
administrative and judicial forums.
32. See supra text accompanying note 24.
33. Note, Protection of Individual Action as "Concerted Activity" Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 369, 374 (1983).
34. Note, Rights for Organized and Unorganized Employees, supra note 25, at 1008.
35. 437 U.S. 556, 568 (1978).
36. Id. But see Note, supra note 33, at 374. The commentator argued that the Court has
indeed interpreted the clause:
The Supreme Court set out the most sensible interpretation of "mutual aid" in NLRB
v. J. Weingarter, Inc.: the "solidarity" established when an employee's activity gives
"assurance to other employees in the bargaining unit that they, too, can obtain ...
aid and protection" in like circumstances is " 'mutual aid' in the most literal sense."
Id. (quoting NLRB v. J. Weingarter, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 261 (1975)).
37. Note, Rights for Organized and Unorganized Employees, supra note 25, at 1008.
38. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 567 n.17.
39. Id. at 567 (quoting NLRA v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962)).
40. See supra ;ext accompanying note 24.
1991]
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B. "Concerted Activity"." Legislative Intent, Shifting Definitions, and
Conflicting Administrative and Judicial
Decisions About Its Scope of Protection
The origin of section 7's "concerted activities" language is unclear, although
commentators have advanced various theories."1 Additionally, "no clear con-
sensus exists among the National Labor Relations Board ... and the United
States Courts of Appeals as to what constitutes concerted activity."' 2 This
lack of consensus is especially apparent where the behavior and interest of a
single union or nonunion employee are involved. Among other consequences,
this absence of a clear consensus has produced an exorbitant amount of debate
and commentary among labor law scholars about the scope of individual pro-
tection under the "concerted activities" language.' s More seriously, the dearth
of intelligible guidance from the Board and the Supreme Court regarding this
matter leaves the individual employee uncertain about three important issues:
41. See Note, Protecting Employee Activity, supra note 25, at 816 ("[T]he Norris-LaGuardia
Act of 1932, which had the avowed purpose of preventing the use of injunctions in labor disputes,
used the same language as in ...section 7."); Note, Rights for Organized and Unorganized
Employees, supra note 25, at 1006 ("[T]he Act's authors borrowed the term 'concerted activities'
from previous legislation. 'Concerted activities' first appeared as part of the statement of public
policy in section 2 of the anti-injunction bill reported to the Senate by the Judiciary Committee on
May 26, 1938."); see also Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 566 n.14 (1978) (noting that
"Congress modeled the language of § 7 after that found in § 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act").
42. Note, Protecting Employee Activity, supra note 25, at 815; see also BOK, supra note 28, at
822 ("With no legislative guidelines ... to distinguish between 'protected' and 'unprotected' con-
certed activity, the Board and courts have assumed' the task of drawing that distinction.").
43. E.g., Bethel, Constructive Concerted Activity Under the NLRA: Conflicting Signals from
the Court and the Board, 59 IND. L.J. 583 (1984); Cloke, Concerted Activity and the National
Labor Policy, 5 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 289 (1976); Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activi-
ties, 26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951); George, Divided We Stand: Concerted Activity Under the NLRA, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 509 (1988); Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and the-Requirement of
"Concert" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286 (1981); Gregory,
Unprotected Activity and the NLRA, 39 VA. L. REV. 421 (1953); Johnson, Protected Concerted
Activity in the Non-Union Context: Limitations on the Employer's Rights to Discipline or Dis-
charge Employees, 49 Miss. L.J. 839 (1978); Lynd, Right to Engage in Concerted Activity After
Union Recognition: A Study of Legislative History, 50 IND. L.J. 720 (1975); Schatzki, supra note
15; Note, Individual Employee Rights Versus the Rights of Employees as a Group: NLRB v.
City Disposal Systems, Inc., 27 B.C.L. REV. 453 (1986); Note, The Requirement of "Concerted"
Action Under the NLRA, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 514 (1953); Note, supra note 33; Note, Protecting
Employee Activity, supra note 25; Comment, supra note 4; Note, Concerted Activity Under Sec-
tion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 1955 U. ILL. L. REv. 129; Note, The Boundaries of
Unprotected "Disloyalty" When a Nonstriking Employee's Section 7 Concerted Activity Threat-
ens Employee-Customer Relations, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1339 (1977); Comment, Constructive Con-
certed Activity and Individual Rights: The Northern Metal-Interboro Split, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
152 (1972); Comment, Exclusive Representation and the Right of Employees to Engage in Con-
certed Activity-Conflicting Policies of the National Labor Relations Act, 4 U.S.F. L. REV. 354
(1970); Note, The Sixth Circuit Spins Interboro and the Doctrine of Constructive Concerted
Activity-ARO, Inc. v. NLRB Leaves Non-Union Employees at the Mercy of Their Bosses, I I
U. TOL. L. REV. 1045 (1979); Note, Protected Employee Activity Under Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 931.
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(1) whether the clause protects an individual employee who acts solely on his
own behalf but, in the process, imparts benefit to other workers; (2) whether a
specific act is the type of activity for which the "concerted activities" language
was fashioned; and (3) whether one's union or nonunion status will influence
one's likelihood of receiving a fair hearing on a claim altogether.
First, the Board 44 and federal courts' 5 generally have accepted the concept
of "individual" concerted activity. And they have protected such activity in
instances where an employee (1) acts on behalf of, and as the chosen represen-
tative for, a group of workers;' 6 or (2) acts iodependently, without conferred
authority, to induce or to prepare for group activity." Among other reasons,
individual action is protected under these circumstances because the behavior
is viewed as furthering the longstanding policy favoring group activity for mu-
tual aid or protection. 8
A major conflict exists, however, between the Board and the courts about
whether to protect individual activity if the purpose of the conduct is not to
induce group action. In recent years, the Board has adopted the position that
individual activity should be protected "if any benefit inures to a group of
employees from an individual's action."' 9 The Board first articulated this stan-
dard, commonly referred to as the "benefit" standard, in Alleluia Cushion
Co.50 The Board's reason for adopting this position rested, in part, on the pre-
sumption that the likelihood of all workers benefitting is enhanced whenever a
single employee's activity is protected.5' What is problematic, however, for
44. See Note, Protecting Employee Activity, supra note 25, at 818 (stating that "[t]he most
expansive approach towards protection of individual action has come from the Board").
45. 'See Note, supra note 33, at 377 ("Each of the twelve federal circuits has accepted the
concept of individual concerted activity.").
46. This type of protection falls under what is commonly referred to as the "representation"
standard. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 4, at 352. The commentator explained:
Under the "[r]epresentation" standard, the employee acts as a representative of fel-
low employees; an individual claim or complaint must be made on behalf of other
employees to be concerted activity. A claim made solely on behalf of oneself is not
concerted activity and is thus unprotected . . . . [Moreover, u]nder the
"[r]epresentation" standard, there must be actual group activity represented by the
individual's actions.
ld.; cf Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Mach., Inc. v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 113, 116 (4th Cir. 1981)
(failing to find protected concerted activity where the individual employee did not act on behalf of
a group); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1009, 1017 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding
protected individual activity where an employee acts as "spokesman for the safety of all . . .
employees").
47. In Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964), the court stated that
individual action may constitute protected concerted activity if "it was engaged in with the object
of initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or that it had some relation to group action
in the interest of the employees." Id. at 685. This has come to be known as the Mushroom stan-
dard or test. Unlike the "representation" standard which requires actual group activity, the Mush-
room standard does not require any group behavior.
48. Note, Protecting Employee Activity, supra note 25, at 818.
49. See Comment, supra note 4, at 356.
50. 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1975).
51. Id.
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many union and nonunion employees seeking to enforce their rights is that
some federal courts have rejected the NLRB's "benefit" standard altogether."2
In addition, a number of federal circuit courts have refused to embrace the
Interboro principle," which the NLRB established in NLRB v. Interboro Con-
tractors, Inc."" This principle ensures protection when an employee attempts to
enforce a provision of an existing collective bargaining agreement." Prior to
Interboro, the Board shielded such activity because in its view such individual
efforts were merely "an extension of the concerted activity giving rise to [the
collective bargaining agreement]."6 This reasoning was also the Board's im-
plicit rationale in Interboro.57 But again, a majority of the federal courts have
refused to accept this reasoning," preferring instead to view such individual
conduct as benefiting "other employees only in a theoretical sense." 5
The second critical issue confronting the individual complainant is deter-
mining whether his specific behavior is the sort of behavior that the concerted
activity clause protects. It is generally accepted that the clause's language does
not protect individual actions that are "unlawful, violent, in breach of contract
[or] indefensibly disloyal."60 Moreover, it is well settled that the clause pro-
tects individual employment-related activity designed to improve the "terms or
conditions of employment-[for instance] wages, promotions, health and
safety, [and] race and sex discrimination in work assignment."'"
But what is less clear and, consequently, more problematic from a com-
plaining union or nonunion employee's perspective is the scope of protection
for employment-related behavior that is covered by state or by other federal
employment legislation, Without doubt, this ambiguity is at least partially at-
52. See Note, supra note 33, at 386.
53. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
54. 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966), affid, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
55. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 500 (2d Cir. 1967).
56. Merlyn Bunney, 139 N.L.R.B. 1516, 1519 (1962).
57. See Interboro, 157 N.L.R.B. at 1298 (finding concerted activity protected by § 7 because
the individual's complaints "were made in the attempt to enforce the provisions of the existing
collective bargaining agreement") (citing with approval Merlyn Bunney, 139 N.L.R.B. 1516
(1962)); see also Note, Rights for Organized and Unorganized Employees, supra note 25, at
1009.
58. See, e.g., Royal Development Co., v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363, 374 (9th Cir. 1983); Roadway
Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 687, 694 (11th Cir. 1983); ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713,
718 (6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1973);
NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d Cir. 1971); see also Kohls v. NLRB, 629
F.2d 173, 176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981) (expressing serious doubts
about the validity of Interboro).
59. Note, Rights for Organized and Unorganized Employees, supra note 25, at 1009; see also
NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884-85 (3d Cir. 1971) (criticizing Interboro as
creating the "legal fiction" of "constructive concerted activity").
60. Comment, supra note 4, at 351.
61. Gorman & Finkin, supra note 43, at 289-90; see also Schatzki, supra note 15, at 378-79
("[Tihe Act does not protect every kind of concerted activity by employees .... It is well settled
that employees who . . . engage in slowdowns, refuse to perform overtime work, or . . .engage in
a 'partial strike' are subject to discharge by their employer.").
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tributable to inconsistent Supreme Court and NLRB decisions.
As early as 1942, the Court stressed in Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB:62
"the Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the... Act
so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and equally important Con-
gressional objectives. Frequently the entire scope of Congressional purpose
calls for careful accommodation of one statutory scheme to another ... ,
Over the years, the Board followed the Court's counsel and applied a very
broad interpretation of the Southern Steamship Court's "accommodation"
language. More specifically, it fashioned a presumption of protected individual
concerted activity under section 7. In so doing, the Board safeguarded specific
acts when an employee, acting solely on his own behalf, attempted to enforce a
statutory right"' either under state or other federal employment statutes.65 Re-
cently, however, the NLRB reversed itself. In Meyers Industries, Inc. ("Mey-
ers I")," the Board held that "the concept of concerted activity first enunci-
ated in Alleluia [did] not comport with the principles inherent in Section 7 of
the Act";67 correspondingly, "individual activity . . . aimed at securing em-
ployer compliance with other [employment-related] statutes" no longer re-
62. 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
63. Id. at 47; see also Comment, supra note 4, at 371 ("The NLRB in Alleluia noted that the
Supreme Court told it to recognize the purpose and policies of other employment legislation and
to construe the Act in a manner supportive of the overall statutory scheme.").
64. For an examination of the Board's action involving federal employment-related statutes and
issues, see Salisbury Hotel, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. 685, 686 (1987) (finding protected concerted activ-
ity for a female employee who filed a wage and hour complaint with the Department of Labor);
General Teamsters Local 528 (Theatre Service Co.), 237 N.L.R.B. 258, 260-61 (1978) (finding a
single employee's filing of a Title VII racial discrimination complaint against a union with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is protected concerted activity); Dawson Cabinet
Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 290, 292 (1977) (finding protected concerted activity when a single female
employee initiated a Title VII complaint about sex discrimination in the workplace); Alleluia
Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1976) (holding that a single California employee's Occu-
pational Safety & Health Act ("OSHA") complaint about unsafe working conditions was pro-
tected concerted activity).
For cases involving state statutes and regulations, see Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 252
N.L.R.B 1124, 1133 (1980) (holding that the filing of a sole employee's sex discrimination com-
plaint with California Fair Employment Practice Commission is protected); Bighorn Beverage,
236 N.L.R.B. 736, 752-53 (1978) (finding protected concerted activity when an employee acted
alone in complaining to the state Department of Health and Environmental Sciences about carbon
monoxide fumes in the workplace); Air Surrey Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1064, 1064 (1977) (finding
protected concerted activity where a sole, discharged employee attempted to prevent his employer
from violating an Ohio criminal statute).
65. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C § 215(a)(3) (1988); Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1988); Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1988); Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970,
29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1988); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §
1140 (1988); Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 820(b)(1) (1988);
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
66. 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984). For an excellent review of the evolution of the Meyers standard,
see Ewing v. NLRB, 861 F.2d 353, 355-59 (2d Cir. 1988).
67. Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. at 496.
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ceives the Board's protection."
Whether the Meyers standard remains fixed and provides any credible guid-
ance for future individual complainants is very doubtful. As the Board itself
noted in Meyers I: "Although the definition of concerted activity we set forth
...is an attempt at a comprehensive one, we caution that it is [by] no means
exhaustive. We acknowledge the myriad of factual situations that have arisen,
and will continue to arise in this area of law."09
More important, the courts of appeals are divided over whether section 7's
concerted activity language must be harmonized with the enforcement lan-
guage appearing in other employment-related statutes.70 Again, the Supreme
Court is principally responsible for this confusion. The Court has refused to
state a clear methodology that would enable lower federal courts as well as the
Board to follow the instructions advanced in Southern Steamship. Those in-
structions require lower tribunals to carefully accommodate section 7 and re-
lated NLRA provisions with other legislative schemes such as federal employ-
ment statutes.7 1
68. Meyers Indus., Inc. ("Meyers I1"), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 888 (1986); see also Barmet of
Indiana, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1027 (1987) (holding that to the extent an employee was dis-
charged for participating in an OSHA investigation, such discharge is not unlawful under the Act
and is permissible under Meyers II). See generally Finkin, Labor Law by Boz-A Theory of
Meyers Indus., Inc., Sears, Roebuck and Company and Bird Engineering, 71 IowA L. REV. 155
(1985) (criticizing the Board's adoption of the Meyers i1 rule).
69. Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. at 496-97.
70. Compare Frank Briscoe, Inc. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 946, 951-53 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding pro-
tected concerted activity for each of five discharged ironworkers who filed respective Title VII
discrimination complaints with the EEOC) with Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122,
125 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding no protection for individual activity when an employee filed a work-
place-safety complaint with the Michigan Department of Public Health) and NLRB v. Bighorn
Beverage Co., 614 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding no protected concerted activity when an
employee complained to a state Occupational Health Board about carbon monoxide poisoning
from truck fumes) and NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1083-84 (8th Cir. 1977)
(finding no protected concerted activity for a discharged female employee who attempted to en-
force Title VIl's policy of banning sex discrimination in employment) and Mushroom Transp. Co.
v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964) (finding no protected concerted activity and uphold-
ing the discharge of an employee who intended to report a company's violation to the Interstate
Commerce Commission).
71. Compare Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942) (admonishing the Board to
undertake the responsibility for accommodating the statutory scheme of the NLRA to other fed-
eral legislation) with Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50,
73 (1975) (refusing to find protected concerted activity for individual black workers complaining
about Title VII racial discrimination). The Emporium Capwell Court refused to "accommodate"
the NLRA to another act as it instructed the Board to do in Southern S.S. Co.:
[W]e are told that relief is typically available to the party filing a charge with the
NLRB in a significantly shorter time, and with less risk, than obtains for one filing a
charge with the EEOC. Whatever its factual merit, this argument is properly ad-
dressed to the Congress and not to this Court . . . . In order to hold that employer
conduct violates ... the NLRA because it violates ... Title VII, we would have to
override a host of consciously made decisions ... [and t]his obviously, we cannot do.
Id. (emphasis in original).
For a debate about the wisdom of protecting.Title VII statutory rights as concerted activity
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The final and, conceivably, most egregious barrier influencing whether indi-
vidual conduct is treated as protected concerted activity is an employee's union
or nonunion status. Clearly, "the activities of organized and unorganized
workers are indistinguishable when those activities relate to employment con-
ditions. '"7' Furthermore, it is well settled that section 7 protects: (1) nonunion
employees engaging in a wide variety of concerted activity;73 (2) "unionized
employees acting outside established grievance procedures";7" and (3) "con-
certed conduct by employees ...contemplat[ing] neither union activity nor
collective bargaining." 71
But, what is also exceedingly clear and quite undesirable from the viewpoint
of a complaining worker is that federal courts are allowing one's union or non-
union status to influence whether individual protection is granted under the
concerted activity clausee.7 Such impropriety is occurring without any appar-
ent, defensible legal or statutory explanation. Indeed, the absence of a sound
justification partially explains the splits among circuits77 as well as the incon-
sistent rulings within circuits over this matter. Furthermore, these intercircuit
conflicts are unnecessary because the Supreme Court has had ample opportu-
nity to render a definitive ruling regarding this issue.
Over twenty-five years ago, the Court decided in NLRB v. Washington Alu-
minum Co.78 that a group of dissident nonunion employees was protected by
section 7.79 In Washington Aluminum, a group of seven day-shift, nonunion
workers had repeatedly complained to management about cold, unsafe work-
ing conditions." Although these dissident nonunion employees were not the
official representatives of all rank and file employees, the Court held that man-
agement could not discharge the dissident workers for leaving their jobs as a
protest against a poorly heated plant.81 Moreover, the Court observed that
nonunion employees do not "necessarily lose their right to engage in concerted
activities under [section] 7 merely because they do not present a specific de-
under § 7, compare Gould, supra note 16, at 946, with Meltzer, The National Labor Relations
Act and Racial Discrimination: The More Remedies, the Better?, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. I (1974).
72. Note, Rights for Organized and Unorganized Employees, supra note 25, at 1014.
73. Note, supra note 33, at 371.
74. Id.
75. ld.; see also Note, Protecting Employee Activity, supra note 25, at 830 ("It has long been
held that section 7 of the Act protects concerted activities in nonunion as well as [in] union
settings. ... )
76. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 43, at 292 (Board decisions suggest "there [is] less
statutory protection for organized individual grievants [under the NLRA] than for grievants in
nonunion companies."); Note, Rights for Organized and Unorganized Employees, supra note 25,
at 1009 ("The circuits courts ... have protected the organized worker's activity while denying
protection to the unorganized worker.").
77. See Note, Rights for Organized and Unorganized Employees, supra note 25, at 992.
78. 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
79. Id. at 15.
80. Id. at 10.
81. Id. at 17-18.
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mand upon their employer to remedy a condition they find objectionable."82
Thirteen years later, the Supreme Court reached a very different conclusion
in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization.3
In Emporium Capwell, several dissident union employees complained about a
specific and an objectionable employment policy based on race." Although the
dissidents did not represent all rank and file members, they demanded to deal
directly with top management and expressed their intention to picket the
store." When two of the dissident union employees distributed leaflets calling
for a consumer boycott, management fired them."
Unlike the Court in Washington Aluminum, the Emporium Capwell Court
ruled against the discharged union employees.87 Writing for the majority and
citing a competing need to protect the interests of the union hierarchy, Associ-
ate Justice Marshall asserted that the union has "a legitimate interest in
presenting a united front on this as on other issues and in not seeing its
strength dissipated ... by subgroups ... separately pursuing what they see as
separate interests." 88 An analysis of the Court's earlier decision involving dissi-
dent nonunion employees, however, reveals that Justice Marshall's rationale is
unpersuasive.
The Washington Aluminum Court was cognizant of competing sets of inter-
ests, too. In Washington Aluminum, a union wanted an employer to recognize
and bargain with it." There were also seven discharged nonunion employees
wanting that same employer to reinstate them. 9 While acknowledging that a
ruling for or against the nonunion employees would have a direct bearing on
the union's ability to attain its goal, 91 the Court, nevertheless, gave indepen-
dent attention and support to the nonunion workers' claim. 92 Simply put, the
Supreme Court in Washington Aluminum was indifferent to whether the
union prevailed on its claims.
That the Supreme Court and lower federal courts continue to discriminate
82. Id. at 14.
83. 420 U.S. 50 (.1975).
84. Id. at 53.
85. Id. at 55.
86. Id. at 55-56.
87. Id. at 73.
88. Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
89. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 10 n.1 (1962).
90. Id. at 10.
91. Id. at 10 nI. The Court stated:
The Court of Appeals also refused to enforce another Board order requiring the re-
spondent company to bargain collectively with the [Union] as the certified bargaining
representative of its employees. Since the Union's status as a majority bargaining
representative turns on the ballots cast in the Board's election by four of the seven
discharged employees, the enforceability of that order depends upon the validity of
the discharges being challenged in the principal part of this case. Our decision on the
discharge question will therefore also govern the refusal-to-bargain issue.
Id.
92. See id. at 15.
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between union and nonunion complainants93 without stating some sensible le-
gal justification is rather unsettling. There is nothing in section 7's legislative
history or in the NLRA that justifies protecting unorganized employees' activ-
ity while denying that same protection to organized employees' individual ac-
tivity. This is necessarily so because, as previously expressed, section 7 "does
not distinguish between the rights of employees before union recognition and
the rights of employees after union recognition."'I
II. HISTORICAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ADMINISTRATIVE
ENFORCEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
A. A General Overview of NLRA's Enforcement Provisions
The NLRA's enforcement provisions are stated very generally. More impor-
tant, the chief provisions have been the subject of much litigation since the
Act's inception.95 Yet, courts expect an aggrieved and, typically, unsophistica-
ted9" union or nonunion employee to be knowledgeable of these provisions' ma-
terial language. Additionally, appellate courts expect these employees to com-
ply with several important procedures before obtaining final redress in either
an administrative or a judicial proceeding.
An aggrieved individual must initially seek redress in an administrative fo-
rum. A charge must be filed with one of several regional directors who has
responsibility for gathering pertinent information involving the aggrieved
worker and the alleged offending employer or union." A regional director hasdiscretion to dismiss the charge altogether if the grievance lacks merit;9 the
93. See Tables 2-4 in the Appendix to this Article; infra notes 467-68 & 478-82 and accompa-
nying text.
94. Lynd, supra note 43, at 723. Lynd advanced one plausible, although indefensible, explana-
tion of why the Court as well as lower federal courts are likely to treat the individual activity of
union and of nonunion employees differently:
[Tlhe Court appears to have adopted the position that when a union has been recog-
nized, concerted activity without union approval is presumed to be unprotected ....
Emporium Capwell seems to say that concerted activity which was protected before
union recognition becomes unprotected because of the mere presence of a recognized
union.
Id. at 722-23.
95. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50
(1975) (applying § 8(a)(l) of the NLRA); NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9
(1962) (applying §§ 7 and 8(a)(l) of the NLRA); see also infra notes 105-10 & 112-15 and
accompanying text. ,
96. See, e.g., Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165-66 (1983)
("in the labor setting . . . the employee will often be unsophisticated in collective-bargaining
matters, and he will almost always be represented solely by the union.").
97. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1988); see also BOK, supra note 28, at 105 ("[A] charge may be filed
by any person or employer or qualified labor organization in the office for the region in which the
alleged unfair labor practice occurred.").
98. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988).
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complaining worker, however, may appeal an adverse decision99 to the General
Counsel's office.100
It is generally accepted that the General Counsel has final authority over
whether a complaint will be issued.10' He acts on behalf of the NLRBI °2 and
has discretion to issue a formal complaint against an offending employer or
union for engaging in unfair labor practices. 0 3 Additionally, after adopting a
regional director's findings, the General Counsel acquires the right to exercise
considerable prosecutorial authority over the individual's charge from that
point until the grievance is resolved in a formal proceeding before the
Board.'0 4
99. This includes the situation where the regional director refuses to issue a complaint. See
BOK, supra note 28, at 106-07 ("Should the Regional Director refuse to issue a complaint, the
matter may be appealed to the General Counsel. If the General Counsel declines to issue a com-
plaint, it is generally understood that the charging party has no further recourse.").
100. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1988) ("There shall be a'General Counsel of the Board who shall...
exercise general supervision over all attorneys employed by the Board ... and over the officers and
employees in the regional offices.").
101. Id. Section 153(d) provides in part:
[The General Counsel] shall have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of
the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints under section 10, and in re-
spect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board, and shall have such
other duties as the Board may prescribe or as may be provided by law.
Id.
There is conflict, however, among federal courts of appeals over whether the phrases "final
orders of the Board" and "final authority of the General Counsel" are synonymous when reference
is made to the General Counsel's prosecutorial discretion. In addition, conflict exists over whether
the exercise of the General Counsel's final authority is subject to judicial review. See infra notes
274-90 and accompanying text.
102. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1988) (stating that the NLRB "created by this Act prior to its
amendment by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, is hereby continued as an agency of
the United States, except that the Board shall consist of five instead of three members"); see also
id. § 154(a). Section 154(a) provides:
The Board shall appoint an executive secretary, and such attorneys, examiners, and
regional directors, and such other employees as it may from time to time find neces-
sary for the proper performance of its duties. The Board may not employ any attor-
neys for the purpose of reviewing transcripts of hearings or preparing drafts of opin-
ions ....
Id.
103. Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA provides that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in section 157 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988). In 1947, Congress added the
Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act ("LMRA") amendments to the NLRA which
included rules governing employee-union relations. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
Section 8(b)(I)(A) states that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents . . . to restrain or coerce . . . employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
157 of this title." Id. § 158(b)(I)(A); see also Note, supra note 13, at 1411-17 nn.l 1-33 (provid-
ing a representative sample of the types of unfair labor practices to which employers and union
officials may not subject the individual employee).
104. See Note, The Charging Party Before the NLRB: A Private Right in the Public Interest,
32 U. CHI. L. REV. 786, 787 (1965) ("[T]he charging party retains only limited power over the
prosecution of his own case.").
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The General Counsel's substantial control over a complainant's case is often
a source of friction between Counsel and an aggrieved individual employee.
Indeed, much federal litigation has occurred addressing whether the NLRA
gives the General Counsel absolute authority to issue, 10 5 withdraw, 10 6 dis-
miss,'°7 settle, 108 and determine a complaint's scope'0 9 without receiving a
complainant's input or giving the individual an evidentiary hearing"0 to voice
his dissatisfaction. Unfortunately, these procedural conflicts continue to gener-
ate much scholarly debate as well as unproductive, unwarranted lawsuits more
than fifty years after the NLRA's enactment."' Furthermore, such conflicts
between the General Counsel and complaining individuals only minimize the
likelihood of the latter receiving prompt and adequate redress of their griev-
ances in both administrative and judicial proceedings.
A second major provision preventing a quick resolution of an' individual's
claim is the NLRA's statute of limitations provision, section 10(b)." 2 This
provision requires an unsophisticated, aggrieved worker to file a charge and
give notice to an offending union or employer within six months of an alleged
unfair labor practice."13 This arguably very stringent duty has sparked much
debate among labor law commentators since the Act's inception in 1935.'"
Additionally, lower federal courts have persisted in giving conflicting opinions
105. See infra notes 212-25 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 237-56 and accompanying text.
107. Id.
108. The Supreme Court settled the general conflict among the circuits over whether post-
complaint informal settlement agreements are subject to judicial review. In NLRB v. United Food
& Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 126-27 (1987), the Court held that the
General Counsel's decision to make such settlement agreements was not judicially reviewable
under the NLRA. Conflict persists, however, over whether an aggrieved individual is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing when informal settlement agreements are made without the individual's con-
sent or input. See infra notes 265-71 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 226-36 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 257-73 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (b) (1988). Section 10(b) of the NLRA states in part:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in [an] ...
unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent ... shall have power to issue and cause
to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges ... and containing a
notice of hearing before the Board .... [N]o complaint shall issue based upon any
unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge
with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such
charge is made ....
Id.
At first blush, it appears that § 10(b) only requires an aggrieved individual to give notice to a
defending union or employer. However, a controversy exists among federal courts of appeals over
whether § 10(b) also requires management and union defendants to give some type of notice to an
aggrieved individual. See infra notes 183-205 and accompanying text.
113. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988).
114. See generally Note, Fair Representation by a Union: A Federal Right in Need of a Fed-
eral Statute of Limitations, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 896 (1983) (analyzing commentators' views
and concluding that the six-month period is appropriate).
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about proper service and filing requirements,"' thereby further undermining
an individual's ability to receive adequate and timely redress in administrative
proceedings. Such results are to be expected, given a worker's ignorance about
statute of limitation requirements and what some consider to be the forced
abdication'" of the individual employee's control of his grievance early on in
the administrative process.
After a complaint is properly filed and notice served, an offending employer
or union may file an answer and appear in person at a specified time to give
testimony. "' After all testimony has been considered, the Board may issue an
order requiring the offending party to stop discriminating against the individ-
ual employee."' The Board's orders, however, carry no enforcement power.
Rather, to ensure compliance with its orders, "the Board must secure enforce-
ment by filing a petition in a federal court of appeals . . . in the circuit in
which the unfair labor practice was committed."" 9
It must be stressed, however, that such complicated procedural requirements
are not the major factors undermining a worker's ability to receive adequate
and timely relief in NLRA administrative proceedings. Other factors are even
more restricting. Major NLRB administrative and monetary problems, for ex-
ample, as well as a history of conflicting judicial interpretations of key NLRA
administrative provisions are significantly more likely to prevent an individ-
ual's success than, say, inconsistent service and filing requirements. It is to
these issues, therefore, that we now turn our focus of attention and analysis.
115. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
116. See Note, supra note 21, at 561-62. According to the commentator:
]Courts should] allow the individual to process and pursue his own grievance
against the employer.... The Taft-Hartley Act, like the Wagner Act before it, made
... [the] union ... the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees. The
justification offered for this creation of monopoly power over contract negotiations...
is the need for and ability of a single bargaining representative to prevent repeated
minority strikes and work stoppages . . . . [Tihe same reasoning does not justify a
similar grant of power in the settlement of individual grievances under that agree-
ment ....
Id. (emphasis added).
117. Section 10(b) of the NLRA states in part that "[tihe person so complained of shall have
the right to file and answer to the original or amended complaint and to appear in person or
otherwise and give testimony at the place and time fixed in the complaint." 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)
(1988).
118. Section 10(c) of the NLRA states in part:
The testimony taken . .. shall be reduced to writing and filed with the Board .... If
upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that
any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair
labor practice, . . . the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause
to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from
such unfair labor practice ....
Id. § 160(c).
119. BOK, supra note 28, at 109; see also 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1988) ("The Board shall have
power to petition any court of appeals of the United States or ... any district court of the United
States, within any circuit or district . . . for the enforcement of such order and for appropriate
temporary relief or restraining order. ... )
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B. The Adverse Effects of Administrative and Judicial Constraints on the
Enforcement of Individual Rights in NLRB Proceedings
1. Administrative Delays and Backlogs
Briefly stated, administrative delays are major barriers that prevent ag-
grieved individuals from obtaining a timely and fair resolution of their com-
plaints in NLRA administrative proceedings. "The delay in resolving unfair
labor practice charges ... has always been a concern but in the last few years
delays have become more common and more extreme."1 20 Moreover, evidence
strongly suggests that the problem of delay has been more acute at. the
Board,' rather than at the General Counsel level, 2' since the NLRA's enact-
ment in 1935.
Several factors persistently cause administrative delays and backlogs. First,
the number of unfair labor practice charges filed each year is staggering. 23
Moreover, the staff provided to process and meaningfully treat each complaint
is insufficient. In recent years, more than 40,000 charges were filed annually,
120. Mikva, supra note 3, at 1133-34.
121. Murphy, The National Labor Relations Board-An Appraisal, 52 MINN. L. REV. 819,
832-33 (1968); see also Mikva, supra note 3, at 1134 ("In fiscal year 1981, the Board took an
average of 120 days after receiving an administrative law judge's decision to issue its own ruling.
In fiscal year 1983, it averaged 194 days[,] . . . even though the number of cases reaching the
Board steadily decreased over the same period.").
122. See, e.g., Rothman, Four Ways to Reduce Administrative Delay, 28 TENN. L. REV. 332,
332 (1961). Rothman stated:
I believe it can now be fairly said that justice is no longer denied by delay in the
procedures of the Office of the General Counsel ....
It is a matter of common knowledge that until recently, large backlogs in the Office
of the General Counsel were considered commonplace, chronic and practically insur-
mountable . . . . Today these backlogs are gone.
Id.
To support his argument, Rothman reported that "[in April 1959, 49 unfair labor practice
hearings were closed [in the Office of the General Counsel], with a median age of 139 days from
the filing of the charge to close of hearing. In April 1960, 71 hearings were closed with a median
age of 91.5 days." Id. at 335. But see Apruzzese, The Proposed Labor Reform Legislation-A
Management View of the Most Controversial Labor Reform Proposals in Decades: An Analysis
of the Provisions and Where We Go from Here, in LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1979, at 25 (M.
Landwehr ed. 1979) ("The greatest obstacle to. timely decision making is the continuing bottle-
neck at the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) level.").
123. See Operations Summary of NLRB Office of General Counsel for Fiscal 1986, 4 Lab. L.
Rep. (CCH) 9336 (1987) (41,639 unfair labor practice charges filed); Report on General Coun-
sel's Operation for Fiscal Year 1985, 4 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 9325 (1987) (40,290 unfair labor
practice charges filed); NLRB General Counsel's Summary of Operations for FY .1984, 1984
Lab. Rel. Y.B. (BNA) 323, 324 (1985) (43,426 unfair labor practice charges filed); 48 NLRB
ANN. REP. 6 (1983) (40,634 unfair labor practice charges filed); see also Murphy, supra note 121,
at 820. Murphy concluded:
The Board . . . has no control over its caseload, which is determined solely by the
filing of petitions and charges by private parties . . . . It has more cases before the
courts than any other agency. In one recent year, between one-third and one-half of
the federal government's actions in the courts of appeals were NLRB cases.
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and evidence strongly suggests that a significant abatement in the current
levels of filings will not occur in the near future. 2 Second, NLRB vacan-
cies,1 25 a continuing reexamination of Board precedents, 126 and severe internal
Board conflicts and disagreements' are major operational problems that are
causing burgeoning caseloads and administrative delays.
Third, some delays are caused by the respective parties' requests for contin-
uances and for extensions of time to file briefs. 28 Fourth, one commentator
has argued that protracted proceedings and delays are caused by "the Board's
124. \ See Operations Summary of NLRB Office of General Counsel for Fiscal 1986, 4 Lab. L.
Rep. (CCH) 9336 (1987); Report on General Counsel's Operation for Fiscal Year 1985, 4 Lab.
L. Rep. (CCH) 9325 (1987); NLRB General Counsel's Summary of Operations for FY 1984,
1984 Lab. Rel. Y.B. (BNA) 323, 324 (1985); 48 NLRB ANN. REP. 6 (1983).
125. See Zimmerman, The NLRB and the Courts: Mutual Respect Is Overdue, in LABOR LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 1982, at 51 (M. Landwehr ed. 1982). According to Zimmerman:
The Board has experienced a long period of turmoil and change in its personnel. It
functioned with fewer than its full complement of five [mlembers virtually the entire
period from December 1979 until August 1981 . . . . From January to August of
1981, the Board functioned with only three [m]embers, a situation unprecedented
since the Taft-Hartley Act expanded the Board to five [m]embers ....
Id.; see also Mikva, supra note 3, at 1135 ("[A]n unfilled vacancy on the 5-member Board . . . is
holding up many important decisions); Irving, NLRB: Master of its Own Destiny (Fate?), in LA-
BOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1982, at 67 (M. Landwehr ed. 1982). Irving notes:
During the past year, we have seen greater personnel flux at the Board than at any
time in its history .... For more than six months of this year, the Board has operated
with three instead of five [miembers. Resignations and term expirations made 1980
an equally unsettled year for the Board.
Id. at 73.
126. See Mikva, supra note 3, at 1135. ("[A]n ongoing reexamination of Board precedent ...
has postponed decisions in a host of related cases.").
127. To understand some of the issues that generate conflict among Board members themselves,
compare Zimmerman, supra note 125, at 51-52, with Irving, supra note 125, at 68-70. According
to Zimmerman:
One criticism that has repeatedly been levelled at the Board is that . . . the Board
fails to defer sufficiently-or, some would say, hardly at all-to the decisions of the
Courts of Appeals that disagree with the Board's interpretation of labor's and man-
agement responsibilities under the National Labor Relations Act. My thesis . . . is
that the courts have been equally guilty of fostering confusion and that the Board
faces a difficult, thankless, and in some cases virtually impossible task in reconciling
its national responsibilities with the views of various Circuit Courts.
Zimmerman, supra note 125, at 51-52. Irving writes:
In a speech ... at the Ninth Annual Personnel Policy Conference of Executive Enter-
prises, Inc. . . . I suggested . . . that the Board has contributed to its own caseload
dilemma by overextending its jurisdiction and by issuing decisions in certain areas
which . . . are ill conceived . . . and which do little to promote labor-management
stability or Agency credibility. . . . I gave examples of how the Board frequently
invites litigation by ignoring reasoned arguments and instructions of the courts and by
failing to reconcile its own inconsistent opinions . . . . Within two weeks of my ...
remarks, Member Zimmerman responded ... by calling me a "one man task force to
cut the Board's budget."
Irving, supra note 125, at 68-70.
128. See Murphy, supra note 121, at 832-33.
1991] ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE LABOR ACTS 675
... often unreflective, conclus[ive] decisions which virtually invite reversal or
remand." '129 Finally, frequent revisions of legal memos, routine circulations of
all decisions to every Board member, and excessive modifications of Board de-
cisions before issuances contribute to severe administrative delays.180
Over the years, several recommendations have been advanced to help resolve
the problem of delays and mounting caseloads. One suggestion encourages the
Board "to solicit the views of management, labor, and the bar for suggestions
on coping with its [administrative] problems." '181 Another proposal advises the
NLRB to reinstate its policy of awarding great deference to arbitrators' deci-
sions and to "[place] more, not less, reliance on arbitration" as a means of
satisfying its administrative responsibilities.8 2 A third recommendation, ad-
vanced by the Kennedy administration more than twenty-five years ago, en-
courages Congress to allow the NLRB "to delegate .. . its functions to a
division of the Board, [to] an individual Board member, [to] a hearing exam-
iner, or [to] an .. .employee board."' 1 3
A final suggestion is found in the now defunct Labor Reform Bill of
1978."3 This bill included a "summary affirmance" proposal that was
designed to help alleviate administrative delays. The bill would have "required
the Board to establish a procedure for summary affirmance of its Administra-
tive Law Judge[s'] [ALJs'] decisions ... upon motion of the party prevailing
before the AL.''1  Many regarded the summary affirmance proposal as an
effective means of reducing administrative delays because, among other rea-
129. Estreicher, The Second Circuit and the NLRB 1980-1981: A Case Study in Judicial Re-
view of Agency Action, 48 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1063, 1079-80 (1982).
130. Id.
131. See Irving, supra note 125, at 107.
132. Ryan, Arbitration-An Alternative to Our Overburdened Judiciary, in LABOR LAW DE-
VELOPMENTS 1983, at 275, 284 (M. Landwehr ed. 1983) (emphasis in original).
133. See Reorg. Plan No. 5 of 1961, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1359, 1360. Simply put, the Kennedy Administration plan would have given the
Board authority to delegate all of its key functions to another administrative entity, "including
functions with respect to hearing, determining, ordering, certifying, reporting or otherwise acting
as to any work, business, or matter." Id.
134. H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). This bill
was never enacted and its demise occurred for reasons having very little to do with protecting
individual rights in administrative proceedings. Instead, supporters of management's interests were
able to prevail over those supporting the interests of union officials. See Schulman, The Proposed
Labor Reform Legislation-Its Frustration and Suggested Consequences, in LABOR LAW DEVEL-
OPMENTS 1979, at 29, 32 (M. Landwehr ed. 1979). Schulman wrote:
In the House, H.R. 8410 ... passed by a substantial majority ... [; however a] small
senatorial group, assisted by their specialized attorneys and aided and abetted by such
"friends" of American working people as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the
National Association of Manufacturers ... prevent[ed] the Senate from ... vot[ing] .
. . [on] the issue ... [by riesorting to the filibuster ....
Id.; cf Nash, The Labor Reform Act of 1977-A Management Viewpoint, in LABOR LAW DE-
VELOPMENTS 1979, at 43 (M. Landwehr ed. 1979) ("That bill, which presumably was to be
quickly passed by Congress ... failed to gain broad-based support, in part ... because it was such
an obvious pro-union, antimanagement proposal.").
135. Apruzzese, supra note 122, at 49.
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sons, (1) most issues coming before the ALJs are factual, and the view is that
judges are in the best position to resolve them;'-" (2) the overwhelming major-
ity of ALJ "decisions are adopted without any modification or [with only]
minor clarification"; 7 and (3) "[m]ore than 80 percent of [ALJs'] positions
are affirmed by the Board." '38
As of this writing, Congress has failed to enact any of the proposals outlined
above. This inaction is indefensible in light of the severe administrative delays
that continue to prevent complaining unions and nonunion employees from ob-
taining fair and timely resolutions of their complaints.
2. Conflicts Between the NLRB and Courts of Appeals over the NLRB's
Refusal to Follow Circuit Precedents
A major and continuing debate over whether the NLRB must follow a cir-
cuit's precedent in cases originating within that circuit also undermines timely,
predictable, consistent, and effective administrative enforcement of individual
rights. The NLRB has maintained that it possesses nationwide authorization
to enforce the NLRA, in general, and individual rights, in particular. Conse-
quently, in the Board's view, it "cannot acquiesce to the disparate views of
every Circuit."1 9 Several courts of appeals, on the other hand, have ruled that
the Board must follow circuit precedents in cases originating within a particu-
lar circuit, unless the Board intends to seek a Supreme Court review of a par-
ticular proceeding.4 0
Given the breadth of the Board's authority under the NLRA and the num-
ber of courts involved, it appears likely that the Board and federal courts of
appeals will remain severely divided for an interminable period of time. This
need not be. Over the years, both Congress and the Supreme Court have had
ample opportunity to end this conflict and reduce its adverse consequences on
the administrative enforcement of individual rights. More important, Congress
itself planted the seed of this specific altercation when, in 1935, it enacted the
NLRA's venue clauses, section 10(e)"' and section 10(f)." 2
136. W. GOULD, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 127 (1986).
137. Id.
138. id
139. Zimmerman, supra note 125, at 63.
140. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ashkenazy Property Management Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir.
1987) (stating that administrative agencies must follow circuit precedent in cases arising within
the circuit, "unless the Board has a good faith intention of seeking review of the particular pro-
ceeding by the Supreme Court"); see also Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 382 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (" '[Tihe Board is not a court nor is it equal to this court in matters of statutory
interpretation. Thus, a disagreement by the NLRB with a decision of this court is simply an
academic exercise that possesses no authoritative effect.'" (quoting Allegheny General Hospital v.
NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1979))); Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228
(4th Cir.) ("The position of the Board is one in which we cannot acquiesce. While deference is to
be given to an agency's interpretation of the statute it administers ... it is the courts that have the
final word on matters of statutory interpretation .... "), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1988); see supra note 119 (providing the text of § 160(e)).
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Section 10(e) authorizes the NLRB to seek enforcement of its orders in
courts of appeals in circuits where offending employers and union officials ei-
ther reside, transact business, or violate the rights of the individual em-
ployee.1"" Likewise, section 10(f) permits complaining union leaders and em-
ployers to challenge the Board's adverse final orders outlawing the alleged
abuse of individual rights."" As petitioners, these employers and members of
the union hierarchy may initiate causes of actions in federal appellate courts
in the circuit where the petitioners reside, transact business, or committed the
unfair labor practice. 4 5
Section 10(f) clearly provides an aggrieved petitioner an extraordinarily
broad venue to challenge the Board's inauspicious orders. Indeed, section 10(f)
"virtually invites forum shopping." 4" Consequently, section 10(f) effectively
prevents the Board from predicting the circuit to which its decisions will be
appealed.' 7 Furthermore, from the perspective of an aggrieved individual em-
ployee, section 10(f)'s broad venue clause produces two undesirable conse-
quences: (1) it skews circuits' precedents involving individual rights; and (2) it
causes selective enforcement of NLRB's pro-individual orders.' 8
Existing case law readily exemplifies the gravity of the selective-enforce-
ment problem. One need only examine a representative sample of inconsistent
section 8(a)(3) 1 9 dual-motive decisions15" involving nonunion individuals' at-
tempts to organize collective bargaining units. Indeed, the First Circuit, in
142. Id. § 160(f). Section 160(f) reads in pertinent part:
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board .. .may obtain a review of such
order in any United States court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor
practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person re-
sides or transacts business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia ....
Id.
143. Id. § 160(e).
144. Id. § 160(f).
145. Id.
146. Nielsen Lithographing Co. v. NLRB, 854 F.2d 1063, 1066 (7th Cir. 1988).
147. See Zimmerman, supra note 125, at 63.
148. Nielsen, 854 F.2d at 1066.
149. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). Section 158(a)(3) prohibits employers from discriminating
"in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization." Id.
150. See Note, National Labor Relations Act: The Roles of the NLRB and the Courts of
Appeals After Pullman-Standard in Determining Employer Motivation in Section 8(a)(3) Dual
Motive Cases, 36 VAND. L. REv. 1095 (1983). The author noted:
An employer violates section 8(a)(3) by discharging or [by] disciplining an employee
as punishment for participation in lawful union activity. A problematic situation com-
monly occurs when an employer had lawful and unlawful motives to discipline or [to]
discharge an employee. Courts and commentators call this situation a dual motive
case .... Consequently, when employer motivation in employment decisions is un-
clear, parties ... ask the ... Board ... to decide whether an employer acted pursuant
to legitimate or illegitimate reasons.
Id. at 1096-97.
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NLRB v. Wright Line,"' correctly observed that dual-motive rulings were
"the source of a continuing controversy among the circuits and between the
Board and this court."152 To resolve the conflict, the First Circuit ruled that
once the Board's general counsel makes a prima facie showing that an em-
ployee's union activity motivated an employer to discharge or discipline the
employee, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show that it would
have taken the same action in the absence of the employee's protected union
activity.153
Wright Line became good law in the First Circuit and other circuits after
the Supreme Court approved the test in NLRB v. Transportation Manage-
ment Corp.54 One would presume, therefore, that an individual employee 55
need not be further concerned about inconsistent dual-motive rulings or about
employers shopping for sympathetic courts to obtain favorable decisions in-
volving such rulings. The converse, however, is true. Concern is warranted be-
cause the Court's Transportation Management decision has not and will not
stop forum shopping or selective enforcement of individual rights.
An examination of dual-motive cases following Transportation Management
and Wright Line reveals an unexpected phenomenon: some courts are defer-
ring to the Board's discriminatory intent findings and enforcing the Board's
dual-motive orders," 6 while other courts are not.15 7 This occurrence, in itself,
151. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); see also Wright Line, A
Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980) (recognizing "the existing controversy and
confusion" in the "dual motive" cases).
152. Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 901.
153. Id. at 901-02.
154. 462 U.S. 393, 397 (1983).
155. In fact, one would think that it is the Board which need not be concerned about forum
shopping after Transportation Management, because, as discussed in a succeeding section, an
individual employee loses control of his grievance once the General Counsel issues a complaint
against an employer or against union officials. Both commentators and courts are divided over who
owns the individual's grievance after a complaint is issued. See infra notes 206-56 and accompa-
nying text.
156. See, e.g., NLRB v. S.E. Nichols, Inc., 862 F.2d 952, 957 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing the
Wright Line standard and finding that nonunion employees were discharged for their prounion
activities), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 3162 (1989); NLRB v. Health Care Logistics, Inc., 784 F.2d
232, 237 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying the test and holding that the Board satisfied its burden of
establishing a prima facie case of unlawful discharges); Birch Run Welding & Fabricating, Inc. v.
NLRB, 761 F.2d 1175, 1181 (6th Cir. 1985) (applying the Wright Line method and holding that
the Board reasonably established a prima facie case of antiunion animus which the employer
could not overcome); Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 754, 760 (10th Cir.)
(applying the Wright Line analysis and holding that the General Counsel made a prima facie case
of unlawful discharge that employer could not rebut), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984); NLRB v.
Acme Die Casting Corp., 728 F.2d 959, 961-62 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying the test and supporting
the Board's finding of impermissible discharges); NLRB v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 674
F.2d 943, 950 (1st Cir. 1982) (applying the Wright Line test and holding that "there is probative
evidence which specifically rebuts the Company's alleged defenses regarding ... the discharge").
157. See, e.g., Cedar Coal Co. v. NLRB, 678 F.2d 1197, 1198-99 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying
Wright Line and holding that the General Counsel failed to demonstrate a prima facie violation of
§ 158(a)(3)); NLRB v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 674 F.2d 943, 947, 949 (.st Cir. 1982)
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is not disconcerting since the Wright Line burden of proof analysis can and
will produce such outcomes. What is disturbing about this new development,
however, is that several courts of appeals across the circuits are resolving dual-
motive disputes without truly performing a Wright Line type of analysis as
mandated by the Supreme Court in Transportation Management.'58 This judi-
cial recalcitrance is disconcerting because it encourages forum shopping and
creates conflicts between the Board and courts of appeals.
While the Board retains a national charter to enforce all aspects of the
NLRA, including individual rights, the NLRB-like other federal agen-
cies-must follow each circuits' respective precedents. 15 On the other hand,
federal circuit courts "[are] not authorized to interpret ... labor laws with
binding effect throughout the whole country."' 60 Moreover, if venue is prop-
erly conferred, federal courts of appeals may not decline jurisdiction simply
because they believe another circuit would be the more appropriate forum.'
(applying the Wright Line approach and ruling that the discharges were not caused by antiunion
sentiment); NLRB v. Eldorado Mfg. Corp., 660 F.2d 1207, 1214 (7th Cir. 1981) (employing the
Wright Line test and finding no impermissible discharges); TRW, Inc. v. NLRB, 654 F.2d 307,
312 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing the Wright Line analysis and holding that the Board failed to show
that employee's prounion activities caused an alleged retaliatory discharge); NLRB v. Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp., 651 F.2d 436, 437-38 (6th Cir. 1981) (applying Wright Line and re-
jecting an administrative judge's finding that the employer had a mixed motive for refusing to hire
an individual); Peavey Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 460, 461-62 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing Wright Line
and holding that evidence did not support the Board's finding of a discriminatory discharge).
158. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Lenape Prods., Inc., 781 F.2d 999, 1004 nn.3-4, 1005 (3rd Cir.
1986) (disregarding petitioner's § 158(a)(3) claim and failing to apply a Wright Line analysis but
summarily concluding that "[t]here [was] no evidence that management was aware of the em-
ployees' embryonic efforts to unionize their division"); Intermountain Rural Elect. Ass'n v.
NLRB, 732 F.2d 754, 764 (10th Cir.) (finding that employee's reprimand was a violation of §
158(a)(3) but holding that "a remand to restate the findings in terms of the Wright Line analysis
[was] unnecessary"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984); Artra Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 730 F.2d
586, 591 (10th Cir. 1984) (ignoring petitioner's complaint and holding that although the adminis-
trative law judge failed to use the exact words of the Wright Line test, it was obvious that the
standard was applied); Pioneer Natural Gas Co. v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 408, 418 (5th Cir. 1981)
(failing to apply the Wright Line analysis and failing to "uphold the .Board's conclusion that
Pioneer violated § 158(a)(3) ...by discharging [the employee]").
159. See Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. 449 U.S. 975
(1980). In Ithaca, the Second Circuit stated:.
[T]he Board cannot, as it did here, choose to ignore the decision as if it had no force
or effect. Absent reversal, that decision is the law which the Board must follow. The
Board cites no contrary authority except its own consistent practice of refusing to
follow the law of the circuit unless it coincides with the Board's views.
Id.; see also Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1980) (" '[T]his
is a most unusual circumstance in which a federal agency has refused to apply the law announced
by the federal judiciary.' . . . [T]he Board seems to ignore precedent from federal appellate courts
in favor of its own interpretations of its own decisions." (quoting Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB,
608 F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1979))); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir.
1979) ("A decision by this court, not overruled by the United States Supreme Court, is ...
binding on all inferior courts and litigants in the [circuit], and also on administrative agencies.").
160. Nielsen Lithographing Co. v. NLRB, 854 F.2d 1063, 1066-67 (7th Cir. 1988).
161. See Rikal, Inc. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 402, 404 (lst Cir. 1983); see also United States Elec.
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In addition to these restrictions, there is a complicating factor: "It is well set-
tled that the unfair labor practice and the Board's hearings need not have
occurred in the same circuit where [judicial] review is sought.1 62 It is appar-
ent, then, that the liberal venue requirements of section 10(e) and (f) are pro-
ducing unnecessary conflicts between the NLRB and circuit courts. Further-
more, as demonstrated above, such conflicts are producing inconsistent,
inequitable, and untimely dispositions of individual claims in administrative
proceedings. Clearly, Congress did not intend the NLRA's venue provisions to
affect the administrative enforcement of personal rights so severely. Moreover,
it is equally apparent that "this is a matter certainly within the power of Con-
gress to change." 68
C. Disparate Effects of Statutory and Judicially Created Defenses on an
Individual's Access to and Participation in NLRB Proceedings
1. Intercircuit Conflicts Respecting the Offending Party's Defense Under the
Statute of Limitations Provision
As noted above, section 10(b)-the NLRA's statute of limitations provi-
sion-may prevent an individual union or nonunion employee from having his
grievance heard. 6" Of course, that this statute of limitations defense may bar
an individual's claim is not, in itself, a source of concern. More unsettling,
however, are the very contrasting interpretations of section 10(b) that are
found among lower federal'courts' opinions. 65 These contrasting interpreta-
tions have caused competing statute of limitations rules to emerge that have
barred individual claims from NLRB deliberations in a disparate manner. The
Supreme Court's ill-conceived section 10(b) decisions have fostered the issu-
ance of these incompatible appellate court rulings and unreasonable, disparate
Motors, Div. of Emerson Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 315, 318 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Neither a
petitioner nor the Board can confer jurisdiction on this court when the record is devoid of any
evidence whatsoever that the petitioner transacts business within this judicial circuit."), cert. de-
nied, 467 U.S. 1216 (1984); NLRB v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 124 F.2d 50, 53 (6th Cir.
1941) ("Our jurisdiction of the present case cannot be declined or renounced, even though it may
appear preferable that the cause should have been brought in another jurisdiction authorized by
the statute."), af'd., 318 U.S. 9 (1943); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 83 F.2d
731, 732-33 (2d Cir. 1936) ("Section 10(e) ... very plainly declares that ... the court 'thereupon
shall have jurisdiction of the proceedings and of the question determined therein .... ").
162. Rikal, 721 F.2d at 404; see also Friedman-Harry Marks, 83 F.2d at 732 ("[U]nder sec-
tion, 10(e) [and (f)] any Circuit Court of Appeals ... will acquire jurisdiction of an enforcement
proceeding, if the respondent 'transacts business' within its circuit; the hearings need not have
been conducted within that circuit, nor need the forbidden acts have occurred there." (emphasis
added)).
163. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Local Union No. 6-418 v. NLRB, 694 F.2d 1289, 1301
(D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Indiana & Mich. Elec., 124 F.2d at 53 ("Venue, under the National
Labor Relations Act, is wholly a matter for the Congress."). In recent years, various venue pro-
posals have been advanced in Congress. See, e.g., S. 1134, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC.
18511-12 (1987); H.R. 439, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 3129-31 (1985).
164. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 181-82, 187-205 and accompanying text.
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selections of individual claims for redress in administrative hearings. 66
The disparate manner in which federal appellate courts bar individual
claims from NLRB proceedings need not exist. As early as 1959, the Court
had a good opportunity to outline a fairly sound methodology that would help
lower federal courts apply section 10(b) in a rational and on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis. The Court also has had a subsequent opportunity to explain clearly
both charging and offending parties' rights and defenses under section 10(b)'s
statute of limitations proviso.16 In both instances, the Court failed to do so.
NLRB v. Fant Milling Co. 60 was the Supreme Court's first opportunity to
provide guidance regarding the section 10(b) issue. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, limited its first section 10(b) ruling to the narrow issue of whether sec-
tion 10(b)'s proviso applies to unfair labor practices committed "[slubsequent
to the filing of ... [an original] charge." '69 In Fant Milling, the Court held
that the NLRB may consider unfair labor acts committed while an original
proceeding was pending if an offending party's subsequent acts were "related
to" and were of the "same class" of violations as those alleged in the original
charge. ° Less than a year after the Fant Milling decision, the Supreme
Court issued its second section 10(b) ruling in Local Lodge No. 1424, Interna-
tional Association of Machinists v. NLRB. 1'7 Again the Court restricted the
scope of its review and refused to outline clearly the extent of both charging
and offending parties' defenses under the proviso.
In Local Lodge, a nonunion employee filed an unfair labor practice charge
against both the union and employer." The employee alleged that her rights
and the individual rights of other employees were abridged when the union
and employer signed a union-shop contract and entered into additional supple-
mental agreements without the employees' input.'17 The union and employer
defended by arguing that the employee's supplemental unfair labor charges
were filed at least ten months after the formation of an allegedly illegal con-
tract. 7 4 Therefore, the defendants argued that section 10(b)'s proviso pre-
vented the employee's supplemental charges from being addressed by the
166. Compare infra note 181 and accompanying text with infra note 182 and accompanying
text.
167. The 1947 amendments to the NLRA added a proviso to § 10(b). The proviso states that:
[Nbo complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than
six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy
thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made, unless the person ag-
grieved thereby was prevented from filing such charge by reason of service in the
armed forces, in which event the six-month period shall be computed from the day of
his discharge.
29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988).
168. 360 U.S. 301 (1959).
169. Id. at 309 n.9.
170. Id. at 307.
171.-362 U.S. 411 (1960).
172. Id. at 414.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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Board.1' Both the NLRB and the D.C. Circuit Court disagreed, holding that
the six-month limitation proviso did not prevent the Board from addressing the
employee's charges." 6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and restricted its review to an ex-
tremely narrow question, one even narrower than the question presented in
Fant Milling. In Local Lodge, the Court asked whether section l0(b)'s proviso
allows the Board to consider a charge, if a charge (1) involves otherwise lawful
behavior occurring within six months of a filing, and (2) involves otherwise
lawful behavior that is "tainted" by and is a continuation of illegal conduct
occurring more than six months before a filing. 177
Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan ruled that the employee's claim
and comparable claims were barred by section 1O(b)'s six-month limitation
period. 178 Justice Harlan also stressed that l0(b)'s proviso did not recognize a
"[d]octrine of continuing violation" in instances where an otherwise legal act
became illegal only by cloaking it with the illegality of a time-barred, unfair
labor practice.17 9
While the Local Lodge decision is sufficiently comprehensible, it is also re-
markably narrow. Furthermore, Justice Harlan clouded the ruling by need-
lessly stating: "It is doubtless true that 10(b) does not prevent all use of evi-
dence relating to events transpiring more than six months before the filing and
service of an unfair labor practice charge."180 This language, unfortunately,
has caused much confusion and disparate treatment of individual employees'
claims among and within the federal circuits.
Some courts of appeals cite Justice Harlan's dictum as support for the doc-
trine of continuing violation.' 8' Other courts dismiss the language altogether,
175. Id.
176. Id. at 414-15.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 429.
179. Id. at 422-423.
180. Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
181. Cf. NLRB v. Hartman, 774 F.2d 1376, 1382 (9th Cir. 1985) (recognizing the validity of
the "continuing violation" theory under § 10(b)); Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 710 F.2d
1280, 1284 (7th Cir. 1983) (recognizing the validity of a "continuing violation" doctrine, but
disposing the case on the theory of independent repeated unfair labor practices); NLRB v. Basic
Wire Prods., Inc., 516 F.2d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 1975) (supporting the Board's view that
"[riespondent was under a continuing obligation to bargain"); NLRB v. Colonial Press, Inc., 509
F.2d 850, 854 (8th Cir. 1975) (recognizing the validity of the continuing violation theory as an
evidentiary tool); Cone Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 445, 448-49 (4th Cir. 1969) (supporting
the continuing violation doctrine on the basis of "a repetitive succession of events occurring within
a period of six months prior to the filing of the charge"); NLRB v. Louisiana Bunkers, Inc., 409
F.2d 1295, 1300 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that the filing of the charge was timely and that respon-
dent was under a "continuing duty to bargain"); NLRB v. Ritchie Mfg. Co., 354 F.2d 90, 100
(8th Cir. 1965) (supporting the use of the continuing violation theory as an evidentiary tool);
NLRB v. Albritton Eng'g Corp., 340 F.2d 281, 285 (5th Cir.) (holding that the filing of the claim
was timely, given the employer's continued obligation to employees), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 815
(1965); NLRB v. White Constr. & Eng'g Co., 204 F.2d 950, 952-53 (5th Cir. 1953) (holding that
the charge was timely filed because the employer's "duty to deal with the certified union was a
1991] ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE LABOR ACTS 683
citing the Court's single holding as a ground for rejecting the doctrine.182 One
major consequence of such competing interpretations becomes readily appar-
ent: the doctrine of continuing violation is applied in an unreasonable and dis-
parate manner to bar individual claims from administrative forums. Congress
clearly did not intend for this statute of limitations proviso to produce such
unwarranted individual discrimination. The problem, however, will remain un-
til the Court resolves the conflict or Congress acknowledges the source of the
controversy and amends the NLRA.
2. Intercircuit Conflict Respecting the Charging Party's Defense Under the
Statute of Limitations Provision
The text of section 10(b) is clear: whenever an employer or union officials
are charged with "engaging in any .. .unfair labor practice, the Board ...
shall ... issue and cause to be served upon such person[s] a complaint stating
the charges ... and containing a notice of [a] hearing." '83 Section 10(b) also
provides that the Board may not issue a complaint "based upon any unfair
labor practice occurring more than six months" 184 before the filing and service
of the charge.
Congress inserted this language in the Act to serve the interests of offending
employers and union officials. These same 10(b) excerpts, however, raise three
important and interrelated questions regarding the rights of individual employ-
ees: (1) whether section 10(b) requires offenders to give an aggrieved individ-
ual notice of an unfair labor practice; (2) whether the language requires giving
a specific type of notice to a complaining individual; and (3) whether notice,
continuing one").
182. Cf NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 549 n.3 (3d Cir. 1983) (refusing to "rely on
any continuing violation theory"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1039 (1984); General Marine Transp.
Corp. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 180, 187 (2d Cir. 1980) (refusing to accept a continuing violation
theory by noting that "the complaint at issue ... unequivocally derives from the time-barred
initial repudiation of the . . . contract"); NLRB v. Preston H. Haskell Co., 616 F.2d 136, 142
(5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting the continuing violation doctrine where an "otherwise permissible re-
fusal to sign contracts" was infused with illegality); NLRB v. Auto Warehousers, Inc., 571 F.2d
860, 865 (5th Cir. 1978) (rejecting the continuing violation theory by holding that "[i]ndependent
violations of continuing obligations do not exist where the illegality of the conduct . . . [is] estab-
lished . ..[only by] assessing events outside the Section 10(b) period"); J. Ray McDermott &
Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 850, 858 (5th Cir.) (refusing to characterize the alleged unfair labor
practice as a "continuing" duty to bargain), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978); Wisconsin River
Valley Dist. Council of the United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 47, 54 (7th Cir. 1976)
(rejecting the continuing violation theory by noting that respondent's behavior "was a current
violation"); NLRB v. Serv-All Co., 491 F.2d 1273, 1275 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding "that any
application of a continuing obligation doctrine under [current] facts .. .is inconsistent with the
purposes of [section] 10(b)"); NLRB v. McCready & Sons, 482 F.2d 872, 875 (6th Cir. 1973)
(holding that the "application of the continuing obligation doctrine ...is inconsistent with the
purposes of [section] 10(b)"); NLRB v. Field & Sons, 462 F.2d 748, 751 (lst Cir. 1972) (refus-
ing to find a continuing obligation to bargain with the union).
183. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988).
184. Id.
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per se, commences the tolling of the statute of limitations.
The Supreme Court has not ruled on these issues. A simple majority of
federal circuits, however, has held that section 10(b) requires offending parties
to give some type of notice to an individual charging party.1' 5 Moreover, there
is some agreement among federal courts of appeals that the tolling of section
10(b)'s limitation period commences only after notice is given.' Intracircuit
and intercircuit conflicts over these issues are pronounced because courts of
appeals cannot agree on the type of notice that individual complainants must
receive. Correspondingly, such disagreement is causing a disparate selection of
individual grievances for NLRB review within and across the federal circuits.
The plight of the single, nonunion employee in NLRB v. California School
of Professional Psychology87 demonstrates the severity and nature of this
conflict. In California School of Professional Psychology, Professor Michael
Cohen had attempted to organize faculty members, which caused tension be-
tween him and the school administration. 18 8 The school mailed a formal letter
of notification, dated July 23, 1975, to Professor Cohen informing him that his
employment contract would terminate on August 31, 1975.189 After receiving
this letter, Professor Cohen filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
NLRB. 190
Professor Cohen filed his charge less than six months after his official termi-
nation date but more than seven months after the date of formal notifica-
tion.""l The school argued that the charge was barred by section 10(b) because
the complainant had failed to file within the six-month period. " The Board
disagreed, holding that the limitation period started running on the date of
Professor Cohen's termination, rather than on the date of his official notifica-
tion.'93 The school appealed, compelling the Ninth Circuit to decide whether
section 10(b)'s period of limitation starts when an aggrieved individual is noti-
fied that an unfair labor practice will occur or when he is informed that an
unfair labor act has occurred.
If Professor Cohen had filed his charge in the Third Circuit, the filing would
have been timely. The Third Circuit has held that notice of an intent to com-
mit an unfair labor practice fails to trigger section 10(b). 18 ' Similarly, the
Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits would have upheld the filing because these
courts have held that the limitations period begins when an unfair practice
185. See infra notes 194-205 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
187. 583 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1978).




192. Id. at 1101.
193. Id. at 1100.
194. See NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 547 (3d Cir. 1983) ("A statement of intent
or threat to commit an unfair practice does not start the statutory six months running."), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1039 (1984).
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actually occurs. 95 Apparently, notice of an unfair act, per se, is not required
in these circuits.
Contributing to the confusion, however, are rulings issued by the First,
Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits. These courts of appeals have held
that the limitation period begins when a party receives actual or constructive
notice of an unfair labor practice.19 More specifically, the First Circuit,
adopting a fairly recent Board decision,.? 7 has held that the "clock starts when
a 'final adverse employment decision is made and communicated to an
employee.' "198
Of these five latter circuits, three would exacerbate the section 10(b) chaos
by imposing on the complainant a standard of care similar to that found under
a negligence doctrine. Specifically, the Sixth, Seventh, and D.C., Circuits
would have shifted the burden of discovering when the unlawful act occurred
from the school to Professor Cohen. The shift would occur because these three
latter circuits have ruled that section 10(b)'s period of limitations commences
when an aggrieved individual should have discovered an unfair labor act. 99
195. See, e.g., id. ("The running of the limitations period can begin only when the unfair labor
practice occurs."); Local 1104, Communications Workers v. NLRB, 520 F.2d 411, 416 (2d Cir.
1975) ("It does not seem reasonable to argue that the statutory limitations period begins to run or
may even run out before the violation.occurs."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976); Russell-
Newman Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that the six-month
statute of limitations did not bar a charge that was filed four months after the occurrence of the
unfair labor practice); NLRB v. Plumbers & Pipe Fitters Local Union 214, 298 F.2d 427, 428
(7th Cir. 1962) ("To hold that the running of a limitations period can begin only when the unfair
labor practice occurs .. .is in accord with well-established principles.").
196. See, e.g., Land Air Delivery, Inc. v. NLRB, 862 F.2d 354, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("The
limitations period does not begin to run until the party filing the charge knows ... that an unfair
labor practice has occurred."), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 52 (1989); Teamsters Local Union No. 42
v. NLRB, 825 F.2d 608, 614 (Ist Cir. 1987) ("It is settled that the limitations clock does not
begin to tick until the charging party has notice that an unfair labor practice occurred."); NLRB
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 697 F.2d 724, 727 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that the statute of limita-
tions period commenced when the union employee had actual notice of his discharge); NLRB v.
Allied Prods. Corp., Richard Bro. Div., 548 F.2d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1977) ("[Tihe six month
limitation[s] period does not begin 'to run until the employer's unlawful activity ... has become
known to the charging party."); Wisconsin River Valley Dist. Council of the United Bhd. of
Carpenters v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 47, 53 (7th Cir. 1976) ("The Act's statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the aggrieved party knew ... that his statutory rights were violated."); NLRB
v. Shawnee Indus., Inc., 333 F.2d 221, 224 (10th Cir. 1964) ("[Tihe limitation[s] period begins
when the facts of a discriminatory hiring policy first become known to an applicant.").
197. Postal Serv. Marina Center, 271 N.L.R.B. 397, 400 (1984). The Board stated:
Where a final adverse employment decision is made and communicated to an em-
ployee-whether the decision is nonrenewal of an employment contract, termination,
or other alleged discrimination-the employee is in a position to file an unfair labor
practice charge and must do so within 6 months of that time rather than wait until
the consequences of the act become most painful.
Id.
198. Teamsters Local Union No. 42 v. NLRB, 825 F.2d 608, 614 (Ist Cir. 1987) (citation
omitted).
199. Land Air Delivery, 862 F.2d at 360 ("The limitations period does not begin to run until
the party filing the charge .. .has reason to know that an unfair labor practice has occurred.");
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Professor Cohen's charge, however, was not filed in these circuits; it was
filed in the Ninth Circuit. There, the court barred the charge "[blecause Co-
hen could have filed his claim as of the date of receiving the letter of termina-
tion."200 In the'court's view, the complainant erred because section 10(b)'s
period of limitation commences "when the employee can first file an unfair
labor practice charge to protect his interests." 01
Obviously, the federal courts of appeals are sharply divided over the issue of
when a complainant's section 10(b) period of limitation begins. Furthermore,
extremely incompatible section 10(b) decisions can be found within the same
circuit. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has ruled that section 10(b)'s period
of limitations starts when an employee can first file a charge about an impend-
ing unlawful act. 202 But the Ninth Circuit has also adopted the doctrine that
"notice of the intention to commit an unfair labor practice does not trigger
section 10(b)."203 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has espoused the view that
the limitation period begins the moment after an unfair labor practice is com-
mitted.20' Moreover, this court has embraced the principle that the limitation
period begins to run only after "the party filing the charge receives actual
notice that an unfair labor practice has occurred." 05 Clearly, this conflict
Allied Prods. Corp., 548 F.2d at 650 ("[A] limitation[s] period begins to run 'when the claimant.
. . should have discovered ... the acts constituting the alleged [violation].' ") (quoting Hungerford
v. United States, 307 F.2d 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1962)); Wisconsin River Valley, 532 F.2d at 53
("The Act's statute of limitations does not begin to run until the aggrieved party ... should have
known that his statutory rights were violated.").
200. NLRB v. California School of Professional Psychology, 583 F.2d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.
1978).
201. Id. at 1101; see also NLRB v. Local 30, Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union,
549 F.2d 698, 701 (9th Cir. 1977) ("We . . . hold . . . that the six-month time period does not
begin to run until the laborer was in a position to file the unfair labor practice charge, i.e., upon
receipt of the notice of the penalty.").
202. See California School of Professional Psychology, 583 F.2d at 1101.
203. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union 112, 827 F.2d 530, 534 (9th
Cir. 1987); see also American Distrib. Co. v. NLRB, 715 F.2d 446, 452 (9th Cir. 1983)
("[Notice of the intention to commit an unfair labor practice does not trigger section 10(b)."),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984). Compare NLRB v. R.O. Pyle Roofing Co., 560 F.2d 1370,
1372 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that a "statement merely indicat[ing] a possibility of future non-
compliance with the contract ... did not constitute a repudiation" and, therefore, "it was insuffi-
cient to start the 10(b) period") with California School of Professional Psychology, 583 F.2d at
1100-02 (holding that the letter announcing the school's intention to fire Professor Cohen started
the commencement of the limitation period).
204. See Local 30, Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 549 F.2d at 701. In Local
30, Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's, the Ninth Circuit has supported the Seventh Cir-
cuit's holding in NLRB v. Plumbers & Pipe Fitters Local Union 214, 298 F.2d 427 (7th Cir.
1962), in which the Seventh Circuit held: "It does not seem reasonable to argue that the statutory
limitations period begins to run before the violation occurs. To hold that the running of a limita-
tion period can begin only when the unfair labor practice occurs, is in accord with a well-estab-
lished principles." Id. at 428.
205. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 827 F.2d at 533; see also American Distrib. Co., 715
F.2d at 452 ("The limitation period does not begin to run until the party filing the charge receives
actual notice that an unfair labor practice has occurred.").
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within and among the federal circuits must be resolved before the discrimina-
tory, administrative selection of individual charges can end.
D. The Breadth of General Counsel's Prosecutorial Discretion: Intercircuit
Conflicts and Their Disparate Impact on the Administrative
Enforcement of Individual Rights
The General Counsel's prosecutorial discretion is another important factor
affecting whether an individual employees' interests will be addressed and de-
fended in administrative proceedings. Unquestionably, the NLRA provides the
General Counsel with an extraordinary amount of prosecutorial discretion. 06
Indeed, one commentator recognizes that when an employer or a union vio-
lates the NLRA, and the General Counsel fails to issue a complaint, "the
'wronged' [individual] has no redress. 21 07 Another commentator argues that
the General Counsel's "failure to issue a complaint is a denial of relief under
the statute, leaving the [individual] who claims to be suffering from an unfair
labor practice without any remedy at all, since [the individual] is usually not
entitled to relief in any other forum."208
Despite this considerable prosecutorial discretion, the General Counsel does
not have absolute control over whether an individual's grievance receives ade-
quate and timely redress before the NLRB. Both federal regulations and case
law support this proposition. For instance, the National Labor Relations
Board's rules and regulations,20 9 as opposed to the NLRA, 210 provide ag-
206. See Murphy, supra note 121, at 823-24. Murphy stated:
The power of the General Counsel to decide whether a complaint shall issue has been
recognized by the courts as being unreviewable, either by the Board or by the courts
themselves. This fact was realized in 1947 when Taft-Hartley was before Congress
and led to charges that the General Counsel would become a "labor czar." [Ilt is a
very great and important power.
Id.; see also HR. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF THE LMRA, supra note I1, at 1559-60. Senator Morse remarked:
[I]t is a tremendous power that has been given to the General Counsel .... I simply
shall never vote to vest in any single individual any such sweeping power over the
handling of labor relations cases in this country .. . .This person would control the
procedural right of every employer and every labor union in the country. And, when it
comes to the question of issuing complaints, it can -be done independently 'of the
Board. The Board members would sit there and twiddle their thumbs and could not
do anything about it ....
Id,
207. Schatzki, supra note 15, at 399.
208. Murphy, supra note 121, at 824.
209. 29 C.F.R. § 102.38 (1990) outlines the rights of parties and states in pertinent part:
Any party shall have the right to appear at such hearing in person, by counsel, or
by other representative, to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, and to intro-
duce into the record documentary or other evidence, except that the participation of
any party shall be limited to the extent permitted by the administrative law judge ...
Id.; see also International Union, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 219 (1965) ("[Once] the Gen-
eral Counsel issues a complaint .. .the charging [individual] is accorded formal recognition: he
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grieved individuals a right to participate in an administrative proceeding
before the NLRB. Because such a right exists, it is unlikely that the General
Counsel will exercise complete control over the plight of an individual's
grievance.
More important, the Board itself curtails the extent of General Counsel's
prosecutorial discretion. The Board influences whether Counsel addresses and
protects an aggrieved individual's legitimate concerns and interests. 1' In fact,
many intercircuit conflicts exist regarding whether an injured union or nonun-
ion employee has a right to take complete control of his grievance and chal-
lenge the General Counsel's prosecutorial discretion. The following section ex-
amines several issues that are generating these intercircuit conflicts and
contributing to the disparate enforcement of individual rights in administrative
proceedings.
participates in the hearing as a 'party'; he may call witnesses and cross-examine others, may file
exceptions to any order of the trial examiner, and may file a petition for reconsideration of a
Board order."); Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Prods. Co., 622 F.2d 1176, 1191 (3d Cir.) (Pollack, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting International Union, UAW v. Scofield, 382
U.S. 205, 219 (1965)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980); Concrete Materials of Georgia, Inc. v.
NLRB, 440 F.2d 61, 64 (5th Cir. 1971) (citing Marine Eng'rs' Beneficial Ass'n No. 13 v. NLRB,
202 F.2d 546 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953), and noting that after the Board issues a
complaint, the charging individual does have some standing before the Board); Kellwood Co.,
Ottenheimer Bros. Mfg. Div. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 493, 499 (8th Cir. 1969) ("It is quite true ...
that once a hearing on a [filed] charge ... has commenced, the charging [individual] has substan-
tial rights to participate in the proceeding .... He is entitled to be heard by the [e]xaminer and
[by] the Board .... ); Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795, 798 (2d Cir.
1964) (noting that under the Board's rules and regulations the charging individual has a right to
participate in NLRB administrative proceedings); Marine Eng'rs', 202 F.2d at 548 (noting that
the Board's Rules and Regulations "permit the charging [individual] to be listed as a party to the
proceedings from the outset").
210. See. e.g., Marshall, 622 F.2d at 1191 n.5 (Pollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("The NLRA does not, in terms, provide that the charging [individual] can participate as a
party to Board proceedings.").
211. The language of the Act clearly separates the administrative functions of the General
Counsel and of the Board. The Sixth Circuit in Jackman v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 759 (6th Cir. 1986),
concluded:
Section 3(d) amended the Act to provide that the General Counsel be vested with
"final authority ... in respect of the ... issuance of complaints ... and in respect of
the prosecution of such complaints before the Board .. " The obvious intent of
amended [s]ection 3(d) was a complete separation of the prosecutorial and adjudica-
tory functions of the Act, with the former to be exercised by the General Counsel and
the latter by the Board.
Id. at 763.
It is also true, however, that some courts of appeals accept the view that the Board's adjudica-
tory responsibilities allow the Board to review, to modify and to restrict General Counsel's
prosecutorial actions. This explains in part why the federal circuits are severely divided over
whether General Counsel has "the broadest unreviewable discretion in the prosecution of unfair
labor practices" involving individual rights. See id.
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1. Intercircuit Conflict over Whether the General Counsel Has Unreviewable
Authority to Issue or Not to Issue a Complaint
The circuit in which an individual submits his grievance for administrative
review is very important. Indeed, depending upon the jurisdiction, a regional
director-acting on the General Counsel's behalf 21-may refuse to issue a
complaint against an alleged wrongdoer, leaving the aggrieved individual with
the prospect of receiving no administrative remedy. 213 Furthermore, the Courts
of Appeals for the First 2 1' Third, 218 Sixth, 21 6 Seventh 2 1 7 and Tenth 21 8 Cir-
212. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
213. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 139 (1975). The Court held:
In those cases in which he decides not to issue a complaint, no proceeding before the
Board occurs at all. The practical effect of this administrative scheme is that afn]
[individual's] believing himself the victim of an unfair labor practice can obtain
neither adjudication nor remedy under the labor statute without first persuading the
Office of General Counsel that his claim is sufficiently meritorious to warrant Board
consideration.
id.
214. See Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306, 307 (lst Cir. 1948) ("The issuance of a complaint
. . . is a matter of administrative discretion . . . [and] the General Counsel of the Board 'shall
have final authority .... ").
215. See Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527, 533-34 (3d Cir. 1966) ([U]nder the
Act and the rules and regulations of the Board, General Counsel, after investigation of a charge,
may elect not to issue a complaint, and such action is discretionary."); Marine Eng'rs' Beneficial
Ass'n, No. 13 v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 546, 547 (3d Cir.) ("[N]o one has authority to compel the
[General Counsel] to issue a complaint .... "), cert denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953); Jacobsen v.
NLRB, 120 F.2d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 1941) ("[T]he Board does not have to cause a complaint to be
issued . . . or proceed to prohibit any unfair labor practices complained of. The course to be
pursued rests in the sound discretion of the Board .... "); Mobilab Union, Inc. v: Johansen, 600
F. Supp. 826, 828 (D.N.J. 1985) ("[T]he decisions of the General Counsel regarding the issuance
of a complaint are not generally considered reviewable.").
216. See Jones v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 299, 838 F.2d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 1988)
("[Tihe . .'. General Counsel has unreviewable discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor
practice complaint."), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 404 (1989); Jackman v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 759, 763
(6th Cir. 1986) ("General Counsel [has] the broadest unreviewable discretion in the prosecution
of unfair labor practices . . . [including] the . . . discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor
practice complaint." (dictum)); Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, Local 310 v. NLRB, 745
F.2d 358, 362 (6th Cir. 1984) ("The General Counsel has wide discretion in determining whether
a complaint should issue and the Act provides no appeal from his decision." (dictum)); Echols v.
NLRB, 525 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1975) ("We have no jurisdiction to review a decision of the ...
General Counsel not to file a complaint' alleging unfair labor practice charges."); Mayer v.
Ordman, 391 F.2d 889, 889 (6th Cir.) ("It is well settled that the National Labor Relations Act
precludes District Court review of the manner in which the General Counsel of the Board investi-
gates unfair labor practice charges and determines whether to issue a complaint. ), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 925 (1968).
217. See Sparks v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 705, 706-07 (7th Cir. 1987) (sanctioning petitioner's
counsel for initiating a "frivolous" action because in the court's view it is a "bedrock principle of
labor law" which is "squarely on point" with "recent" Supreme Court decisions that the General
Counsel's decision "not to file an unfair labor practices complaint is not judicially reviewable");
Ihternational Union, UAW v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 237, 242 (7th Cir.) (holding that the Act gives
the General Counsel the discretion to prosecute complaints), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 908 (1956).
218. See General Drivers, Local 886, v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 492, 494-95 (10th Cir. 1950) ("The
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cuits have adopted the view that the General Counsel has the broadest unre-
viewable discretion to prosecute unfair labor practices. Consequently, these
circuits hold that the Board and federal courts are prohibited from ordering
the General Counsel to issue a complaint.
Other circuits, however, disagree. These latter circuits embrace the proposi-
tion that the General Counsel's decision not to issue a complaint is reviewable.
For example, the Fourth Circuit has ruled that a review of the General Coun-
sel's decision not to issue an unfair labor practice complaint is warranted if he
acts "in excess of his delegated powers."21 9 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has
noted that a court may interfere with the General Counsel's decision to issue a
complaint when he acts "in excess of ... delegated powers and contrary to a
specific prohibition in the Act."'22 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has held
that "where the decision of the general counsel not to issue an unfair labor
practices complaint is wholly without basis in law, a federal . . . court may
mandate issuance of the complaint." 2 '
Also, an intracircuit conflict exists over the issue of whether the General
Counsel has complete discretion to issue an unfair labor practice complaint. In
1952, the D.C. Circuit decided that "a court has no power to order the Gen-
eral Counsel to issue a complaint ... [because] the issuance of a complaint lay
within the discretion conferred upon the General Counsel by the statute. 222
The D.C. Circuit reaffirmed this view eight years later in Bandlow v. Roth-
man.223 Two years after Bandlow, however, the court complicated the circuit's
law by holding that "courts should not be asked ... to scrutinize [the General
Counsel's] decisions in matters of [this] ... kind, except perhaps in the most
extreme situation.2 24
1947 amendment vested in the General Counsel . . . the power and function of investigating
charges and issuing complaints. No provision was made for the review of the General Counsel's
action by the courts.").
219. Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., Baltimore Metro. Chapter v. Irving, 610 F.2d
1221, 1227 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980). But see Wellington Mill Div.,
West Point Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 579, 591 (4th Cir.) (noting that "[a] court has no power
to order the General Counsel to issue a complaint"), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964).
220. Bova v. Pipefitters & Plumbers Local 60, 554 F.2d 226, 228-29 (5th Cir. 1977). But see
Hernandez v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 119, 120 (5th Cir. 1974) ("We find no basis for departing from
the teaching of the Supreme Court that 'the Board's General Counsel has unreviewable discretion
to refuse to institute an unfair labor practice complaint.' ").
221. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union 357, 445 F.2d 1015, 1016 n.2
(9th Cir. 1971); Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers v. Ordman, 318 F. Supp. 633, 636 (C.D.
Cal. 1970) (noting that the General Counsel's "refus[al] even to consider plaintiff's charges...
make[s] this ... an extreme case which compels limited judicial action"). But see Pacific South-
west Airlines v. NLRB, 611 F.2d 1309, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1980) ("This and other courts of ap-
peals have adhered to the view that the General Counsel's decision not to issue a complaint is
unreviewable by the Board or [by] courts of appeals.... To the limited extent such review may be
available, it is in a district court.").
222. Hourihan v. NLRB, 201 F.2d 187, 188 (DC. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 930
(1953).
223. 278 F.2d 866, 866 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 909 (1960).
224. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 954, v. Rothman, 298 F.2d 330, 332 (D.C. Cir.
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In sum, only some complaining individuals may force the General Counsel
to issue complaints when their interests are threatened or abridged under the
NLRA. Moreover, quick resolution of this disparate and selective access to
administrative review appears unlikely in light of the D.C. Circuit's refusal to
harmonize its inconsistent rulings. More relevant, the Supreme Court has de-
clined to resolve the conflicts involving this issue within and among federal
courts of appeals.2"'
2. Intercircuit Conflict over Whether the General Counsel Has Unreviewable
Authority to Determine the Scope of a Complaint
A complaining nonunion or union employee commonly will ask for several
remedies when a charge is filed. Remedies, for example, may include a "cease
and desist" order, reinstatement, monetary compensation for loss of earnings,
job promotion, and "other benefits."22 6
Whether an aggrieved individual secures the requested remedies depends in
part upon the merits of his contention and the Board's evaluation of the
charge. But it is fairly certain that an individual will not receive back pay,
reinstatement, or any other remedy if the General Counsel refuses to include
such requests in an unfair labor practice complaint. The magnitude of the
General Counsel's authority to influence the likelihood of individuals receiving
certain types of remedies is a narrow issue that has surfaced in case law;22 7
1962) (emphasis added).
225. See Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., Baltimore Metro. Chapter v. Irving, 610
F.2d 1221, 1225 (4th Cir. 1979) ("Although the issue ... has not been resolved definitively by
the Supreme Court, that court ... , in various decisions, [has] indicated in discussion that such a
decision by the General Counsel is not reviewable by the courts." (emphasis added)), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 965 (1980); see also Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight
Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 553 (1988) ("[Tlhe [G]eneral [Clounsel has discretion to refuse to
issue a complaint if she is not persuaded that the charge has merit or is of sufficient importance to
justify prosecution." (dictum)); NLRB v. United Food .& Commercial Workers Union, Local 23,
484 U.S. 112, 122 (1987) ("[T]he General Counsel's approval of a determination not to file an
unfair labor practice complaint is not subject to judicial review .... (dictum)); Detroit Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 316 (1979) ("To be sure, the Board's General Counsel could theoret-
ically bring a separate unfair labor practice charge against the Union, but he could also in his
unreviewable discretion refuse to issue such a complaint." (dictum)); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 421 U.S. 132, 138 (1975) ("Congress has delegated to the Office of General Counsel on
'behalf of the Board' the unreviewable authority to determine whether a complaint shall be filed."
(dictum)); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967) ("[T]he Board's General Counsel has unre-
viewable discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor practice complaint." (dictum)).
226. E.g., Clinton's Ditch Coop. Co. v. NLRB, 778 F.2d 132, 136 (2nd Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 814 (1986); De Queen Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 744 F.2d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1984).
227. See, e.g., Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund for N. Cal. v. Advanced Lightweight
Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 553 (1988) ("[T]he scope of relief available in an NLRB proceeding
.is often a matter of agency discretion."); Detroit Edison Co. v. N LRB, 440 U.S. 301, 316 (1979).
According to the Court:
We are mindful that the Board is granted broad discretion in devising remedies to
undo the effects of violations of the Act ...and of the principle that in the area of
federal labor law the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for adminis-
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however, a much broader issue contributes to the disparate, selective adminis-
trative enforcement of individual rights under the NLRA.
Currently, severe confusion exists within and among federal courts of ap-
peals over whether the General Counsel has complete authority to determine
the entire scope of a complaint228 without the Board's, federal courts',-or an
aggrieved individual's input or consent. The Third 29 and Fourth 230 Circuits,
for example, have held that the General Counsel has complete discretion to
determine a complaint's scope. Also, the Fifth 231 and D.C.2 32 Circuits have
ruled, on several occasions, that the General Counsel has plenary authority to
determine the scope of complaints.
However, the Ninth,"' Fifth,234 and D.C.2 38 Circuits have rendered con-
trative competence. . . . Nonetheless, the rule of deference to the Board's choice of
remedy does not constitute a blank check for arbitrary action.
Id.
228. Reference is made to the General Counsel's ability to request certain types of remedies, to
include or delete certain types of violations or charges, and to determine "what is and what is not
an issue" in the complaint. See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 1343, 1350 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978); Frito Co., Western Div. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 458, 461-62
(9th Cir. 1964); see also Note, supra note 104, at 787-88 ("Entirely within the General Counsel's
discretion are whether a formal complaint will issue and what it will contain." (emphasis added)).
229. See Piasecki Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 575, 588 (3d Cir. 1960) ("The Board was
within its province in according determination of the scope of the complaint to the General Coun-
sel."), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961).
230. See Wellington Mill Div., West Point Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 579, 590 (4th Cir.)
("The decision as to the scope of a complaint is for the General Counsel." (emphasis in original)),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964).
231. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1749 v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 102, 105 (5th
Cir. 1988) (noting that the Fifth Circuit has "affirmed the broad, unreviewable right of the Gen-
eral Counsel . . . to 'control . . . the scope of the proceedings under section 3(d) of the Act' by
refusing to include certain charges in an unfair labor practice complaint"); Winn-Dixie, 567 F.2d
at 1350 ("Section 3(d) ... leaves to the [Gleneral [Clounsel the decision as to what is and what
is not at issue in an unfair labor practice hearing.").
232. See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. FLRA, 789 F.2d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
("[T]he court violates one of the most fundamental and settled principles of federal labor law:
that the FLRA and NLRB General Counsel, as a necessary corollary of their unreviewable discre-
tion to determine whether to bring unfair labor practice [c]omplaints, have plenary authority to
determine the scope of such [c]omplaints." (Silberman, J., dissenting)); see also United Steel-
workers v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 661, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding that the Board cannot entertain
an amendment to the complaint which the General Counsel opposes); International Union of Elec.
Workers v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 757, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (same).
233. See Frito Co., Western Div. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 458, 462-65 (9th Cir. 1964). The Frito
court stated:
[T]he Board considers that the public interest in the scope of the litigation is repre-
sented exclusively by the General Counsel and that the Board itself is powerless to
amend the complaint . . . with regard to an issue . . . . The Board argues that the
General Counsel has the exclusive right to determine what issues are to be considered
and the Board is powerless to exercise its own discretion . . . . [W]e hold that the
Board does have the authority to allow an amendment over the objection of the Gen-
eral Counsel and that this is a judicial function . . ..
Id.
234. See United States Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 692, 696 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting
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trary decisions. All three circuits have held that the Board has discretion to
amend a complaint and that a failure to exercise such discretion would be
paramount "to assign[ing] to the General Counsel matters that clearly fall
within the adjudicatory function of the Board. 236
One consequence of this particular conflict is that a particular complainant's
ability to shape an unfair labor practice complaint is highly influenced by the
court of appeals in which the charge is filed. Thus, some circuits allow com-
plainants to shape their complaints and thereby increase the probability of
receiving adequate and timely remedy. Other circuits deprive complainants of
this liberty. Clearly, such unwarranted, discriminatory action must cease be-
cause it undermines one of the Act's. primary objectives: the elimination of
unfair labor practices.
3. Intercircuit Conflict over Whether the General Counsel Has Discretion to
Dismiss a Charge and Withdraw a Complaint
Another concern from an aggrieved individual's perspective is the ability of
the General Counsel effectively to prevent complainants from receiving any
administrative remedy. This problem exists because several federal circuits
have accepted the view that the General Counsel has complete unreviewable
discretion not to issue a complaint.3 7 Consequently, many complaining union
and nonunion employees do not gain access to an administrative forum be-
cause the General Counsel dismisses their alleged unfair labor practice
charges and withdraws their complaints without the injured parties' input.238
that the General Counsel has considerable discretion with respect to determining the scope of a
complaint with qualification); NLRB v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 925, 460
F.2d 589, 596 (5th Cir. 1972) ("[T]he Board has considerable leeway to found a complaint on
events other than those specifically set forth in the charge, the only limitation being that the
Board may not get 'so completely outside . . . the charge that it may be said to be initiating the
proceeding on its own motion .... (citation omitted)); accord Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336
F.2d 128, 132 (5th Cir. 1964).
235. See George Banta Co., Banta Div. v. NLRB, 686 F.2d 10, 23 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
("[T]he Act places judicial and policymaking functions with the Board, including the responsibil-
ity to determine which issues are within the scope of a complaint." (emphasis in original)), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983).
236. George Banta Co., 686 F.2d at 23.
237. See infra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
238. Some courts of appeals describe this procedure as the General Counsel's authority to dis-
miss a charge and withdraw a complaint. Others define it as General Counsel's authority to dis-
miss a complaint and withdraw a charge. Compare Jackman v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 759, 764 (6th
Cir. 1986) (defining the issue as the right to withdraw a complaint) and George Banta Co. v.
NLRB, 626 F.2d 354, 356 (4th Cir. 1980) (viewing the issue as a right to withdraw a charge),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981) with NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union,
Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 118 (1987) (noting that the regional director may dismiss a charge after
it has been properly investigated) and Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527, 534 (3d
Cir. 1966) (framing the issue as a right to dismiss a complaint). In several places, the NLRB's
rules and regulations outline the conditions under which the General Counsel may withdraw a
complaint. In others, the regulations outline when a complainant may withdraw a charge. See
infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text. The NLRB and the federal courts of appeals are using
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Some courts of appeals have perceived such behavior as a legitimate exercise
of the General Counsel's unreviewable prosecutorial discretion; others have
not.239
The intercircuit conflict over this particular issue is unnecessary. In NLRB
v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23,240 the Supreme
Court had a good opportunity to resolve the controversy over whether the
NLRA gives the General Counsel unreviewable authority to dismiss a charge
and withdraw a complaint for whatever reason. The Court did not take advan-
tage of that opportunity. Instead, the Court issued a very narrow ruling that
upheld the General Counsel's right to withdraw a complaint under certain
conditions. 241 Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the General Counsel
has unreviewable authority to dismiss a charge and withdraw a complaint in
cases involving settlement agreements. 24 2
Unlike the narrow ruling in United Food & Commercial Workers Union,
the NLRB's rules and regulations are much broader and unequivocal. They
permit "[a]ny .. .complaint [to] be withdrawn before the hearing by the
regional director on .his own motion."24 Moreover, if an aggrieved individual
refuses to accept a regional director's recommendation to dismiss a charge, the
latter may dismiss the charge without the individual's consent.244
these terms interchangeably. The same practice is followed here.
239. Compare infra notes 244-50 and accompanying text with infra notes 251-56 and accompa-
nying text.
240. 484 U.S. 112 (1987).
241. Id. at 125-26.
242. Id. According to the Court:
[W]e fail to see why the General Counsel should have the concededly unreviewable
discretion to file a complaint, but not the same discretion to withdraw the complaint
before hearing .... The General Counsel's unreviewable discretion to file and with-
draw a complaint ... logically supports a reading that she must also have final
authority to dismiss a complaint in favor of an informal settlement, at least before a
hearing begins.
Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
243. 29 C.F.R. § 102.18 (1990).
244. Id. § 101.6. Section 101.6 states in part:
If the complainant refuses to withdraw the charge as recommended, the Regional
Director dismisses the charge. The Regional Director thereupon informs the parties of
this section [sic, probably should be action], together with a simple statement of the
grounds thereof, and the complainant's right of appeal to the General Counsel in
Washington, D.C., within 14 days.
Id. (emphasis added).
It is also true that an individual's decision to dismiss an unfair labor practice charge does not
affect General Counsel's prosecutorial discretion, because
[tihe Board has ... long recognized that the willingness of a charging party to with-
draw charges is not necessarily grounds for dismissal of a complaint "for once a
charge is filed, the General Counsel proceeds, not in vindication of private rights, but
as the representative of an agency entrusted with the power and the duty of enforcing
the Act in which the public has an interest."
Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 806 F.2d 269, 272 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
see also Note, supra note 104, at 787 ("[T]he General Counsel can refuse to permit the charge to
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The Second, '" Fourth, '2 4 6 Sixth,24 7 and Ninth 4 8 Circuits have supported the
view expressed in the Board's regulations. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has
consistently held that the General Counsel's decision to dismiss a charge and
withdraw a complaint is an act of prosecutorial discretion that is unreview-
able.249 But, the Ninth Circuit also has adopted the position that "the Board
has the authority to alter its public position on matters of labor law either
through changes and additions to its regulations or through Board deci-
sions. ' ' 250 Yet, this same circuit continues to support the proposition that the
Board does not have authority to review General Counsel's withdrawal
decisions.
Conversely, the Third Circuit has vehemently disagreed with the argument
that Board regulations give the General Counsel and regional directors unre-
viewable authority to dismiss a charge and withdraw a complaint. In Leeds &
Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 251 the court strongly attacked the NLRB's regulation
which allows a regional director to withdraw a complaint on his own mo-
tion.252 In Leeds .& Northrup, the court held that the regulation "is inconsis-
tent with the scheme of the Act ... and arbitrarily aborts both administrative
and judicial review contrary to law."2 53 In addition, the Third Circuit has sup-
ported the view that the General Counsel's decision to dismiss a complaint is
reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act.254 In support of this con-
tention, the court reasoned that after a complaint has been issued, "an adjudi-
catory phase of the administrative process arises necessitating appropriate ave-
nues of review, both administrative and judicial. 2 55
be withdrawn.").
245. See Local 282, Teamsters v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1964) ("[Tlhe General
Counsel has ... power to determine whether a complaint can be successfully prosecuted and, if he
thinks not, to drop it.").
246. See George Banta Co. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 354, 356-57 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that the
decision of the General Counsel to withdraw and not to prosecute the charge in the complaint was
an unreviewable prosecutorial decision), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
247. See Jackman v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 759, 764 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[T]his court concludes that
it is without jurisdiction to review the General Counsel's decision to withdraw the unfair labor
practice complaint.").
248. See International Bhd. of Boilermakers, Union Local 6 v. NLRB, 872 F.2d 331 (9th Cir.
1989).
249. Id. at 332 ("We hold that the General Counsel's decision to withdraw the complaint was
an act of prosecutorial discretion which is non-reviewable."); Foley-Wismer & Becker v. NLRB,
695 F.2d 424, 427 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982) ("IT]he General Counsel's dismissal of the . . . charges is
not appealable."); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Lubbers, 681 F.2d
598, 605 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that § 3(d) of the Act precludes a review of the General Coun-
sel's "decision to withdraw a complaint when that decision is accompanied by a statement indicat-
ing the reasons for the action."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1201 (1983).
250. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 872 F.2d at 332.
251. 357 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1966).
252. Id. at 535.
253. Id.
254. Id. For the text of the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988).
255. Leeds & Northrup, 357 F.2d at 535.
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The D.C. Circuit has similarly supported some limited review of the Gen-
eral Counsel's decision to dismiss a charge and withdraw a complaint. The
court's rationale for its position is that the General Counsel's "prosecutorial
role may at times blend with the [Board's] adjudicatory role," and his
"prosecutorial act often might . . . encompass basic policy considerations. 256
4. Intercircuit Conflict over Whether the General Counsel Has Unreviewable
Discretion to Grant or Deny an Evidentiary Hearing
When the General Counsel refuses to issue a complaint, refuses to expand a
complaint's scope, withdraws a complaint, or negotiates an informal settlement
agreement 57 without an aggrieved individual's input or consent,258 an individ-
ual's interests are unquestionably affected in a significant manner. Perceiving
some inherent unfairness in such an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, sev-
eral federal courts of appeals have ordered the General Counsel to provide
aggrieved individuals an evidentiary hearing to voice legitimate concerns and
disagreements. Other federal appellate courts have refused to order such hear-
ings. Such disparate access to a forum to protest alleged abuses of
prosecutorial discretion only fosters the continued, unequal administrative en-
forcement of individual employees' rights across this nation.
Under the NLRA, federal courts of appeals have granted or denied ag-
grieved litigants' requests for an evidentiary hearing for a variety of reasons.
For example, the Sixth Circuit has asserted that there is no statutory right to
an unconditional evidentiary hearing involving an unfair labor practice
256. ILGWU, Local 415-475 v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 823, 830-31 & n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1974). On
another occasion, the D.C. Circuit has suggested that it will not give the General Counsel blanket
authority to dismiss a charge and withdraw a complaint; instead, the General Counsel's discretion
to withdraw a complaint would be subjected to a case-by-case review. American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. FLRA, 785 F.2d 333, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The question is whether the Authority
General Counsel properly exercised his discretion [when he] withdrew the unfair labor practice
complaint. We uphold the General Counsel's exercise of his discretion in this particular case...
(emphasis added)).
257. See Modjeska, The NLRB Litigational Processes: A Response to Chairman Dotson, 23
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 399, 425 (1988) ("[Alpproximately 40,000 or more unfair labor practice
charges are filed annually [and] General Counsel . . . [has an] impressive settlement rate of ap-
proximately 95%.").
258. See, .e.g., Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 HARV. L. REV. 720,
727 (1946) ("[Tlhe Board appears to have absolute discretion . . . [and i]t may settle a contro-
versy either before or after formal action."); see also Note, Labor Law: Right of a Person Filing
an Unfair Labor Practice Charge to a Hearing, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1104, 1107 (1965) ("[TIhe
determination to enter into a settlement should not turn solely upon the interest of the charging
party .... [Tihe decision to settle [a] case and enter a consent order should be within the Board's
discretion . .. [but] the charging party ... [should have] an opportunity to present its reasons for
objecting to the settlement. ... ); Note, NLRB Settlement Agreements-Right of a Charging
Party to an Evidentiary Hearing, 20 Sw. L.J. 901, 902-03 (1966) ("A formal settlement agree-
ment results in the issuance of a final Board order and can be enforced by a court decree .... An
informal settlement agreement is a gentlemen's agreement, and no formal order or court decree
issues . . . . [S]ettlement agreements may give the charging party less than it sought.").
[Vol. 40:653
1991] ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE LABOR ACTS 697
charge. " On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit has also held that "newly dis-
covered or previously unavailable evidence" requires the General Counsel to
grant an evidentiary hearing. 260
The Second Circuit, also, has refused to order evidentiary hearings as a
matter of course. The court has noted that although section 10(b) of the Act
may allow an aggrieved individual to participate in any hearing, "it does not
purport to create an independent entitlement to ... [an evidentiary] hear-
ing."' Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the notion that an ag-
grieved individual has a statutory right to an evidentiary hearing when a con-
troversy involves an issue "outside the scope of the comllaint. '111 2
Among the circuits embracing the principle that a complaining individual
has a statutory right to an evidentiary hearing, the Third and Fifth Circuits'
views are most poignant. The Third Circuit has supported the rule that "peo-
ple who bring charges and succeed in getting complaints to be issued are enti-
tled to [an evidentiary] hearing." 63 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has adopted
the rule that ' "charging party must be afforded ... an evidentiary hearing on
any material issues of disputed fact presented by his objections." 26'
Federal appellate courts also are divided over whether aggrieved union and
nonunion employees have a right to an evidentiary hearing to protest unfavor-
able informal settlement agreements. In recent years, more than 40,000 unfair
labor practice charges were filed annually and nearly all were resolved through
informal settlement agreements. 25 These agreements often provide the com-
plaining individual with a remedy that is less than what was sought in the
complaint. 266 The complainants who have an opportunity to challenge unac-
ceptable informal settlements in evidentiary hearings have an increased likeli-
hood of receiving meaningful and adequate redress for imprudent settlement
agreements. Indeed, some courts of appeals have acknowledged this fact and
order postsettlement evidentiary hearings. Both the Third2 67 and Ninth268 Cir-
259. NLRB v. Brush-Moore Newspaper, Inc., 413 F.2d 809, 811 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1002 (1970).
260. Id.
261. Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795, 798 (2d Cir. 1964).
262. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union 357, 445 F.2d 1015, 1016
(9th Cir. 1971).
263. Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527, 536 (3d Cir. 1966); see also Jacobsen v.
NLRB, 120 F.2d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1941) (holding that the NLRB, itself, must afford the charging
party the opportunity to present additional evidence).
264. Concrete Materials, Inc. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 61, 68 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Note, supra
note 104, at 793-94. According to the commentator, "Since an unfair labor practice may indubita-
bly affect the charging party in a substantial way ... the charging party should be granted a right
to be heard." Id. The commentator also asserts that "r]equiring a hearing to allow a charging
party to place on the record his reasons for objecting to a consent order is unlikely to undermine
the efficient use of Board resources." Id. at 801.
265. Modjeska, supra note 257, at 425 nn.160-63.
266. See supra note 258.
267. See Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 23 v. NLRB, 122 L.R.R.M. 2121,
2126 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that the charging party is entitled to evidentiary hearing to protest a
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cuits, for example, have instructed the General Counsel to conduct evidentiary
hearings to resolve complainants' settlement disputes.
In contrast, other federal appellate courts have refused to order the General
Counsel to conduct settlement-related evidentiary hearings. For example, the
D.C. Circuit has ruled more than once that a victim of an unfair labor prac-
tice has no statutory right to an evidentiary hearing to discuss an informal
settlement agreement. 2"9 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit, in Jackman v. NLRB,270
adopted a similar position. In Jackman, the court held that the General Coun-
sel's acceptance of an informal unfair labor practice settlement-before con-
vening an evidentiary hearing for complainant to discuss and contest the
agreement--did not violate "the intent and purposes underlying the Act." 271
These conflicts that divide the federal courts of appeals continue to thwart
predictable and unbiased administrative enforcement of individual rights
under the NLRA, and the Supreme Court has refused to remedy this inequi-
table situation. In NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union,"'
the Court settled several other NLRA procedural issues but concluded that
"we need not determine whether an evidentiary hearing should have been
ordered. 213
5. Intercircuit Conflict over Whether the General Counsel's Adverse Deci-
sions Are "Final Orders" of the Board Thereby Allowing an Individual to
Obtain Judicial Review
Clearly, 4n aggrieved individual who seeks administrative relief under the
NLRA finds himself in a very unpleasant position if the General Counsel ref-
uses to issue a complaint or withdraws a complaint and, instead, accepts an
informal settlement agreement. An individual would find himself in a some-
what similar dilemma if the General Counsel refused to expand the scope of a
complaint to adequately redress an unfair labor practice injury. Similarly, the
General Counsel's unwillingness to grant an evidentiary hearing to discuss his
settlement agreement), rev'd, 484 U.S. 112 (1987).
268. See International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Lubbers, 681 F.2d 598,
604 (9th Cir. 1982) ("This court held that an evidentiary hearing on the disputed facts was re-
quired. Other circuits similarly have ordered evidentiary hearings to consider objections raised by
charging parties concerning the settlement of their complaints."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1201
(1983); NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union 357, 445 F.2d 1015, 1018
(9th Cir. 1971) (holding that an evidentiary hearing was required to resolve a material settlement
issue).
269. See, e.g., ILGWU, Local 415-475 v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 823, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[lIt
was a proper exercise of discretion to accept the settlement agreement without [affording the
charging party an evidentiary] hearing."); Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 315 F.2d 41, 42
(D.C. Cir. 1963) (holding that the charging party was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing to
protest against an informal settlement agreement).
270. 784 F.2d 759 (6th Cir. 1986).
271. Id. at 763.
272. 484 U.S. 112 (1987).
273. Id. at 133.
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final, adverse actions would very likely exacerbate the victim's injury.
To soften the effects of the rule that a "victim of an unfair labor practice
can obtain neither adjudication nor remedy under the labor statute without
first persuading the Office of the General Counsel, ' 27 4 several federal circuits
have characterized the General Counsel's final, adverse decisions as "final or-
ders of the Board. 12 75 In this way, some appellate courts have granted judicial
review to complainants under the NLRA.
By way of example, the Third,276 Fourth,27 7 and D.C.2 78 Circuits have
granted judicial review of certain "final" General Counsel decisions. These cir-
cuits have found decisions involving informal settlement agreements, the re-
fusal to issue complaints, and the withdrawal of complaints to be final NLRB
orders. The Ninth Circuit has suggested that the General Counsel's decisions
are final orders because Counsel's action "is unreviewable by the Board or [by
federal] courts of appeals. '279 Consequently, these courts have granted judicial
review.
Conversely, other circuits have refused to view the General Counsel's ac-
tions as final Board orders. In fact, the First Circuit has unequivocally stated
274. Turgeon v. FLRA, 677 F.2d 937, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
275. Section 10(f) of the NLRA provides an aggrieved individual the right to appeal "a final
order of the Board." 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1988).
276. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 23 v. NLRB, 122 L.R.R.M.
2121, 2125 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that the General Counsel's decision was a final order because
"there [is] no distinction between disposition of complaints by formal or informal settlements"),
rev'd, 484 U.S. 112 (1987). But see Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527, 534 (3d Cir.
1966) (although finding that the General Counsel's action was final Board action in the instant
case, the court noted that the authority to issue final, orders resides in the Board itself).
277. See Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., Baltimore Metro. Chapter v. Irving, 610
F.2d 1221, 1225 (4th Cir. 1979) (suggesting that the General Counsel's decision not to issue a
complaint is a final order-subject to judicial review-because the Board cannot review the Gen-
eral Counsel's decision), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980). But see George Banta Co. v. NLRB,
626 F.2d 354, 356 (4th Cir. 1980) ("The phrase 'final order of the Board' . . . refers'solely to an
order of the Board either dismissing a complaint in whole or in part or directing a remedy for the
unfair labor practices ...." (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
278. See ILGWU, Local 415-475 v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 823, 826 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("There is
no question ...that the ...charging party ...has been aggrieved by the withdrawal of the
complaint, [and] that the 'order' is final for review purposes. ... ). But see Turgeon v. FLRA,
677 F.2d 937, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1982) In Turgeon, the court found:
Case law under the National Labor Relations Act has established that a decision of
the ... General Counsel declining to issue an unfair labor practice complaint is not a
"final order of the Board" within the meaning of the judicial review provision of the
NLRA .... Such administrative determinations by the General Counsel are not
denominated 'orders' in the Act, and the Act makes no provision for their review."
Id. (quoting Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306, 307 (Ist Cir. 1948)).
279. Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 611 F.2d 1309, 1311 (9th Cir. 1980). But see Inter-
national Bhd. of Boilermakers, Union Local 6 v. NLRB, 872 F.2d 331, 332 (9th Cir. 1989) ("A
federal court has the authority to review only those Board orders which arefinal.... Thus, if the
General Counsel's decision to withdraw his complaint was an act of 'prosecutorial discretion,'
there is no opportunity for judicial review." (emphasis in original)); Foley-Wismer & Becker v.
NLRB, 695 F.2d 424, 427 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that the General Counsel has "final author-
ity" to issue a complaint and that his "decision is not reviewable in any judicial forum").
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that "the phrase 'a final order of the Board' . . . refers solely to an order of the
Board either dismissing a complaint in whole or in part or directing a remedy
for the unfair labor practices. 2 80 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has ruled that
the General Counsel's final adverse informal settlement decisions are not final
orders which would allow an aggrieved employee to obtain judicial review in
federal court.28' Finally, both the Fifth282 and Tenth283 Circuits have ruled
that only the Board-not the General Counsel-has authority to issue a final
order that is reviewable in a federal appellate court.
Like other incompatible federal appellate courts' decisions involving the
NLRA's administrative procedures, these intercircuit and intracircuit conflicts
over the definition of "final orders of the Board" are contributing to the unjus-
tified, disparate, and selective administrative enforcement of individual rights
under the NLRA. It is equally apparent that the Supreme Court can bring an
end to this unjustified discrimination by issuing broader, more intelligible, and
sounder decisions.
Certainly, the Court's decision in NLRB v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Union, Local No. 23284 regarding section 10(f) is neither intelligible
nor sound. There, the Court had an opportunity to clearly state whether the
General Counsel's prehearing determinations were "final orders" and therefore
subject to judicial review. The Court did not seize this opportunity; instead, it
presented a rambling discussion of "prehearing prosecutorial" and "post-hear-
ing adjudicatory" determinations without precisely defining the meaning of
these expressions.2 85 In applying these ill-defined concepts, the Court con-
cluded that the General Counsel's decision to accept an informal settlement
agreement "before a hearing begins" is a "prosecutorial" determination that
bars judicial review.2 86
The Supreme Court's "final orders" decision in United Food & Commercial
Workers is truly unsettling. Among other faults, the opinion fails to ade-
280. Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306, 307 (Ist Cir. 1948).
281. See Jackman v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 759, 762 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Retail, Wholesale &
Dep't Store Union, Local 310 v. NLRB, 745 F.2d 358, 362 (6th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that the
General Counsel's decisions are not final orders because "the Act provides no appeal from his
decision").
282. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees Local 1749 v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 102, 105 (5th
Cir. 1988). The American Fed'n court held:
As is the case with the NLRB, the Authority's General Counsel has a role similar to
that of a prosecutor, and his decision not to prosecute puts an end to the matter and is
not reviewable, irrespective of the merits of the underlying unfair labor practice as-
sertions. The General Counsel of the Authority having made his decision not to issue
an unfair labor practice complaint [has issued] no "final order" of the Authority that
confers jurisdiction on this court.
Id. (emphasis added).
283. See General Drivers, Local 886 v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 492, 494 (10th Cir. 1950) ("The
phrase 'a final order of the Board' . . . refers solely to an order of the [B]oard .....
284. 484 U.S. 112 (1987).
285. Id. at 125-30.
286. Id. at 130.
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quately define the phrase "before a hearing begins." In addition, the decision
does not resolve other controversies. Specifically, federal courts of appeals are
still forced to debate and decide whether the General Counsel's refusal to alter
the scope of a complaint 287 and whether his refusal to grant an evidentiary
hearing 288 are "prosecutorial" or "adjudicatory" determinations. The contro-
versy persists because these determinations may fall under either heading, de-
pending upon when they are made.
For instance, a fair reading of the Court's decision suggests that the Gen-
eral Counsel's decision to modify the scope of a complaint is a "prosecutorial"
act when the modification occurs after the commencement of a hearing but
prior to the actual discussion of the merits of the unfair labor practice com-
plaint.2"9 By necessary implication, the opinion suggests that the decision to
modify would not be a final Board order and, therefore, not reviewable. Alter-
natively, the Board's decision to modify a complaint's scope before the begin-
ning of a hearing may be labelled "adjudicatory," because an impartial read-
ing of the Act strongly suggests that the Board can amend a complaint "any
time prior to the issuance of an order. ' 90 Presumably, this refers to any time
before or after the commencement of a hearing. Thus, it is clear that the
United Food & Commercial Workers decision will perpetuate the ambiguities
and unfair discrimination that exists today with respect to the NLRA's admin-
istrative procedures.
Congress must act to correct the severe and persistent discriminatory effects
that the federal appellate courts' inharmonious procedural rulings have
caused. Congress is obligated to enforce individual rights and ensure that ag-
grieved union or nonunion employees who present meritorious charges receive
timely and predictable redress in administrative proceedings under the NLRA.
Congressional action is necessary because it appears that the Supreme Court
is not ready or is unwilling to resolve these procedural conflicts in an intelligi-
ble and timely fashion.
III. NLRA COMPLAINANTS' DIFFERENTIAL ACCESS TO PRIVATE JUDICIAL
REMEDIES UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
Certainly, many disgruntled union and nonunion employees who file charges
287. See supra notes 228-36 and* accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 257-73 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's distinction between
"prehearing prosecutorial" and "post-hearing adjudicatory" determinations).
290. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988) (emphasis added). Section 160(b) states in pertinent part:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in . . .any . . .unfair labor
practice, the Board .. .shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such
person a complaint stating the charges . . .and containing a notice of hearing . ..
Any such complaint may be amended by ... the Board in its discretion at any time
prior to the issuance of an order based thereon.
Id. (emphasis added).
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 40:653
under the NLRA overcome various procedural barriers and obtain resolutions
of their unfair labor practice complaints on the merits. While the Board's final
orders often include remedial directives that are congruent with the complain-
ants' desires and expectations, sometimes they do not.291
Appreciating that the NLRA allows any person to obtain judicial review of
an adverse, final Board order,292 many unsuccessful nonunion and union em-
ployees seek such review in an appropriate federal court of appeals. Other
unsuccessful parties originate private actions in a federal district court under
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").29 3
The laws of the respective federal circuits control whether an individual re-
ceives a private remedy under the NLRA and under the APA. Once again,
conflicts exist. Some federal circuit courts allow aggrieved individuals to ob-
tain a private remedy under the NLRA, while others do not. And some federal
circuits allow unfair labor practice victims to commence private actions in fed-
eral district courts under the APA to secure a private remedy. A discussion of
these procedural conflicts among the federal circuits and their significant con-
tribution to the disparate and selective enforcement of individual rights under
the NLRA follows below.
A. Intercircuit Conflict over Whether an Aggrieved Individual Is Entitled
to Private Judicial Relief Under the NLRA
The debate over whether the NLRA protects a private right 294 or a public
right is almost as old as the Act itself. Fifty years ago, Professor Jaffe stated
that "a law promoting 'public interests' does not exclude or negate private
right. '299 He added that "there is no clear and shining line between so-called
private rights enforced by individual litigants and so-called public rights en-
291. See, e.g., Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 1404, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (where an unlawfully
discharged employee challenged the NLRB's deferral to an arbitrator's "inadequate" award);
NLRB v. Bin-Dicator Co., 356 F.2d 210, 213. (6th Cir. 1966) (where an unlawfully discharged
employee-who allegedly threatened his supervisors-challenged the Board's denial of reinstate-
ment and backpay).
292. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
293. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988).
294. An individual employee may seek protection for and enforcement of various "individual
rights," "private interests," or "private rights." However, in the context of this discussion, "pri-
vate rights" include-but are not limited to-the right to form, join and attend labor associations
right to solicit members; right to picket; and the right to wear union insignia on clothing. If the
individual employee is discharged for participating in such activities, "private rights" means the
right to be reinstated; the right to receive the actual amount of wages lost during a period of
termination; and the right to occupy the same seniority status after reinstatement. And finally,
where the Board adopts the General Counsel's recommendations and refuses to award reinstate-
ment or backpay, "private rights" means the right to challenge the General Counsel's decision to
perform or not to perform one or all of the following: issuing a complaint; expanding the scope of
a complaint; withdrawing a complaint; accepting an informal settlement agreement and convening
an evidentiary hearing for an individual to protest the General Counsel's adverse decisions.
295. See Jaffe, supra note 20, at 493.
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forced by an agency like the National Labor Relations Board."2 9
The Third Circuit supports Professor Jaffe's position. The Third Circuit has
observed that although "the Board and its Agents act in the public interests[,]
.. [they do] not [act] exclusively so, or in utter disregard of private interests,
be they individual or collective. 29 7 The Ninth Circuit's position is similarly
consistent with Professor Jaffe's argument. The Ninth Circuit has observed
that "ft]he public may incidentally ... [benefit] by peace in our industrial
establishment but private rights are the primary concern of ... [the] General
Counsel['s] [function] under the NLRA."' 9 '
Other federal appellate courts espouse a very different view about an indi-
vidual's right to secure a private judicial remedy under the NLRA. The Fifth
Circuit, for example, has consistently held that "the National Labor Relations
Act [does] not provide a private administrative remedy and ... provide[s] no
private rights to victims of unfair labor practices."'29 Similarly, the First,"'0
Second 30 Fourth,30 2 Seventh, 803 and D.C.30' Circuits embrace the view that
296. See Jaffe, supra note 258, at 720.
297. Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527, 532 (3d Cir. 1966); see also Marine
Eng'rs' Beneficial Ass'n No. 13 v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 546, 547 (3d Cir.) ("That the Board is
charged with the responsibility of representing public interests, [and] not that of private litigants
[is recognized]. But this is one of those situations where general propositions do not decide con-
crete cases."), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953). But see Schaefer v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 558, 560
(3d Cir.) (" 'It is well settled that an individual may not waive, bargain away or compromise any
backpay which might be due him (or her) since it is not a private right which attaches to the
discriminatee, but is, indeed a public right which only the Board or the Regional Director may
settle.'" (quoting the administrative law judge's ruling)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 945 (1983).
298. Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 611 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1980). But see Hales-
ton Drug Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
In Haleston Drug Stores, the court noted:
The courts have uniformly recognized that the National Labor Relations Act did not
confer private rights, but granted only rights in the interest of the public to be pro-
tected by a procedure looking solely to public ends. The proceeding authorized to be
taken by the Board was not for the adjudication or vindication of private rights. The
Board's function as an administrative agency is to give effect to the declared public
policy of Congress. These propositions have been too long and too firmly established
to justify citation of the cases.
Id. (emphasis added).
299. Concrete Materials, Inc. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1971); see also United
States Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 692, 695 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The Board ... acts in the
public interest by enforcing public, not private rights ...."); Gulf States Mfrs., Inc. v. NLRB,
598 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The Board acts in the public interest to enforce public, not
private rights."); W.C. Nabors v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir. 1963) ("The National
Labor Relations Board 'does not exist for the adjudication of private rights'; it acts in a public
capacity to give effect to the declared public policy of the Act to eliminate and prevent obstruc-
tions to interstate commerce .... ), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 911 (1964).
300. See, e.g., Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214, 215 (1st Cir.) ("The remedies of the National
Labor Relations Act have generally been construed as protecting public rather than private rights
..... ), cert. denied. 409 U.S. 1024 (1972).
301. See, e.g., Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795, 800 (2d Cir. 1964)
("[T]he National Labor Relations Act banned unfair labor practices in order to vindicate a public
interest and did not create private rights in the charging party ...."). But see NLRB v. Local
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the NLRA only allows the vindication of a public right. Consequently, private
rights are not recognized. These courts, therefore, would deny a disgruntled
worker an opportunity to obtain private, make-whole relief"'O in federal courts
under the NLRA, regardless of the types of injuries or deprivations alleged in
their unfair labor practice charges.
3 0 6
This private-right-of-action issue has produced conflicting rulings within and
among the federal courts of appeals. Moreover, these inconsistent holdings
contribute to the disparate enforcement of NLRA complainants' rights. Addi-
tionally, the Supreme Court has exacerbated this inequitable situation by re-
fusing to state definitively whether an injured employee who challenges an
adverse Board order is entitled to private judicial relief under the NLRA. In-
deed, the Supreme Court's conflicting dicta in various decisions have kept the
debate alive for half of a century.
As early as 1940, the Supreme Court observed in National Licorice Co. v.
294, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 279 F.2d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1960) ("[T]he reimbursement order vindi-
cates public rights as well as private rights ....").
302. See, e.g., NLRB v. Globe Prods. Corp., 322 F.2d 694, 697 (4th Cir. 1963) ("It is true that
the Board in issuing a back pay order is enforcing a public rather than a private right; but by
making the individual whole for losses suffered from illegal discrimination, the public right is
thereby vindicated."); NLRB v. Threads, Inc., 308 F.2d 1, 8 (4th Cir. 1962) ("[The] right of a
discriminatorily discharged employee to reinstatement and back pay is not a private right subject,
like an ordinary debt, to private adjustment, but a remedy that is provided in the public interest in
order to enforce a public right.").
303. See, e.g., NLRB v. Rose, 347 F.2d 498, 499 (7th Cir. 1965) (holding that the "right of a
discriminatorily discharged employee to reinstatement and back pay is not a private right subject
* . .to private adjustment, but a remedy that is provided in the public interest in order to enforce
a public right" (citing NLRB v. Threads, 308 F.2d 1, 8 (4th Cir. 1962))); Shank v. NLRB, 260
F.2d 444, 446 n.l (7th Cir. 1958) ("This Court has held that although the National Labor Rela-
tions Act created rights against employers . . . such rights were not private rights vested in the
employees, but were public right, and . . . the function of the Board was to . . .[perform] in the
public interest and not in vindication of private rights."); Local Union No. 12, Progressive Mine
Workers, Dist., No. I v. NLRB, 189 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir.) ("In this proceeding we are not dealing
with private rights . . . .[I]t is true that the National Labor Relations Act created rights against
employers [but] such rights were not private rights vested in the employee but were public rights
.. ), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 266 (7th
Cir. 1948) ("[Any benefit which employees ...derived from the enforcement of these public
rights was entirely incidental to the public purpose which enforcement was designed to achieve.
True, under the Act, the Board acts in a public capacity, but not for the adjudication of private
rights .... "), afi'd, American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
304. See, e.g., Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 806 F.2d 269, 272 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) ("The Board's policy against deference to private settlement agreements is grounded
on the well-accepted principle that the Board, having filed an unfair labor practice complaint,
proceeds in vindication of the public interest, not in vindication of private rights." (emphasis in
original)).
305. See Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 1404, 1406-08 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (the court remanded the
case to the Board to explain why the Board deferred to the arbitrator's award which granted
incomplete relief).
306. See generally Note, supra note 104, at 795 ("NLRB procedure continues ... to make a
distinction between 'public' and 'private rights' . . . . [lI]njured parties may not seek private relief
in the federal courts. This strict limitation on redress available to interested parties is unusual.").
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NLRB 301 that "[tihe proceeding authorized to be taken by the Board under
the National Labor Relations Act is not for the adjudication of private
rights."" '8 And, a year later, the Court stated in Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB °9 that "[tihe Act does not create rights for individuals which must be
vindicated according to a rigid scheme of remedies. It entrusts to an expert
agency the maintenance and promotion of industrial peace." ' 0
However, eleven years after the Phelps Dodge decision, the Supreme Court
decided Nathanson v. NLRB.3" In Nathanson, the Supreme Court issued new
dicta which substantially departed from that found in Phelps Dodge. Wanting
to award individual victims a specific remedy without appearing to be aban-
doning the Phelps Dodge dictum, the Nathanson Court stated that "[a] back
pay order is a reparation order designed to vindicate the public policy of the
statute by making the employees whole for losses suffered on account of an
unfair labor practice." ' 2 In 1965, the Court reinforced this viewpoint in Inter-
national Union v. Scofield."'3 The International Union, UAW Court aban-
doned the Phelps Dodge dictum altogether, boldly pronouncing that "the stat-
utory pattern of the Labor Act does not dichotomize 'public' as opposed to
'private' interests[;] . . . the two interblend in the intricate statutory
scheme."'"
Two years after the Scofield decision, however, the Phelps Dodge language
reappeared in Vaca v. Sipes."'8 In Vaca, the Supreme Court observed that
"[t]he public interest in effectuating the policies of the federal labor laws, not
the wrong done the individual employee, is always the Board's principal con-
cern in fashioning unfair labor practice remedies." 316 This was the Court's
general view for eight years until it decided NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 3 "
There, the Supreme Court reaffirmed what was said in Scofield when it re-
fused "to characterize the enforcement of the laws against unfair labor prac-
tices either as a wholly public or [a] wholly private matter." 18
Undeniably, the Supreme Court must stop issuing such conflicting dicta. It
is imperative that the Court conclusively and authoritatively decide whether
the NLRA protects an injured employee's right to receive private, judicial re-
307. 309 U.S. 350 (1940).
308. Id. at 362 (dictum); see also Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309
U.S. 261, 266 (1940) ("The vindication of the desired freedom of employees is ... confided by the
Act, by reason of the recognized public interest, to the public agency the Act creates." (dictum)).
309. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
310. Id. at 194 (dictum).
311. 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
312. Id. at 27 (dictum) (emphasis added); see also NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306
U.S. 240, 258 (1939) ("The purpose of the Act is to promote peaceful settlements of disputes by
providing legal remedies for the invasion of the employees' rights." (dictum)).
313. 382 U.S. 205 (1965).
314. Id. at 220 (dictum).
315. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
316. Id. at 182 n.8 (dictum).
317. 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
318. Id. at 156 n.22 (dictum).
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lief after exhausting NLRA's administrative remedies. This type of irrefutable
precedent is necessary to cure the discriminatory enforcement of private rights
in which the federal circuits are now engaging. Abrogating the conflict among
the federal circuits regarding the enforcement of private rights is necessary
because neither the NLRA's language nor its implementing legislation con-
template such discriminatory outcomes among individuals who complain about
the NLRB's final adverse orders.
B. Intercircuit Conflict over Whether an Aggrieved Individual Is Entitled
to Private Judicial Relief Under the Administrative Procedure Act
In relevant part, the Administrative Procedure Act states that "[a] person
suffering [a] legal wrong because of agency action ... or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial re-
view.""9 The APA, however, only allows an aggrieved individual to contest a
final agency action if there is no other adequate court relief available.320 Also,
judicial review is not permitted under the APA if a "relevant statute" pre-
cludes it"2' or if "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."
3 22
Some employees who are adversely affected by the NLRB's final orders seek
individual relief in federal appellate courts under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. A few are successful; many are not. A careful examination of judi-
cial rulings suggests that haphazardly reached conclusions-rather than
sound, reasoned decisionmaking-explain much of the disparate enforcement
of NLRA victims' rights under the APA. Furthermore, these decisions con-
tinue to generate inconsistent results within and among the federal courts of
appeals.
For example, the Third Circuit has noted that the General Counsel is not
required to issue a complaint. 2 3 And, if an unfair labor practice complaint is
issued to protect the rights of an aggrieved individual, the Board may resolve
the controversy as it wishes. More important, this tribunal has further held
that an individual may challenge a final action of the NLRB under the APA,
"if after [a] hearing he does not like the result. 3t 24
319. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
320. Id. § 704 ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.").
321. Id. § 701(a)(1).
322. Id. § 701(a)(2).
323. See Marine Eng'rs' Beneficial Ass'n No. 13 v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 546, 547 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953).
324. Id.; see also Piasecki Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 575, 588-89 (3d Cir. 1960) ("It
is true as was said .. .in Marine Engineers ... : 'Our best judgment is that the charging party
after complaint is issued, does have some standing [and] that he is entitled to have a chance to be
heard as the Administrative Procedure Act requires.' "), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961). But
see Mobilab Union, Inc. v. Johansen, 600 F. Supp. 826, 828 (D.N.J. 1985) ("The Administrative
Procedure Act ... adds nothing to plaintiff's argument . . . .Courts that have considered the
General Counsel's discretion, in light of the APA, have all concluded that § 701(a) is applicable,
and that review under the APA is not available.").
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Additionally, a fairly recent ruling from the D.C. Circuit strongly suggests
that an aggrieved individual can challenge a final adverse order from the
NLRB under the APA in that circuit. In International Association of Bridge
Workers, Local No. 111 v. NLRB, 23 the court permitted judicial review. The
court held that the NLRB violated the APA when, in light of prior case law, it
failed to explain its decision to award lost wages to workers not affiliated with
Local 111 P26
On the other hand, other federal appellate courts refuse to allow unfair la-
bor practice victims to challenge the Board's final orders under the APA. For
instance, the Second,3 27 Fifth,328 and Sixth3 29 Circuits have ruled that the
NLRB's decisions may not be reviewed under the APA.
This conflict over whether an NLRA complainant has a right to private
judicial relief under the APA should not exist. As recently as 1987, the Su-
preme Court refused to seize upon a good opportunity to resolve the contro-
versy. In NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23,330
the Court restricted a considerable amount of its deliberation to an extremely
narrow issue: whether the General Counsel's "prosecutorial 331 determination
is subject to judicial review under the APA.3 32 In United Food & Commercial
Workers Union, the Court decided that such review was not required, because
permitting judicial review of the General Counsel's settlement determination
325. 792 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
326. Id. at 248. The court stated:
What we hold, however, is not that the Board has no authority, but that it violated 5
U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A) by failing to provide the union with an explanation of the
apparent inconsistency between its decision to exercise the authority in the present
case and its decisions to refrain from exercising the authority in earlier cases.
Id.
327. See, e.g., New York Racing Ass'n v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 46, 54-55 (2d Cir.) (holding that
the district court had no jurisdiction to review the NLRB's decision pursuant to the APA), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 914 (1983); Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795, 800-01
(2d Cir. 1964) (holding that the APA does not confer any private rights upon a charging party).
328. See, e.g., Concrete Materials of Georgia, Inc. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 61, 68 n.9 (5th Cir.
1971) (finding no private right of action for a charging party who files suit under the APA).
329. See, e.g., Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, Local 310 v. NLRB, 745 F.2d 358, 363
(6th Cir. 1984) ("Equally without merit is . . . appellant['s assertion] that the Administrative
Procedure Act confers jurisdiction on the District Court to review the Board's refusal to assert
jurisdiction over employers in the horse racing business.").
330. 484 U.S. 112 (1987).
331. See supra notes 284-88 and accompanying text.
332. United Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. at 130-31; see also Associated Builders &
Contractors, Inc. v. Irving, 610 F.2d 1221, 1226-27 (4th Cir. 1979) (concluding that the court is
without authority under the APA to review the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980); Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214, 215 (1st Cir.) ("[lit must be
concluded that judicial abstention has been fully acquiesced in by Congress. Indeed, in view of the
imposing authority in favor of non-reviewability, this situation seems paradigmatic of one which is
'committed to agency discretion' under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act .... "),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972); Balanyi v. Local 1031, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 374 F.2d
723, 726 (7th Cir. 1967) ("We also hold that the Administrative Procedure Act does not vest a
district court with jurisdiction over the refusal of the General Counsel to issue a complaint.").
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under the APA would conflict with the NLRA's spirit and text. 333
Although correctly recognizing that "[a]ppeals from final orders .. .of the
Board are expressly directed to the courts of appeals," 33' the United Food &
Commercial Workers Union Court needlessly complicated its decision by con-
cluding that "Congress intended the right of judicial review on the merits of
an unfair labor practice charge to be had only through the express provisions
of the NLRA."33 5 Very conceivably, this dictum will exacerbate the contro-
versy over whether NLRA complainants have a right to private relief under
the APA. Some circuit courts are likely to cite this language and deny private
judicial relief. Others will probably ignore the dictum and grant individual
relief because neither the NLRA's legislative history336 nor its text supports
the Court's dictum. More important, the APA's text is explicit: federal courts
may review the final actions of an agency like the NLRB if a "relevant stat-
ute," such as the NLRA, does not preclude such review. 3 7
Again, it is worth reiterating that until Congress or the Supreme Court ad-
dresses such inconsistent rulings, the disparate enforcement of NLRA com-
plainants' individual rights in the federal courts of appeals will continue. As
several labor law scholars have observed:
The principles which guide appellate courts in reviewing questions of law
and fact are plainly of a very general nature leaving much to the discretion
333. United Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. at 131 ("To allow judicial review through
the APA of the General Counsel's settlement determinations would run directly counter to the
structure of the NLRA.").
334. id.
335. Id. at 133.
336. To help justify its ruling in United Food & Commercial Workers Union, the Court refer-
enced the remarks of Senator Morse-a strong proponent of the NLRA and of individual
rights-and stated that "[olur conclusion is bolstered by the observation that nowhere in the
legislative history of the [NLRA, as amended by the] LMRA is the availability of APA review
adverted to, despite reference to the APA in other contexts." Id. at 131 n.28. But a careful read-
ing of the LMRA's legislative history strongly suggests that the Act does not bar a review of the
Board's or of the General Counsel's deliberations under the APA. See 93 CoNG. REc. 6593, 6613
(1947), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA, supra note II, at 1526, 1559-60.
Senator Morse commented:
Mr. President, it is a tremendous power that has been given to the General Coun-
sel ....
* . . I simply shall never vote to vest in any single individual any such sweeping
power over the handling of labor relation cases in this country....
The [Administrative] Procedure Act prescribes an adequate separation of functions
for all agencies like the Board, and the Board complies with it....
* . . [W]hen we pass[ed the NLRA,] . .. I [did] not know whether [the Board
became] an administrative agency, a court, or what .... but it certainly stands as
bird of its own color so far as the Administrative Procedure Act is concerned .... I
see no reason why an exception should be made to the Administrative Procedure Act
in this connection. I see no reason why the rules and regulations laid down in the
Seventy-ninth Congress, when we passed the Administrative Procedure Act, should
not likewise apply to the National Labor Relations Board.
Id.
337. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
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of the judges involved. . . . [C]ourts will presumably be influenced to some
degree by such . . . factors as the respect they hold for the capabilities and
impartiality of the Board and the cogency and comprehensiveness of the
arguments made by that agency .... These factors are unavoidably subjec-
tive and may therefore cause considerable variation from one court to an-
other concerning the nature of review. 3 8
Therefore, it is imperative that Congress act to minimize such variations, for
they are seriously undermining timely and predictable administrative and judi-
cial enforcement of individuals' rights under the NLRA.
IV. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 301
OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947
Arguably, an aggrieved individual union or nonunion employee can avoid
the many inconsistent procedural and substantive rulings under the NLRA by
filing a private cause of action under section 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act ("LMRA"). 3 9 Theoretically, an employee who presents a meri-
torious claim has a greater probability of receiving timely, predictable, and
effective relief under the LMRA, an accomplishment presently impossible
under the NLRA.
A careful examination of hundreds of relevant.LMRA decisions spanning a
period of forty-three years 40 unfortunately reveals a disturbing development:
Individual LMRA complainants must overcome many of the same procedural
barriers confronting NLRA complainants. More important, federal courts of
appeals are as seriously divided over procedural and substantive issues under
the LMRA as they are over similar issues originating under the NLRA. This
Section will briefly review the LMRA's enforcement provisions and then ex-
amine issues and intercircuit conflicts that contribute to the disparate enforce-
ment of individual rights under the LMRA.
A. Legislative Intent and an Overview of the LMRA's Enforcement
Provisions
It is fairly clear that the LMRA was established to weaken the perceived
unwarranted economic power of labor unions rather than to protect individual
employees' interests.3"' To accomplish this end, Congress permitted disgrun-
338. BOK, supra note 28, at I 11.
339. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988); see infra notes 342-43 (providing the text of § 301). But see infra
notes 340-457 and accompanying text (discussing procedural and substantive barriers to filing
under the LMRA).
340. See the discussion in Part IVB(I)-(3); see also infra note 458 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text; see also Herman, Wrongful Discharge
Actions After Lueck and Metropolitan Life Insurance: The Erosion of Individual Rights and
Collective Strength?, 9 INDUs. REL. L.J. 596, 604 n.28 (1987) ("it appears that Congress ...
believed . . . it was difficult for employers to sue unions as entities in state courts to enforce
contracts. Thus, the purpose of § 301 seemed to be to provide recourse to the federal courts to
enforce contracts as a vehicle for achieving labor peace.").
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tied employers to initiate private causes of actions under section 301(a) of the
LMRA3 42 to enforce collective bargaining agreements. To satisfy labor, Con-
gress also included a provision under section 301(b) giving labor organizations
the right to sue employers in district courts for breach of contract. 8 '
The text of section 301, however, clearly does not provide an aggrieved
union or nonunion employee the right to commence a private cause of action
against either a union or an employer. But a careful reading of legislative
history reveals that LMRA supporters wanted an aggrieved worker to have
that right ." Moreover, "[j]urisprudential developments have recognized that
the language of [s]ection 301 was not intended to prevent the individual em-
ployee from bringing a federal court action for breach of a collective bargain-
ing agreement." ' ' 5 Correspondingly, single victims of unfair labor practices
may sue offending employers and/or union officials in federal district courts
under the LMRA.
342. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988). Section 301(a) of the LMRA states in pertinent part: "Suits
for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees..
.or between any such labor organization, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties. ... Id.
343. Id. § 185(b). Section 301(b) of the LMRA provides in pertinent part: "Any [labor organi-
zation which represents employees] may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employ-
ees whom it represents in the courts of the United States." Id.
344. 93 CONG. REC. 3521, 3535 (1947), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA,
supra note 12, at 601, 616 (The bill guarantees to the individual worker "[t]he right to ...file
charges against his employer, the union, or the union officers without suffering any penalty or
discrimination . (statement of Rep. Hartley)); see also 93 CONG. REC. 4549, 4558 (1947),
reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA, supra note 11, at 1182, 1199 ("[lt seems to
me [that] individual employees in the free exercise of their rights guaranteed by this act are just
as much entitled to protection from [the coercive] activities of unions as they are from the same
kind of coercive activities on the part of employers." (statement of Senator Ball)).
345. Comment, Section 301 Employee Remedies and the Duty of Fair Representation: The
Growing Need for Judicial Action to Protect Individual Employee Rights, II S.U.L. REV. 87, 88
(1985); see also Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 198-200 (1962) (observing that §
301 is designed to vindicate individual and "uniquely personal" employee rights arising from sepa-
rate employment contracts "between the employer and each employee"); Simpson & Berwick,
supra note 15, at 1180-81. These commentators noted:
Section 301(a) of the Act provided that: "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization ..." could be filed in federal court regardless of
the amount in controversy or the parties citizenship. Yet because of the ambiguity in
the italicized phrase, which could modify either "suits" or "contracts," section 301(a)
offered an uncertain basis for federal jurisdiction over disputes between individual
employees and an employer.
In Smith v. Evening News Association, the Court finally announced that the lan-
guage "between an employer and a labor organization" in section 301(a) modifies
"contracts" thus concluding the question of section 301 jurisdiction over individual
claims.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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B. Intercircuit Conflicts Involving Procedural Matters Under Section 301
1. Intercircuit Conflicts Respecting the Appropriate Statute of Limitations
and Filing and Service Requirements
Section 301 of the LMRA has no statute of limitations clause. And for
more than forty years, lower federal courts and the Supreme Court have given
very conflicting instructions about when an action must commence before it is
barred under section 301. These courts also have issued conflicting instruction
about specific filing and service of process requirements under section 301. In
1966, the Supreme Court tried to provide guidance in International Union,
UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.346 In Hoosier Cardinal, the Court refused to
endorse a judicially created uniform period of limitations. 47 The Court held
that federal courts must select the most closely analogous state statute of limi-
tations in suits involving the enforcement of collective bargaining contracts.""6
The Court's instructions in Hoosier Cardinal failed to provide adequate
guidance for lower courts. Consequently, fifteen years after its decision, the
Court was confronted with resolving a statute of limitations controversy propa-
gated by its Hoosier Cardinal decision. In United Parcel Service, Inc. v.
Mitchell,3" the Court was asked to decide whether lower courts must borrow
the most closely analogous state statute involving actions to vacate arbitration
awards or the most closely analogous state statute governing breach of con-
tract actions. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist ruled that
lower courts must choose a state statute of limitations that governs actions to
346. 383 U.S. 696 (1966). In Hoosier Cardinal, a union commenced an action under § 301 to
force an employer to honor the terms of the collective bargaining contract. Id. at 699.
347. Id. at 702-03.
348. Id. at 705. Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart observed:
That Congress did not provide a uniform limitations provision for § 301 suits is not
an argument for judicially creating one, unless we ignore the context of this legislative
omission. It is clear that Congress gave attention to limitations problems in the Labor
Management Relations Act .... [I]t cannot be fairly inferred that when Congress
left § 301 without a uniform time limitation, it did so in the expectation that the
courts would invent one .[.. [T]he timeliness of a § 301 suit ... is to be determined,
as a matter of federal law, by reference to the appropriate state statute of limitations.
Id. at 703-05.
349. 451 U.S. 56 (1981). In Mitchell, a union employee complained about an allegedly dis-
criminatory discharge; however, he received an adverse decision after exhausting all the prerequi-
site contractual remedies-internal grievance and arbitration procedures-outlined in the collec-
tive bargaining contract. Id. at 58. Nearly a year and a half after the arbitration decision, Mr.
Mitchell filed a § 301 "hybrid" suit in district court, alleging that the union breached its duty of
fair representation and UPS discharged him for impermissible reasons. Id. at 58-59. "Both UPS
and the union moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action was barred by New
York's 90-day statute of limitations for actions to vacate arbitration awards." Id. at 59 (emphasis
added). The district court granted the motion. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the district
court "should have applied New York's 6-year limitations period for actions alleging breach of
contract." Id. (emphasis added). Recognizing a severe conflict among the circuits over this proce-
dural issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 60 & n.l.
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vacate arbitration awards.3 5 0
Significantly, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations ("AFL-CIO") filed an amicus curiae brief urging the Mitchell
Court to abandon any version of a "state-borrowing" rule.351 Additionally, the
AFL-CIO implored the Court to adopt the more uniform and analogous fed-
eral six-month statute of limitations found in section 10(b) of the NLRA. 5 2
The Court refused because the parties to the suit did not raise this issue. 3
Furthermore, the Court stressed that certiorari was granted only "to consider
which state limitations period should be borrowed, not whether such borrowing
was appropriate. 3 64
The Mitchell Court's failure to consider the statute of limitations issue ad-
vanced in the AFL-CIO's amicus brief was unwarranted. 355 This decision also
was, in effect, a waste of precious judicial resources because just two years
later, in Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,356 the Su-
preme Court decided whether the NLRA's section 10(b) six-month statute of
350. Id. at 64.
351. Id. at 60 n.2.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. (emphasis in original).
355. The Court's action was unwarranted for two reasons. First, although the Mitchell decision
held that a worker's action against an employer was governed by an analogous state statute of
limitations for vacating an arbitration award, rather than by an analogous state statute for actions
involving breach of contract, the decision did not go far enough. Mitchell failed to give any direc-
tion to disgruntled employees respecting the appropriate state statute of limitations to apply for
suits against both a union and an employer. Secondly, the Court maintained that it could not
seriously consider the AFL-CIO's suggestion because the parties did not raise the issue. Id. This,
however, is an excuse for wasting judicial resources, because the Supreme Court has a long tradi-
tion of considering and of deciding controversial questions of law when such questions were not
advanced by the parties to a lawsuit. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702,
2725 (1989) ("the question that prompted this Court, on its own initiative, to set Patterson for
reargument-was whether the statute created a cause of action ...." (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added)); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 619 (1988) ("The Court
today asks the parties to rebrief and reargue this case, focusing not on some neglected subtlety of
the issues presented for review or on any overlooked jurisdictional detail, but on a question not
presented ...." (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)); see also Casto, The Erie Doctrine
and the Structure of Constitutional Revolutions, 62 TUL. L. REV. 907, 908-09 (1988) ("Neither
the petitioner nor the respondent in Erie addressed Swift's validity until the issue was forced upon
them by Justice Brandeis during oral argument .... [T]he Court forced the issue and devoted
most of the oral argument to a general discussion of Swift.").
356. 462 U.S. 151 (1983). Mr. Del Costello was a union member and was allegedly discrimina-
torily discharged in violation of the collective bargaining contract. After exhausting all contractual
grievance procedures, the complainant failed to get reinstated. He commenced a § 301 suit in the
District of Maryland against the employer and the union. Following the Court's instructions in
Mitchell, both the district court and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected Mr. Del
Costello's argument that Maryland's three-year statute for actions on contracts applied. Accepting
the union's and the employer's arguments, the lower courts ruled that the § 301 "suit was barred
by Maryland's 30-day statute of limitations for actions to vacate arbitration awards." In fact, the
30-day statute of limitations applied to claims against both union and employer. Id. at 156.
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limitations provision governed section 301 "hybrid" suits. 5 ' The Del Costello
decision effectively overruled Mitchell's statute of limitations ruling because
the Del Costello Court proscribed the borrowing of any analogous state stat-
ute of limitations for "hybrid" suits initiated under section 301 of the
LMRA.350
As of this writing, Del Costello governs when a section 301 "hybrid" suit
should commence before it is barred altogether. Whether the Court will mod-
ify, overturn, or distinguish Del Costello in later rulings remains unclear.
There is evidence, however, that the Court will revisit this issue in the near
future.
The first grain of evidence comes from some post-Del Costello cases. Writ-
ing for the majority in Del Costello, Justice Brennan stated "that our holding
today should not be taken as a departure from prior practice in borrowing
limitations periods for federal causes of action .... We do not mean to sug-
gest that federal courts should eschew use of state limitations periods any-
time state law fails to provide a perfect analogy." 59 Unfortunately, this very
dictum is generating another unsettling controversy among the lower federal
courts. In some post-Del Costello cases, federal appellate courts are citing Jus-
tice Brennan's dicta. These courts have borrowed the most closely analogous
state statute of limitations and have refused to apply section 10(b) in employ-
ees' "nonhybrid" causes of actions against employers.300 Conceivably, however,
other courts will refuse to follow this path.
Secondly, the wisdom of applying section 10(b) to LMRA causes of actions
is likely to be reargued before the Court. Supreme Court review is likely be-
cause a serious split already exists among and within the federal circuits over
whether an injured section 301 employee must file a complaint and complete
the service of process within a six-month period. The Ninth3 6' and Eleventh" 2
357. A § 301 "hybrid suit" arises when an employee sues his employer and union in one suit.
See Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 164-65. The cause of action against the employer is premised upon
§ 301, while the cause of action against the union is based on the union's breach of its duty of fair
representation. Id.
358. Id. at 169. The Court held:
In this case ... we have available a federal statute of limitations actually designed to
accommodate a balance of interests very similar to that at stake here-a statute that
is , . . an analogy to the present lawsuit more apt than any of the suggested state-law
parallels. We refer to § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, which establishes
a 6-month period for making charges of unfair labor practices to the NLRB.
Id.; see also Brock v. Republic Airlines, 776 F.2d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 1985) ("In Del Costello, the
Court refused to borrow an analogous state statute because federal policies were at stake and
because federal law provided an even more analogous limitations period.").
359. Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 171 (emphasis added).
360. See Note, Labor Law-Six-Month Limitation Period for Employee Hybrid Suits Enforc-
ing Arbitration Awards-Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 761 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1985), 59 TEMP. L.Q.
1315, 1326-30 nn.88-95 (1986).
361. See, e.g., Gallon v. Levin Metals Corp., 779 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1986) ("While the
Court in Del Costello did not specifically address the timing of service in hybrid suits, we note
that section 10(b) expressly requires both filing and service within a six-month period." (emphasis
in original)), vacated, 481 U.S. 1009, on remand, 819 F.2d 943 (1987); Hoffman v. United Mar-
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Circuits have held that section 301 "hybrid" claims must be filed and service
of process must occur within six months of an alleged unfair labor practice.
Conversely, some courts in the Third,8 s Sixth,864 and Eighths" Circuits only
require that a claim be filed within six months after the accrual of the cause of
action. Even mote disquieting, other courts in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits
require both filing and service within a six month period. 66
In West v. Conrail,8 67 the Supreme Court concluded that the "hybrid" fil-
ing-and-service controversy was resolved.866 The West Court allegedly settled
this conflict between a Third Circuit decision involving the Railway Labor Act
and a Sixth Circuit holding concerning the LMRA.869 The West decision,
kets, Inc., 117 L.R.R.M. 3229, 3230 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (finding "that the requirement of both
filing and service within six months applies to actions by employees against their employers and
unions" (emphasis in original)).
362. See, e.g., Williams v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 756 F.2d 818, 820 (1th Cir. 1985) (requir-
ing both filing and service within the six-month period); Dunlap v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 755
F.2d 1543, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985) (same); Simon v. Kroger Co., 743 F.2d 1544, 1546 (11th Cir.
1984) (holding "that the intent, spirit and plain language of section 10(b) require that a com-
plaint be both filed and served within the six-month limitations period"), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1075 (1985); Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 742 F.2d 612, 613 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Section
10(b) expressly requires both filing and service within a six months period." (emphasis in
original)).
363. See, e.g., Lewis v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 711, 826 F.2d 1310,
1317 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that "section 10(b) statute of limitations does not bar an action as
long as the complaint was filed within the limitations period"). But see Waldron v. Motor Coils
Mfg. Co., 606 F. Supp. 658, 659 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that both the filing and service of a
complaint must occur within a six-month period), affd, 791 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1013 (1987).
364. See, e.g.. Macon v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 779 F.2d 1166, 1172 (6th Cir. 1985)
(holding that § 10(b) only requires the filing of a complaint within a six-month period), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987); Williams v. E.I. duPont de Nemours Co., 581 F. Supp. 791, 793
(M.D. Tenn. 1983) (holding that the filing of the complaint within six months was sufficient and
that service of process may occur within 120 days after filing); La Tondress v. Local No. 7, IBT,
102 F.R.D. 295, 297 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (holding that hybrid § 301 complaints "must be filed
within six months after accrual of the cause of action [and] that defendants be served within 120
days of the filing of the complaint").
365. See, e.g., Thomsen v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., Local 710, 792 F.2d 115, 117 (8th Cir.
1986) (holding that § 10(b) requires only the filing of a claim within a six-month period, but not
both filing and service of process), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987); Elisalde v. International
Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. Lodge No. 142, 792 F.2d 114, 115 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Although the
-Supreme Court . . . borrowed section 10(b)'s six-month statute of limitations for hybrid section
301/fair representation actions, the limitations period is tolled by the filing of the complaint."),
cert denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987).
366. See, e.g.. NLRB v. Laborers' Int'l Union Local 262, 529 F.2d 778, 782 (8th Cir. 1976)
("The statute is clear in providing that a charge must not only be filed, it must also be served
within the prescribed six month period.").
367. 481 U.S. 35 (1987).
368. Id. at 38-39. The Supreme Court held that the six-month statute of limitations period
applied to the filing of a complaint, while Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3 and 4 governed the
service of process. Id.
369. Id. at 38 n.2. The Court noted:
Although Del Costello and the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Macon v. ITT Continen-
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however, is very troubling because it actually controls "hybrid" actions
originating under the Railway Labor Act.870 Although the Court asserted in
dicta that there is "no reason to distinguish the Labor Management Relations
Act from the Railway Labor Act" for determining whether both filing and
service must occur within six months,8 7 1 evidence strongly suggests other-
wise. 7 2 Therefore, until the Court or Congress addresses this particular filing-
and-service conflict under the LMRA, disparate outcomes will continue among
individual complainants who seek redress in federal district and appellate
courts.
2. Intercircuit Conflicts Involving Intraunion Exhaustion Requirements af-
ter Clayton v. UAW
In Clayton v. International Union, UA W,178 the Supreme Court attempted
to resolve several conflicting rulings involving the exhaustion of intraunion
remedies under the LMRA.374 Moreover, the Court addressed numerous con-
cerns of labor law commentators who severely questioned the wisdom of re-
quiring unsophisticated union and nonunion employees to exhaust union griev-
tal Baking Co., 779 F.2d 1166 (1985) ... involved a hybrid action brought under §
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ... rather than a hybrid action brought
under the Railway Labor Act .... [wie find no reason to distinguish the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act from the Railway Labor Act ...for the limited purpose of
determining whether service [and filing] must be effected within the limitations
period.
Id.
370. Id. at 36.
371. Id. at 38 n.2.
372. For example, consider the situation where a nonunion railway employee commences a
cause of action against both the employer and the union. If the suit alleges a breach of duty of
fair representation and challenges an allegedly discriminatory agency-shop agreement, there
would be no statute of limitations conflict because under the Railway Labor Act, both issues can
be raised in the same suit. However, a nonunion, nonrailway employee who resides in Texas and
who raises the same issues must be concerned with two statutes-Texas' "right-to-work" statute
that governs discriminatory agency-shop agreements and the Labor-Management Relations Act
that governs the breach of duty of fair representation. Clearly, Texas' "right-to-work" laws and
the LMRA are very different and the application of § 10(b) would be inappropriate, although the
Labor-Management Relations Act controls the contractual agreement between the union and the
employer. Cf. Wright, Clipping the Political Wings of Labor Unions: An Examination of Ex-
isting Law and Proposals for Change, 5 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y I, 17-26 & nn.128-29 (1982).
According to Wright:
The Taft-Hartley Act clearly outlawed the closed shop, but the maximum degree of
union security permitted by the Labor Management Relations Act can properly be
classified as a modified agency shop. Unlike the Railway Labor Act, the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act provides that its authorization of union security agreements
shall not apply in states which have "right-to-work" laws outlawing such agreements.
Id. at 21 (emphasis in original).
373. 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
374. Id. at 682; see also Note, Exhaustion of Intraunion Remedies Doctrine: The Lower Fed-
eral Courts' Application of Clayton v. UAW, 8 J. CORP. L. 389, 392-94 (1983).
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ance procedures before commencing a section 301 suit in federal court.37 5
Writing for the Clayton majority, Justice Brennan stated that lower federal
courts must consider at least three factors when deciding whether an aggrieved
individual should exhaust internal union procedures . 6 The three factors are
the following:
(1) whether union officials are so hostile to the employee that he could not
hope to obtain a fair hearing on his claim; (2) . . . whether the internal
union appeals procedures would be inadequate either to reactivate the em-
ployee's grievance or to award him the full relief he seeks under § 301; and
(3) . . . . whether exhaustion of internal procedures would unreasonably
delay the employee's opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing on the merits
of his claim. 377
The majority further ruled that "[i]f any of these factors are found to exist,
the court may properly excuse the employee's failure to exhaust. 3 17 8
It is clear that the Clayton decision has not remedied the conflict among
and within the federal circuits over the intraunion exhaustion issue. Indeed,
the decision has exacerbated the problem. The primary reason for this unwar-
ranted development is the Supreme Court's decision to shift the burden of
375. Clayton, 451 U.S. at 693-96; see Fox & Sonenthal, Section 301 and Exhaustion of Intra-
Union Appeals, a Misbegotten Marriage, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1026-29, 1034 (1980). Fox and
Sonenthal made the following remarks:
A clear picture of what an employee must do to exhaust intra-union remedies has yet
to emerge from section 301 cases .... As a result, employees have little idea how far,
or how long, they must pursue union appeals ... Because exhaustion of intra-union
remedies rarely serves any useful purpose . .. the courts should presume that ex-
haustion of such remedies is futile .... [Moreover, tihe procedural rules . . . are
chaotic ... [and] plaintiffs have little idea of what is necessary to preserve their cause
of action and are often caught totally off guard .... Under these circumstance, it is
no wonder that many section 301 plaintiffs succumb to motions for summary judg-
ment .... [Simply expressed, t]he intra-union exhaustion requirement has been im-
ported into section 301 litigation without any serious examination of its appropriate-
ness ....
Id. (emphasis added); see also Note, The Exhaustion of Intra-Union Procedures in Duty of Fair
Representation Cases, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 520, 530 (1979) ("[T]he Supreme Court's treatment
of intra-union exhaustion in section 8(b)(I)(A) disciplinary action should arguably apply to duty
of fair representation cases, whether initiated under [s]ection 301 or on judicial review under
section 8(b)(I)(A)."); Simpson & Berwick, supra note 15, at 1215, 1220. According to these
commentators:
Few couits have ever questioned directly the appropriateness of requiring intraunion
exhaustion in the section 301-fair representation context .... [llntraunion grievance
procedures are poorly adapted to afford relief even from obvious injustices to individ-
ual employees. The chief difficulty is that most collective grievance procedures utilize
relatively short limitations periods .... Even if an employee knows that intraunion
appeals are available, which is not always the case, the technical procedural require-
ments frequently are quite strict.
Id. (emphasis added).
376. Clayton, 451 U.S. at 689.
377. Id. (emphasis added).
378. Id.
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defining major concepts and phrases articulated in Clayton to the courts of
appeals. The Supreme Court left undefined such key terms as "hostility," "fair
hearing," "reactivation of grievance procedures," "complete or full relief," and
"unreasonable delay." The inappropriateness and ineffectiveness of leaving
such terms undefined has become evident in light of the federal appellate
courts' subsequent inability or unwillingness to supply the necessary defini-
tions. It is common for these courts to only incorporate Clayton's key words
and phrases into their holdings while ruling for or against intraunion exhaus-
tion, rather than define these terms.
For example, without defining "reactivation," the Sixth Circuit has held
that a union employee must exhaust internal union remedies, although the em-
ployee had no knowledge of a reactivation of the grievance agreement between
the union and the employer. 79 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has refused to
require intraunion exhaustion where a union's constitution does not provide for
a procedure to reactivate a section 301 grievance.380
A similar split involving another key phrase-"full relief "-exists between
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. In Ghebreselassie v. Coleman Security Ser-
vice,38 the Ninth Circuit held that intraunion exhaustion was not required
where an aggrieved union employee could not be fully recompensed for the
damages he had suffered.38 2 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit held, in Monroe v.
International Union, UAW, 3 that intraunion exhaustion is required even if an
aggrieved individual has no knowledge respecting whether he can receive full
relief.384
Also, the Supreme Court's failure to define the key concepts outlined in
Clayton's intraunion exhaustion test has contributed to very inconsistent, as
well as contradictory, intraunion exhaustion decisions within the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits. For example, the Seventh Circuit has held that intraunion ex-
haustion is required unless the aggrieved employee establishes that hostility
exists at every stage of the grievance process.3 85 However, in Lewis v. Local
379. See Monroe v. International Union, UAW, 723 F.2d 22, 25-26 (6th Cir. 1983).
380. See, e.g.. Hammons v. Adams, 783 F.2d 597, 602 (5th Cir. 1986). In Hammons, the court
stated:
If ... the union constitution does not provide a procedure whereby [one's] grievance
concerning breach of a local union's duty of fair representation may be heard and
adequately remedied, there is nothing to exhaust. Absent an internal union remedy,
the employee may proceed to file suit after pursuing his contractual remedies as far as
possible.
Id.
381. 829 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
382. Id. at 896.
383. 723 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1983).
384. Id. at 25-26.
385. See Sosbe v. Delco Elecs. Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 830 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1987)
("[T]o establish the degree of hostility that would excuse a union member from the ordinary duty
to exhaust internal remedies, the member must establish futility at every step of the relevant
grievance procedure.").
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Union No. 100 of Laborers' International Union,886 this same court inferred
that the grievance proceedings were hostile and decided that the employee did
not have to exhaust internal union remedies.387
The Seventh Circuit has been inconsistent in another significant way. On
one occasion in 1982, this court presumed that an aggrieved worker could not
be certain of the outcomes in a reactivated grievance proceeding and therefore
held that exhaustion was not required.888 But on another occasion in 1982, the
Seventh Circuit adopted the position that "the policies .'. . reiterated in Clay-
ton are served by requiring exhaustion even if the employee may not be able to
obtain the same relief in the reactivated grievance procedure as might have
been available in a § 301(a) suit."88 9
An additional Seventh Circuit inconsistency can be found by comparing
Tinsley v. United Parcel Service, Inc.3 '° and Bassett v. Local Union No. 705,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters.891 Without attempting to define
"complete or full relief," the Bassett court held that intraunion exhaustion was
not required where remedies were inadequate to provide complete relief.802 In
contrast, the Tinsley court required exhaustion because the "internal remedies
were adequate to provide all the relief sought." 893 What is truly disturbing
about these latter two holdings is that the Seventh Circuit adopted unsup-
ported presumptions about the adequacy or inadequacy of intraunion exhaus-
tion procedures and allowed those presumptions to influence whether individ-
ual section 301 claims should remain in court.39'
386. 750 F.2d 1368 (7th Cir. 1984).
387. Id. at 1381 (holding that intraunion exhaustion was not required because the employee
would not have been able to obtain a fair hearing).
388. Schultz v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 696 F.2d 505, 513-14 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Even if plaintiffs
exhaust these intraunion remedies, it is extremely doubtful whether the Union could ... reinstate
or reactivate the grievances .... [Therefore,] it would be unjust to require plaintiffs to exhaust
the uncertain and inadequate intraunion remedies as a prerequisite to the suit .... (emphasis
added)); see also Rupe v. Spector Freight Sys., 679 F.2d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that
intraunion exhaustion is not required if the employee's grievance could not be reactivated).
389. Miller v. General Motors Corp., 675 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Baldini v.
International Union, UAW, Local Union No. 1095, 581 F.2d 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1978) (no excep-
tion to exhaustion of internal union remedies requirement where a union official told plaintiff that
nothing more could be done for him); Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919, 927-28 (7th
Cir. 1974) (allegations of ignorance and reliance upon misleading statements from union president
that any effort to utilize internal appeals procedures would be fruitless are not sufficient to avoid
defense of failure to exhaust internal union remedies).
390. 665 F.2d 778 (7th Cir. 1981).
391. 773 F.2d 932 (7th Cir. 1985).
392. Id. at 937.
393. Tinsley, 665 F.2d at 780.
394. Both the Tinsley and Bassett courts applied the Clayton Court's rule that an employee
need not exhaust intraunion remedies to maintain a hybrid suit where the union's internal appeal
process could not provide reactivation of the employee's grievance or an award of the complete
relief sought in his § 301 suit. See Clayton, 451 U.S. at 689. In Tinsley, the plaintiff-employee's §
301 suit sought both compensatory and punitive damages. Tinsley, 665 F.2d at 779. The Tinsley
court held that dismissal was proper because the employee had failed to exhaust intraunion reme-
dies that "were adequate to provide all the relief Tinsley sought in his § 301 suit." Id. at 780. The
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The Ninth Circuit has similarly adopted unsupported presumptions about
the quality of internal union appeal procedures and has thereby imposed dis-
parate treatment upon section 301 claimants. In Zuniga v. United Can Co., 95
for example, the Ninth Circuit did not require exhaustion because the exhaus-
tion procedures would have produced unreasonable delays. 96 In contrast, the
Ninth Circuit concluded, in Scoggins v. Boeing Co.,39 that a union employee
was required to exhaust his remedies because there was no appearance of hos-
tility during the intraunion exhaustion proceedings. 98
Perhaps, there is a more troubling, unforeseen aftermath of the Court's
Clayton decision. A review of post-Clayton rulings reveals that some federal
appellate courts have modified Clayton's liberal, three-pronged test and substi-
tuted a more conservative, narrower standard. The Third99 and Seventh400
Circuits, for example, have adopted a "reasonableness standard." This stan-
dard requires intraunion exhaustion whenever a court determines that it is rea-
sonable. These courts, however, fail to provide any criteria for determining
when intraunion exhaustion is and is not reasonable. Similarly, the Second
court, however, erred by presuming that intraunion remedies could have provided the employee
with punitive damages from the employer.
The Bassett court also adopted an unsupported presumption regarding the adequacy of intraun-
ion exhaustion procedures. In Bassett, plaintiffs sued their union, Local No. 705, and their em-
ployer, Glendenning Motorways, Inc. Basset, 773 F.2d at 933. The plaintiffs sought reactivation
of their grievances. Id. at 936. The collective bargaining agreement in question established a Joint
Grievance Committee ("JGC"). Id. Majority decisions by the JGC were deemed final and bind-
ing. Id. The collective bargaining agreement, however, provided that JGC deadlock decisions enti-
tled both parties to resort "to all lawful economic or legal recourse," including the ability to strike
or sue. Id. With respect to these plaintiffs' grievances, the JGC rendered a majority decision
regarding the extent of Glenndenning's violations. Id. at 937. The JGC deadlocked, however, over
the amount owed by Glenndenning due to its violations. Id. The court assumed for purposes of its
decision that Clayton's reactivation requirement would be fulfilled if the union had a right to
strike or sue an employer. Id. at 936-37. The court held that the intraunion remedies were inade-
quate. It reasoned that reactivation of plaintiffs' grievances were impossible under the collective
bargaining agreement because of the majority JGC decision. Id. at 937. The court, however,
merely presumed that the union would be unable to strike or sue against the employer and never
explained why the JGC's majority decision should have taken precedence over the JGC's deadlock
decision.
* 395. 812 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1987).
396. Id. at 450 (holding "that further resort to the internal union appeal procedure would have
unreasonably delayed or prevented a judicial hearing on the merits of [the] claim since the six-
month limitation period would have likely expired" (emphasis added)).
397. 742 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1984).
398. Id. at 1229 n.6 ("[F]or there to be an adequate demonstration of hostility, it must appear
that persons involved in the intraunion appeals procedure are hostile toward the union member.").
399. See. e.g., Local Union No. 1075, United Rubber Workers v. United Rubber Workers, 716
F.2d 182, 187 (3rd Cir. 1983) (stressing that a court must look to "the reasonableness of imposing
[intraunion exhaustion) under the circumstances of the situation").
400. See, e.g., Sosbe v. Delco Elecs. Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 830 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir.
1987) (ruling that "a court must look to the reasonableness of imposing [intraunion exhaustion]
under the circumstances of the situation"); accord Miller v. General Motors Corp., 675 F.2d 146,
150 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding it reasonable to impose intraunion exhaustion where a union member
thought resort to the procedure would have been futile).
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Circuit has deviated from Clayton's standard by adopting a bad faith stan-
dard.' 01 This standard requires a union employee to exhaust intraunion reme-
dies unless the employee establishes that "the [u]nion ... acted in bad faith or
in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. '402
3. Intercircuit Conflict over Whether Aggrieved Individuals Must Exhaust
Contractual-Grievance Procedures
Assuming that a prospective section 301 complainant clearly understands
and conforms to a specific circuit's statute of limitations and intraunion ex-
haustion requirements, he still must worry about another ongoing serious in-
tercircuit controversy. In particular, the complainant must decide whether he
should exhaust contractual remedies before commencing a section 301 suit.
Some federal appellate courts require the exhaustion of contractual remedies;
others do not.
Twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court tried to resolve this intercircuit
conflict. Writing for the majority in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,'03 Jus-
tice Harlan ruled that individuals asserting grievances under a collective bar-
gaining agreement must attempt to exhaust grievance procedures agreed upon
by an employer and a union.' 0 ' Two years later, however, the Court modified
its holding by creating two exceptions to the Maddox ruling. In Vaca v.
Sipes,'105 the Supreme Court held that an employee is excused from exhausting
contractual remedies where (1) an employer's conduct amounts to a repudia-
tion of negotiated contractual remedies,' 06 or (2) a union breaches its duty of
fair representation by wrongfully refusing to process the individual's
grievance. 07
In addition to the Vaca exceptions, a few appellate courts have fashioned
and adopted a third exception to the Maddox attempt rule. 08 These courts
have ruled that certain classes of individuals need not attempt to exhaust con-
tractual remedies if they are not covered by the collective bargaining agree-
401. See Wozniak v. International Union, UAW, Local 897, 842 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1988).
402. Id.
403. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
404. Id. at 652. There is some disagreement over the definition of "attempt." Compare Waters
v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 490 (7th Cir.) (stating in dictum
that asking a union for help constitutes an "attempt"), cert denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970) with
Steen v. Local 163, UAW, 373 F.2d 519, 520 (6th Cir. 1967) (stating in dictum that asking union
officials to act does not constitute an "attempt").
405. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
406. Id. at 185.
407. Id. The Supreme Court also created another exception to its Maddox decision in a case
involving racial discrimination under the Railway Labor Act. Writing for the majority in Glover
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324 (1969), Justice Black held that the exhaustion
of contractual remedies was not required where those who would pass on the racial discrimination
claims were the very individuals charged with violating the employee's rights initially. Id. at 329-
31.
408. See Simpson & Berwick, supra note 15, at 1201-02; infra notes 420-24 and accompanying
text.
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ment when the private action commences.40 9 It is important to note that
neither Maddox nor Vaca created this "inapplicability" anomaly to Maddox's
attempt rule.
Deciding whether the "repudiation," "inapplicability," or "breach of duty"
exception frees one from exhausting contractual remedies can be a painstaking
task for an average union or nonunion employee. The individual, however,
must overcome an even more serious procedural barrier: he must confirm that
the repudiation of which he complains is the type of repudiation that a partic-
ular circuit recognizes. This task is complicated by the fact that there is no
universally accepted definition of "repudiation." The majority of rulings on
this issue simply conclude that an offending employer's behavior is or is not a
repudiation of contractual grievance procedures.
The First, Third, and Ninth Circuits, for example, have found a repudiation
to exist where (1) an employer "repudiated" an entire contract and main-
tained that the contract was "inapplicable,"4 " (2) an employer consistently
maintained throughout ten years of litigation that a contract did not exist,41
and (3) a company denied that it was bound by a collective bargaining agree-
ment or that it had any duty toward its aggrieved workers.412 In contrast, the
Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that repudiation did not
occur when (1) an employer took a "stance contrary to that of the employee
during the grievance process,"'"13 (2) a company fired a worker but took no
steps to preclude the worker from challenging the dismissal,"1 , and (3) a com-
pany terminated and refused to reinstate an employee under the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement.4'5
Additionally, incompatible intracircuit pronouncements and conclusions
about the meaning of repudiation are widespread. For example, the Sixth Cir-
409. See infra notes 420-24 and accompanying text.
410. Cabarga Cruz v. Fundacion Educativa Ana G. Mendez, Inc., 822 F.2d 188, 192 (1st Cir.
1987).
411. Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 323 F. Supp 256, 259 (W.D. Pa. 1971), affid,
464 F.2d 870, 875-76 (3d Cir. 1972).
412. Kaylor v. Crown Zellerbach, Inc., 643 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1981). According to the
court:
Before the union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB, it attempted to
negotiate a settlement with [defendant's] attorney. The attorney denied that [the de-
fendant] was bound by the collective bargaining agreement, or that it had any duty
toward the drivers. In so doing, [the defendant] repudiated the contractual remedy
available to the drivers.
id.
413. Bache v. American Tel. & Tel., 840 F.2d 283, 288-89 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
888 (1988); accord Rabalais v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 566 F.2d 518, 520 (5th Cir. 1978). But see
Boone v. Armstrong Cork Co., 384 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1967) ("It seems clear that a refusal
to abide by contractual terms requiring the processing of a matter through a grievance procedure
would be ... repudiation.").
414. D'Amato v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 760 F.2d 1474, 1488 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Bailey v.
Bicknell Minerals, Inc., 819 F.2d 690, 692 (7th Cir. 1987) (refusing to find a "repudiation" of a
commitment to arbitrate where an employer refused to pay negotiated wages).
415. Redmond v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 633, 636 (1lth Cir. 1984).
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cuit has held that repudiation arises where an employer outrightly refuses to
comply with grievance procedures.'1 6 That court, however, also has held that
repudiation does not occur when an employer refuses to process a complaint
that is filed shortly before the filing of a section 301 suit.41 7 On another occa-
sion, the Sixth Circuit ruled that repudiation occurs when an employer adopts
the view that contractual remedies are not available to complainants;' 18 but,
that court has also ruled that repudiation does not arise where an employer
fraudulently withholds and misrepresents evidence that is tangentially related
to terms of the contract or to the complaint. 19 These holdings clearly do not
help complainants decide whether they should exhaust contractual remedies. It
is imperative, therefore, that the judiciary or legislature address and reform
these expanding inharmonious rulings.
Lastly, prospective section 301 complainants must be concerned about one
other exhaustion issue. As indicated above, the "inapplicability" exception re-
leases certain classes of individuals from exhausting contractual remedies.' 20
But an intercircuit conflict is developing over what classes should be exempted.
The debate currently centers on former employees-those who are either re-
tired, disabled, or constructively discharged.
As an example, the Seventh Circuit has held on two occasions that construc-
tively discharged employees-those who are no longer covered by a con-
tract-must exhaust contractual remedies.' 21 Conversely, the Eighth Circuit
has ruled that retirees are not "employees" within the meaning of the
LMRA.' 22 Moreover, the Eighth Circuit has decided that retirees cannot
416. United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, Local 307 v. G & M Roofing & Sheet Metal
Co., 732 F.2d 495, 501 (6th Cir. 1984).
417. Anderson v. Ideal Basic Indus., 804 F.2d 950, 952 (6th Cir. 1986) (where employees filed
a grievance only two weeks before commencing a suit, the company's failure to process it in that
short period of time did not constitute repudiation).
418. Geddes v. Chrysler Corp., 608 F.2d 261, 263 (6th Cir. 1979) ("Employers are normally
estopped from seeking dismissal of a claim based on failure to exhaust remedies when they have
taken the position that those remedies are not available to the employees.").
419. Terwilliger v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 882 F.2d 1033, 1039 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied.
110 S. Ct. 2204 (1990). According to the Terwilliger court:
Terwilliger asserts that Greyhound repudiated the contract when it fraudulently with-
held the second physical examination report and misrepresented Terwilliger's physical
condition in order to secure Union agreement to a third physician's examination.
However, Terwilliger has not asserted that Greyhound ever refused to abide by the
terms of the contract regarding the available grievance procedures.
id.
420. See supra text accompanying notes 408-09.
421. Roman v. United States Postal Serv., 821 F.2d 382, 388 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Roman . . .
attempts to create an additional exception based upon the fact that he was told by Union repre-
sentatives ... that there was nothing they could do for him because he was no longer an employee
.... Nevertheless, we do not believe these allegations excuse Roman's failure to exhaust his
contractual remedies."); Mitchell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers, Inc., 772 F.2d 342, 347 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986) (rejecting an almost identical argument advanced by a former
employee who had been forced to resign).
422. Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 752 F.2d 1293, 1298-99 (8th Cir.) (en banc),
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properly be joined with active employees within a collective bargaining unit.'2 3
Therefore, such former employees do not have to exhaust contractual remedies
before commencing a section 301 action. In addition to this intercircuit con-
flict between the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, there is a similar intracircuit
conflict within the Sixth Circuit.424
C. Intercircuit Conflicts Generated by the Judicially Created
Doctrine-Breach of Duty of Fair Representation
Assuming that a section 301 complainant overcomes the procedural barriers
and conflicts discussed above, she still faces an even more challenging obstacle
if she commences a suit against a union. Specifically, she must prove that the
union breached its duty of fair representation. 125 This burden is nearly insur-
mountable because a universal representation standard does not exist.
The duty of fair representation evolved through the fires of numerous judi-
cial decisions. 26 As early as 1944, the Supreme Court recognized a statutory
duty of fair representation in railroad cases. 27 Nine years later, the Court
imposed the duty on NLRB-certified unions. 28 And although the scope of the
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1102 (1985); see also Johnson v. Colts, Inc., 306 F. Supp 1076, 1079 (D.
Conn. 1969) (refusing to grant defendant-employer's motion to dismiss former employee's claim
for failure to exhaust contractual remedies, but without prejudice to its renewal); Hauser v. Far-
well, Ozmun, Kirk & Co., 299 F. Supp. 387, 392 (D. Minn. 1969) (holding that former employ-
ees-who had been advised that nothing could be done for them-exhausted available contractual
remedies as far as practicable).
423. Anderson, 752 F.2d at 1298-99.
424. Compare Bsharah v. Eltra Corp., 394 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1968) (concluding that a former
employee "had failed to follow the contractual grievance procedures with which she was inti-
mately familiar, since her primary duty with the company had been the processing of employee
grievances under the collective bargaining agreement") with Schneider v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
456 F.2d 366, 370 (6th Cir. 1972) (concluding that the contractual grievance procedure was "in-
applicable" and, therefore, the former employees were not required to exhaust such remedies). See
also United Elec. Workers v. Amcast Indus. Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1135, 1138, 1139 (S.D. Ohio
1986) (overruling defendant's motion to dismiss because former employees had not exhausted
available contractual remedies).
425. After the enactment of the Labor-Management Relations Act, a considerable amount of
judicial conflict and of scholarly debate ensued over whether a § 301 complainant must prove that
a union breached its duty of fair representation before suing an employer. See, e.g., Summers, The
Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Represen-
tation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 252 (1977) ("The employee can sue the employer for breach of
his rights under the collective agreement only after first showing that the union has acted unfairly
in refusing to process his grievance to arbitration." (emphasis added)).
Recently, the Supreme Court resolved this issue and related concerns in Breininger v. Sheet
Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, 110 S. Ct. 424 (1989). In Breininger, the Court
stressed that "[o]ur reasoning in Vaca in no way implies . . . that a fair representation action
requires a concomitant claim against an employer for breach of contract .... Federal courts have
jurisdiction to hear fair representation suits whether or not they are accompanied by claims
against employers." Id. at 433-34 (emphasis in original).
426. Breininger, 110 S. Ct. at 432.
427. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
428. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
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"fair representation" standard is broad and has never been precisely de-
fined,' 9 the rule's purpose is clear: It is "a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union
conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the pro-
visions of federal labor law."'310 More specifically, the rule prevents unions
from discriminating on the basis of race, 3 1 sex, 3 1 or membership status. 33
The rule also prohibits unions from arbitrarily ignoring workers' meritorious
claims' 3 ' and processing such claims in a perfunctory manner.' 5
But what standard of conduct determines whether a breach of duty has oc-
curred? This is a serious question confronting section 301 complainants. The
issue is similarly a difficult one for the judiciary because it continues to gener-
ate much judicial conflict within and among the federal courts of appeals.436
In the end, the blame for such confusion must be laid upon the Supreme Court
because the Court's refusal to articulate a clear standard of conduct for unions
to follow has prolonged this controversy.3 7
Over the span of twenty-six years, 1964-1990, the Court has decided eight
major questions concerning a union's duty of fair representation under either
the NLRA or the LMRA. During this period, however, the Court has failed to
adopt a specific fair representation standard. Instead, the Court has either
429. See, Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229, 1236 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 839 (1980).
430. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
431. See Ryan v. New York Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union No. 2, 590 F.2d 451, 455
n.9 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The Supreme Court recognized a statutory duty of fair representation over
20 years before Vaca v. Sipes ...in railroad cases involving alleged racial discrimination.");
Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEX. L. REv. 1119, 1121
(1973) ("[T]he kinds of union conduct that constitute a DFR violation have never been satisfacto-
rily defined . . . .Obviously, racial discrimination is prohibited.").
432. See, e.g., Bell & Howell Co. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 136, 146 n.29 (D.C. Cir.) ("The primary
purpose of the LMRA was not, and is not, the eradication of discrimination in employment ....
However, in prohibiting union discrimination, the Act clearly reflects a concern that unions [do]
not use their power of exclusive representation to shut individuals out of the workplace based upon
race or sex."), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979); cf. McCollum v. Bolger, 794 F.2d 602, 612
(1 th Cir. 1986) (finding that two female employees failed to prove that the union breached its
duty of fair representation by not filing their grievances), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987).
433. See, e.g., Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 240 (1983) ("The duty of
fair representation obliges a union 'to make an honest effort to serve the interests of all [union and
nonunion] members' fairly and impartially."); National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 721
F.2d 1402, 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that a union's policy of providing attorneys only for
union employees was a breach of duty of fair representation and reaffirming the principle that a
union may discriminate against neither union nor nonunion members affiliated with the public
bargaining unit). But see National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 800 F.2d 1165, 1172
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the union did not breach its duty of fair representation by refusing
to provide attorneys to represent nonunion, public employees on a statutory appeal).
434. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191.
435. Id. at 193.
436. See infra notes 440-57 and accompanying text.
437. See Comment, supra note 345, at 93 ("To date, the ...Court has not established the
precise degree of inadequacy of union representation which must be shown in order to sustain a
breach of duty of fair representation claim.").
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ruled, or-stated in dicta, that a union may breach its duty of fair representa-
tion by exhibiting one or any combination of the following types of conduct:
"arbitrary," "hostile," "discriminatory," "malicious," "negligent," "fraudu-
lent," "dishonest," or "deceitful.' ' 8  Additionally, some rulings have held that
a breach occurs if union officers "intentionally" discriminate against members
of the bargaining unit or if such officials act in "bad faith.' ' 9
Over the years, the courts of appeals have grappled with and tried to apply
the Court's fair representation rulings and dicta in a consistent manner. The
pronounced examples of intracircuit and intercircuit conflicts, however, evi-
dence the appellate courts' inability to do so. For instance, the Seventh Circuit
has held that "mere negligence is insufficient to constitute a breach" of the
duty of fair representation. 40 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has stated
that "union negligence may breach the duty of fair representation [where] the
individual interest ... is strong and the union's failure to perform a ministerial
act completely extinguishes the employee's right to pursue his claim.""' But
on another occasion, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that more is required than
mere negligence to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation." 2
As of this writing, an individual who commences an action in the Seventh
Circuit must prove that a union's breach was "intentional" and "invidious."' " 3
438. See Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, 110 S. Ct. 424,
436 (1989) ("The duty of fair representation ... serves as a 'bulwark to prevent arbitrary union
conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal
labor law.' " (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S.
735, 743 (1988) (recognizing a duty of fair representation action where employees claimed that
"the union failed to represent their interests fairly and without hostility" (emphasis added));
Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 229 (1983) (accepting the proposition that
"judgment against ... [a] union can ...be had only for those damages that flowed from [the
union's] ...own ...discriminatory conduct" (emphasis added)); International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 46 (1979) (noting that "there was insufficient evidence of mali-
cious, wanton, or oppressive conduct to justify the jury's punitive damages award" (emphasis
added)); Foust, 442 U.S. at 52 ("The union's conduct ... betrayed nothing more than negligence,
and thus presented an inappropriate occasion for awarding punitive damages ...." (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added)); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
274, 299 (1971) (noting that there must be substantial evidence of fraud to establish a breach of
the duty of fair representation); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348 (1964) (stressing that
there must be "substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct" to establish a
breach of the duty (emphasis added)).
439. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971)
("The duty of fair representation was judicially evolved ... and carries with it the need to adduce
substantial evidence of discrimination that is intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union
objectives .... " (emphasis added)); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967) ("A breach of the.
.duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collec-
tive bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." (emphasis added)); Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564-65 (1976) (accepting the proposition that a union
breaches its duty of fair representation by acting in "bad faith" (emphasis added)).
440. Thomas v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 890 F.2d 909, 922 n.5 (7th Cir. 1989).
441. Dutrisac v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 749 F.2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 1983).
442. Salinas v. Milne Truck Lines, Inc., 846 F.2d 568, 569 (9th Cir. 1988).
443. Thomas, 890 F.2d at 922 n.5.
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While this "is the only circuit to require proof of intentional misconduct,"""'
the circuits are likely to remain indefinitely divided over this issue. The Sev-
enth Circuit has "repeatedly declined all invitations to overrule the intentional
misconduct standard."'" Likewise, other federal appellate courts show little or
no inclination to force individual complainants to prove that a breach was "in-
tentional" or "invidious."446
Perhaps the most glaring example of intracircuit confusion involving the fair
representation standard appears in the Ninth Circuit. This circuit has ruled
that "[a] union breaches its duty of fair representation only when its conduct
toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is 'arbitrary.' "" Unfortu-
nately, the Ninth Circuit has never provided a definitive definition of "arbi-
trary" conduct. Instead, several definitions have been advanced: A union's con-
duct is arbitrary if (1) the union fails to secure sufficient evidence "before
assessing the merits of a grievance";""8 (2) the conduct is "without rational
basis";" 9 (3) the conduct is "egregious, unfair and unrelated to legitimate
union interests"; 450 (4) the union ignores a meritorious claim or handles the
claim in a perfunctory manner by failing to initiate a "minimal investigation"
of the grievance;"51 and (5) the union exhibits "reckless disregard" for the
rights of individual employees." 52
In addition to these various definitions, the Ninth Circuit further exacer-
bates the confusion over what constitutes arbitrary conduct by distinguishing
two types of union conduct.413 The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between union
444. Id.
445. Adams v. Budd Co., 846 F.2d 428, 433 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008
(1989).
446. The following cases note that other circuits have allowed complainants to establish a
breach of duty of fair representation without requiring proof of intentional or invidious conduct:
Shane v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 1989); Deringer v. Columbia
Transp. Div., Oglebay Norton Co., 866 F.2d 859, 864 (6th Cir. 1989); Parker v. Connors Steel
Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1520 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066 (1989); Dement v. Rich-
mond, Fred. & Pot. R.R., 845 F.2d 451, 459-60 (4th Cir. 1988); Masy v. New Jersey Transit Rail
Operations, Inc., 790 F.2d 322, 328 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 916 (1986); Hammons v.
Adams, 783 F.2d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 740
F.2d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1984); Curtis v. United Transp. Union, 700 F.2d 457, 458 (8th Cir. 1983);
Warehouse Union, Local 860 v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1022, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Foust v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 572 F.2d 710, 715 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd in part, 442 U.S. 42
(1979); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 284 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
447. Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1253 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122
(1986).
448. Banks v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 870 F.2d 1438, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in
original).
449. Gregg v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Union Local 150, 699 F.2d 1015, 1016 (9th
Cir. 1983) (quoting Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways, Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir.
1978)).
450. Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 756 F.2d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
451. Tenorio v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1982).
452. Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways, Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 1978).
453. Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1254 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122
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conduct that requires "an exercise of judgment" and union conduct that in-
volves the performance of "a procedural or [a] ministerial act."'454 In applying
this distinction, this court holds that a union breaches its duty of fair represen-
tation only when it arbitrarily refuses to perform a procedural or a ministerial
act.4
55
Unquestionably, the Ninth Circuit regards its representation standard as the
correct one. This tribunal assertively argues: "We have never held that a union
acted in an arbitrary manner where the challenged conduct involved the
union's judgment .... To the contrary, we have held consistently that unions
are not liable for good faith, non-discriminatory errors of judgment made in
the processing of grievances. "' Yet, this same court correctly acknowledges
that "the line separating 'procedural and ministerial' actions from those . . .
requir[ing] 'an exercise of judgment' is, at times, indistinct. 4 5 1
Perhaps the single uncontrovertible observation to emerge from this analysis
is that there is no universal standard pertaining to the duty of fair representa-
tion. Consequently, it is clear that until Congress or the Supreme Court ad-
dresses the substantive problems generated by this judicially created doctrine,
we will continue to witness conflicting fair representation decisions within and
among the federal circuits. Moreover, it is equally apparent that such conflict-
ing decisions will foster unwarranted disparate outcomes and promote the in-
equitable administration of the law with respect to section 301 complainants.
V. LABOR LAW CASE STUDY
This final Part presents findings from an analysis of 1249 cases-200 ad-
ministrative decisions, 760 federal appellate court NLRA and LMRA deci-
sions, and 289 Supreme Court NLRA and LMRA cases. 58 A representative
sample of administrative cases, NLRB decisions, was selected from the Deci-
sions and Orders of the National Labor Relations Board. Similarly, represen-
tative samples of NLRA and LMRA appellate court cases were selected from
the Federal Reporter. Finally, every reported NLRA and LMRA decision ap-
pearing in the U.S. Supreme Court Reporter was selected. Without doubt, the
most egregious findings reported in this Article are based on a statistical anal-
ysis of cases decided in federal courts between 1935 and 1990.
(1986).
454. Id.
455. Id. According to the court:
There are some significant general principles that emerge from our previous decisions.
In all cases in which we found a breach of duty of fair representation based on a
union's arbitrary conduct, it is clear that the union failed to perform a procedural or
ministerial act, that the act in question did not require the exercise of judgment and
that there was no rational and proper basis for the union's conduct.
Id.
456. Id. (emphasis added).
457. Banks v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 870 F.2d 1438, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989).
458. The author's database is available at the office of the DePaul Law Review.
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A. Statistical Findings
The results of the case study are presented in four tables in the Appendix.
Table 1 illustrates the demographic characteristics of NLRA and LMRA liti-
gants. Table 2 provides a more detailed comparison of nonunion and union
complainants. Table 3 analyzes how certain "predictors" influence the disposi-
tion of labor law cases in both federal and administrative proceedings. Finally,
Table 4 addresses some statistical questions that the study raises. A discussion
of some of the more significant findings presented in these tables follows
below.
1. Significant Findings Reported in Table I
Table 1 illustrates the demographic characteristics of NLRA and LMRA
litigants. A careful examination of Table 1 reveals that when complainants
present grievances before the NLRB, those grievances have nearly a one hun-
dred percent probability (98%) of being disposed of on the merits.' In addi-
tion, NLRA actions have a substantially greater likelihood of being resolved
on the merits than on procedural grounds; this is true among NLRA cases
decided in federal appellate courts and in the Supreme Court.4 60 In contrast,
however, LMRA complainants are more likely to have their causes of actions
disposed of on procedural grounds in the courts of appeals and in the Supreme
Court.4 '
Several reasons may explain why federal courts are substantially more likely
to dispose of LMRA complaints on procedural grounds. First, significantly
more procedural obstacles are found in LMRA suits than in NLRA actions.' 62
Second, disgruntled union employees are more likely to file LMRA suits,'63
and their complaints are more likely to involve unprotected "individual activ-
ity" rather than protected "concerted activity.' 64 These factors would cer-
tainly reduce the likelihood of LMRA disputes being resolved on the merits.
There is, however, a more compelling explanation: individual rights are sig-
nificantly more likely to be addressed in a timely manner where a board of
"experts" adjudicates the grievances and where those "experts" argue on be-
half of individual complainants in federal courts of appeals. Unsophisticated
LMRA complainants often hire attorneys who generally are not "experts."
Moreover, LMRA grievants must help shoulder the burden of overcoming
complicated procedural obstacles and proving violations in federal courts. In
contrast, NLRA complainants are spared these problems; the NLRB and its
459. See Table I in the Appendix to this Article ("Grounds for Disposing Case").
460. See id.
461. See id.
462. See supra notes 346-424 and accompanying text.
463. See Table I in the Appendix to this Article ("Types of Complainants").
464. See id. ("Claims Involved"); see also supra notes 24-94 and the accompanying text (Part
I discusses "protected" and "unprotected" concerted and individual activity under the LMRA and
the NLRA).
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general counsel argue on behalf of NLRA grievants at relevant points in both
administrative and judicial proceedings. Therefore, many procedural obstacles
are avoided or easily remedied.
Other significant revelations in Table 1 appear among the administrative
cases: Employers are more likely to be defendants than are union officials
(83.5% versus 16.5%); complainants are more likely to win than are defend-
ants (72.5% versus 27.5%); and alleged victims of unfair labor practices are
more likely to be employed in an unorganized shop or plant (55%).
Among NLRA and LMRA complainants who went to federal court, the
overwhelming majority were employed in an organized shop or plant.4 " Addi-
tionally, when comparing NLRA and LMRA plaintiffs who sought judicial
review, the former group was significantly more inclined to complain about
"willful violations," "repeated violations," and "retaliatory discrimination."' 66
2. Significant Findings Reported in Table 2
Table 2 provides a more detailed comparison than Table 1. There, nonunion
and union complainants are compared. And the percentages reveal another
example of blatant, disparate discrimination among individual victims of un-
fair labor practices. The findings in Table 2 indicate that nonunion complain-
ants are significantly more likely to win in both administrative and judicial
proceedings.467 Conversely, union employees are more likely to be unsuccessful
in both forums. More important, Table 2 also confirms the finding stated
above: in federal courts, nonunion employees' grievances are more likely to be
disposed of on meritorious rather than on procedural grounds. The converse is
true for union employees.' 68 These findings are clearly unwarranted. More-
over, it is untenable to contend that Congress intended these disparate results
between union and nonunion employees when it enacted the facially neutral
enforcement provisions of the LMRA and the NLRA.
Other findings were made with respect to administrative cases. One finding
reveals that nonunion employees are more likely to complain about employers'
alleged unfair practices (88.9%); union employees, on the other hand, are
comparatively more likely to complain about union officials' alleged discrimi-
natory behaviors (40% ).469 In addition, nonunion employees are significantly
more likely to complain about "harassment" on the job in administrative pro-
ceedings (88.9%). In contrast, union employees' claims are comparatively
more likely to involve alleged breach of duty of fair representation (16% ).470
465. See Table I in the Appendix to this Article ("Employees Were").
466. See id. ("Alleged Violations").
467. See Table 2 in the Appendix to this Article ("Disposition (Outcome) of Case"). This
finding is truly disturbing, because a statistically significant relationship remains even after con-
trolling for the influence other extralegal factors within federal court decisions. See infra notes
491-93 and accompanying text.
468. See id. ("Grounds for Disposal").
469. See id. ("Types of Defendants").
470. See id. ("Unfair Labor Practices").
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The demographic characteristics of complainants who decided to seek judi-
cial review are very different. First, Table 2 reveals that nonunion employees
are more likely to complain about punishment for engaging in "protected"
concerted activity (86.5 %); union employees are comparatively more likely to
be punished for engaging in "unprotected" individual activity (52.1 %). 7 Sec-
ond, nonunion employees are significantly more inclined than their union coun-
terparts to complain about "harassment," "retaliation," and "discriminatory
discharges" than are union complainants. The percentages are 53.3 %, 83%,
and 86.2%, respectively. 47
2
Finally, among complainants in federal courts, nonunion employees are
more likely to commence actions against employers (91.6%) than are union
employees (70.1 %).117 Nearly a third (29.9%) of the latter group, however,
initiated causes of actions against union officials. 4 74 Whether these actions
were filed specifically against local and international unions is uncertain, be-
cause Table 2 also reveals that union employees filed a statistically significant
number of actions (25.1 %) where a union's breach of a duty of fair represen-
tation was the overriding issue. 7 5 As indicated above, for years federal judges
required disgruntled employees to prove that a union breached its duty of fair
representation before such employees could bring unfair labor practices suits
against an employer.4 7 6 Lower federal courts clearly recognized and accepted
this interdependence among suits involving unions and employers until the Su-
preme Court issued its less-than-sterling decision on the matter in 1990. 47
3. Significant Findings Reported in Table 3
Finally, two additional unexpected and unwarranted findings are reported in
Table 3. Among NLRA decisions, the probability of winning in federal court
is significantly influenced by the circuit where the action commenced. Specifi-
cally, complainants who filed actions in the Tenth Circuit are more likely to
471. See id. ("Types of Protected Activities").
472. See id. ("Unfair Labor Practices").
473. See id. ("Types of Defendants").
474. See id.
475. See id. ("Unfair Labor Practices").
476. See supra notes 425-57 and accompanying text.
477. See Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, 110 S. Ct. 424,
432-34 (1989). According to the Court:
The Court of Appeals . . . held that if an employee fails to allege that his employer
breached the collective-bargaining agreement, then he cannot prevail in a fair repre-
sentation suit against his union .... This is a misstatement of existing law .... Our
reasoning in Vaca in no way implies ... that a fair representation requires a concomi-
tant claim against an employer for breach of contract . . . . Respondent argues that
the concern in Vaca that suits against the employer and union be heard together in
the same forum is applicable to the hiring hall situation .... This reasoning misinter-
prets our reasoning in Vaca . . . . While in Vaca an allegation that the union had
breached its duty of fair representation was a necessary component of [a section] 301
claim against the employer, the converse is not true here . . ..
Id. (emphasis in original).
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win than complainants who filed in other circuits.' 7 Furthermore, when ser-
vice-sector workers commence an action under the LMRA, they are more
likely to win in a federal court of appeals.""9 In contrast, there is no similar
statistically significant finding among service employees who commence ac-
tions under the NLRA.
Close scrutiny of statutory language and of congressional intent discloses no
valid justification for these findings. Additionally, there is nothing of signifi-
cance in the hundreds of Supreme Court opinions and thousands of appellate
court decisions to support the view that nonunion employees' grievances are
more meritorious than those of union employees. Yet, nonunion employees are
more likely to win than union employees. 80 Further, a review of relevant case
law 81 failed to substantiate the claim that discrimination against employees in
the Tenth Circuit is very different or more severe than that found in other
federal circuits. Notwithstanding the similarity in employee treatment, how-
ever, Tenth Circuit complainants are significantly more likely to be successful
than complainants in other circuit courts. 8 '
B. An Empirical Analysis of Some Unexpected Problems Inherent in
Litigating Individual Rights Suits in the Supreme Court
and Federal Courts of Appeals
This section presents a quantitative analysis of the way federal courts dis-
pose of NLRA and LMRA causes of actions. Unexpectedly, this analysis un-
covered a very disturbing finding: an individual complainant's likelihood of
winning in federal court is significantly shaped by variables over which the
complainant has little, if any, control and by factors that have little to do with
a case's merits. 83 In light of these compelling findings, alleged victims of un-
fair labor practices must be denied access to federal courts. Congress should
encourage complainants to resolve individual disputes in federal administrative
proceedings. More important, Congress must allocate more funds to help re-
cruit a greater number of highly qualified administrative law judges. Enacting
these suggestions would prevent the occurrence of the unwarranted results re-
ported in this Article. Such enactments also would prevent the disparate treat-
ment that union and nonunion employees are currently receiving in the Su-
478. See Table 3 in the Appendix to this Article ("Action Originated in Tenth Circuit").
479. See id. ("Service Sector Business").
480. See Table 2 in the Appendix to this Article ("Disposition (Outcome) of Case").
481. The author's database included 1249 cases-200 administrative decisions, 760 federal ap-
pellate court NLRA and LMRA decisions, and 289 Supreme Court NLRA and LMRA cases.
The database is available at the office of the DePaul Law Review.
482. See Table 3 in the Appendix to this Article ("Action Originated in Tenth Circuit")..
483. Similar conclusions appear in the author's other published studies of the federal judiciary.
See Rice, Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Title VI, Title IX and Section 504: A Pre-
and Post-Grove City Analysis, 5 REv. LITIGATION. 219, 279-82 (1986) [hereinafter Rice, Grove-
City Analysis]; Rice, Judicial Enforcement of Fair Housing Laws: An Analysis of Some Unex-
amined Problems that the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1983 Would Eliminate, 27 How.
L.J. 227, 254-74 (1984) [hereinafter Rice, Fair Housing].
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preme Court and federal courts of appeals.
1. Statistically Significant "Simple" Two-by-Two Relationships Between
Demographic Characteristics and the Disposition of NLRA and of LMRA
Actions in Federal Courts Between 1935 and 1990
A few of the statistically significant findings reported in Table 3 are dis-
cussed above.48 However, other significant findings appear in the table, and
they are discussed here. The procedures for computing the phi coefficients and
determining whether those coefficients are statistically significant have been
thoroughly discussed elsewhere for a legal audience. 8
To help appreciate the significance of the findings reported in Table 3, the
following questions are advanced. Should the disposition of federal suits be
influenced by the geographic boundaries and by legal jurisdictions (types of
circuits) in which complainants reside? Should federal judges or members of
the Supreme Court allow results to be influenced by whether defendants were
employers or union officials? Should nonunion employees have greater success
in federal courts than union employees? Should actions originating in adminis-
trative proceedings have more favorable dispositions in federal courts of ap-
peals than suits originating in federal district courts? The answer, of course, to
these questions is a resounding "no."
Table 3, however, reveals the following "positive" statistically meaningful
relationships: (1) actions originating in administrative proceedings are indeed
more likely to be successful in the federal appellate courts and Supreme
Court-the positive phi coefficients are 101 and .175, respectively; (2) As re-
ported above, actions originating in the Tenth Circuit are more likely to be
successful than actions originating in other circuits"8 -the positive phi coeffi-
cient is .095; and (3) When defendants are private employers, individual com-
plainants are notably more likely to win in the Supreme Court. This final rela-
tionship is very evident among actions filed under both the NLRA and
LMRA. The positive phi coefficients are .246 and .359, respectively. 87
A statistically significant negative phi coefficient means that a particular
variable decreases the likelihood of an individual winning in federal court. A
negative coefficient also means that an inverse relationship exists between the
disposition of a case and a particular variable. Several unexpected and unwar-
ranted inverse relationships appear in Table 3. First, among federal appellate
court decisions, union members are more likely to lose in federal court when
they bring actions under either the NLRA or the LMRA. The respective sig-
nificant negative coefficients are -.100 and -.320.
Finally, two other troublesome findings appear among Supreme Court cases.
484. See supra notes 478-79 and accompanying text.
485. See Rice, Grove-City Analysis, supra note 483, at 284-85 nn.403-04; Rice, Fair Housing,
supra note 483, at 254-57 n.162.
486. See supra note 478 and accompanying text.
487. See Table 3 in the Appendix to this Article ("Types of Defendants").
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For unknown reasons, both NLRA and LMRA employees are more likely to
lose in that supreme tribunal when defendants are union officials-the nega-
tive phi coefficients are -.168 and -.300, respectively. Above, it was noted that
these same complainants are more likely to win when defendants are private
employers.' 88 A careful reading of the respective Acts, their legislative history,
and judicial decisions, fails to uncover a single legal justification for these dis-
parate results.
2. The Disposition of NLRA and LMRA Claims in Federal Courts: A Mul-
tivariate Probit Two-Stage Analysis
Are federal appellate court judges actually biased in favor of complainants
from the Tenth Circuit? Are Court members truly biased in favor of nonunion
employees? Are those Supreme Court Justices really antiworker when defend-
ants are union officials? Apparently, federal judges and members of the Su-
preme Court are biased, and they are wittingly or unwittingly permitting ex-
tralegal factors to influence the disposition of unfair labor practices suits. This
is a fair conclusion if we only consider the relevant statistics reported in Ta-
bles 2 and 3.
It is possible, however, that another phenomenon, called "self-selectivity
bias"' 89 is producing these unjustified, discriminatory results. One source of
such bias could be the sample itself. 90 Conceivably, the sample of federal
court cases is biased because it includes only disgruntled employees who de-
cided to file LMRA suits and decided to seek judicial enforcement of NLRB's
orders. The sample does not include persons who decided not to advance their
actions in federal court after receiving a favorable ruling in administrative
hearings or in some other forum. Self-selection is involved in each decision;
and, without testing for self-selectivity bias, it would be improper to conclude
that judicial bias is causing the disparate or intentional discrimination.
Additionally, the difference between litigants' financial resources is often
another source of selectivity bias because a positive relationship exits between
the level of one's financial resources and one's ability to purchase good legal
representation. Therefore, a finding that employers-defendants are more likely
to win in federal court than employees-plaintiffs could be a reflection of differ-
ential access to adequate resources rather than a reflection of judicial bias.
Table 4 illustrates the results of a multivariate probit two-stage analysis.49'
488. See supra note 487 and accompanying text.
489. See G. MADDALA, LIMITED-DEPENDENT & QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN ECONOMETRICS
257-71 (1983).
490. Other relevant examples of self-selectivity bias from a legal perspective are found in Rice,
Grove-City Analysis, supra note 483, at 286-87.
491. This procedure has been reasonably discussed and explained in Rice, Grove-City Analysis,
supra note 483, at 286-87 & nn. 406-10. If the reader wants more than a cursory discussion of
this statistical procedure or of the computer software for generating the probit coefficients, he
should consult the references outlined in the Grove-City article; or, the reader may contact the
author.
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Simply stated, this procedure answers two important questions: (1) is there
self-selectivity bias in the study?; and (2) if selectivity bias is not present,
what are the simultaneous and multiple effects of certain factors on the dispo-
sition of NLRA and LMRA actions in federal courts between 1935 and 1990?
Seven "predictor" variables are listed in the very left column in Table 4.
They appear because a preliminary statistical procedure4 92 revealed that each
variable singularly and significantly correlated with one's decision to go to
court and with the disposition of claims. However, when examining the simul-
taneous effects of the seven factors on one's decision to go to court after, say,
an administrative hearing, only one statistically significant coefficient appears.
The -.7019 probit coefficient and its corollary 4.560 t-statistic strongly suggest
that when controlling for the influences of the other factors: (1) unions are less
likely to be defendants in federal courts, or (2) disgruntled employees are sig-
nificantly less likely to select union officials as defendants. Although this par-
ticular finding is interesting, it is of little relevance. The truly disturbing find-
ings appear in the two columns situated on the right in Table 4.
First, the statistically insignificant lambda term (.3177) indicates that self-
selectivity bias is absent and that disposition is not influenced by some alleged
unique characteristics of complainants who decided to go to court. Second, the
statistically significant and positive .4604 probit coefficient suggests that, when
controlling for the influence of the other variables, complainants who com-
menced actions under the NLRA have a greater likelihood of winning in fed-
eral courts than persons who initiated suits under the LMRA.
Finally, the statistically significant and positive .4806 two-stage probit coef-
ficient reinforces a previous finding: after removing the influence of the other
factors, nonunion employees are still more likely to win in the Supreme Court
and federal appellate courts than are union employees.93 Again, we are forced
to ask: Did Congress intend these disparate results when enacting the National
Labor Relations Act in 1935 and the Labor Management Relations Act in
1947?
C. Recommended Congressional Action to Cure the Disparate Treatment
of Labor Law Litigants and the Inequitable Enforcement
of the LMRA and NLRA
Here, two rather controversial recommendations are advanced to help re-
duce the disparate results and the incidence of other enforcement problems
uncovered in this Article. First, Congress must repeal the LMRA if it is truly
committed to protecting individual employees' rights as well as employers' and
union officials' rights. As reported in Table 1, the majority of LMRA cases are
disposed of on procedural grounds. By any appraisal, this is a serious waste of
precious judicial resources. Moreover, among cases decided on the merits, im-
permissible extralegal factors are significantly influencing the outcomes.
492. See supra note 485 and accompanying text.
493. See supra notes 467-68 and accompanying text.
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Against this background, Congress should do what has been suggested before:
encourage or compel employers and unions to submit their grievances to bind-
ing arbitration or to some alternative dispute resolution forum. 494 Congress
should also force individuals who have grievances against unions or employers
to file their complaints under the NLRA and resolve them before highly
skilled administrative law judges.
The second suggestion is not new: Congress must reform the NLRA. 495 Spe-
cifically, Congress should give individual complainants, rather than the Gen-
eral Counsel, the right to take unfair labor practice claims before administra-
tive law judges after complainants have exhausted appropriate grievance
proceedings in the workplace. Another needed reform is to make ALJ rulings
final, subject only to the Board's review. Judicial review of these administra-
tive decisions in federal courts of appeals should not be permitted.
Two compelling reasons exist for prohibiting judicial review of an AL's or
Board's ruling. First, as revealed above, there is an extremely high likelihood
that an administrative hearing will result in discrimination disputes being re-
solved upon the merits.4 96 However, among cases decided in federal court, the
likelihood of such disposition drops considerably. 497 Clearly, administrative
dispositions are superior. Further, administrative proceedings, arguably, are
less costly.
Second, there are simply too many intercircuit conflicts involving enforce-
ment issues under the NLRA and LMRA. Intracircuit conflicts are prevalent,
too. Furthermore, both types of conflicts are not limited solely to NLRA or
LMRA decisions. Conflicting judicial decisions are found wherever federal
statutes permit judicial review of agency action. 98 In fact, the problem is so
widespread that, as of this writing, legal scholars and judges are debating the
merits of a controversial proposal to help settle intercircuit conflicts. 499
This proposal includes a recommendation by a federal courts study commit-
tee that Congress authorize a four-year pilot project that would allow the Su-
preme Court to refer intercircuit conflicts to an en banc court of appeals for
final disposition. 00 The en banc proceedings, however, would take place in a
circuit not involved in the conflict.5"' It is fairly unlikely that Congress will
accept the committee's recommendations, given past congressional reactions
494. See Ryan, Arbitration-An Alternative to Our Overburdened Judiciary, in LABOR LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 1983, at 275 (M. Landwehr ed. 1983).
495. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
496. See supra note 459 and accompanying text.
497. See supra note 461 and accompanying text.
498. See Strauss, One Hundred Fifty' Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1096-
1100 nn.28-30 (1987).
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and the debate's present tone.8 2 Congress, however, should seriously consider
and enact the counsel proffered in this Article.
The suggestions made in this Article would require Congress to (1) pass
legislation that would compel individual complainants to resolve unfair labor
practice disputes in administrative proceedings, (2) provide adequate funds for
hiring a substantially larger number of career-oriented administrative law
judges, and (3) preclude judicial review-of federally created individual rights.
These changes would make unpredictable judicial outcomes, costly delays, ex-
orbitant caseloads, and intercircuit conflicts moot issues. It is imperative for
Congress to take remedial action soon. Indeed, Congress' failure to take such
action to provide timely, predictable, and effective administrative relief would
prompt one to conclude that congressional concern for ending groundless dis-
crimination against individual employees is, at best, disingenuous.
VI. CONCLUSION
As early as 1930, the Supreme Court adopted the view that when a statu-
tory right is created, a legal obligation to enforce that right in an appropriate
administrative or judicial proceeding follows. 8 ' The Court reaffirmed this
principle nearly forty years later in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.5""
when it acknowledged that "[t]he existence of a statutory right implies the
existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies." 05
Both the NLRA and the LMRA create individual rights for union and non-
502. See McMillion, An End to Diversity?-New Report on Fed Courts Sparks Mixed Reac-
tions, 76 A.B.A. J. 111 (1990). McMillion wrote:
The ABA is among the major organizations reviewing the draft report of the Federal
Courts Study Committee, a panel created by Congress to examine federal court
problems and to develop the first long-range plan for the federal judiciary .... The
draft proposes shifting some types of cases to other tribunals, trimming back federal
jurisdiction when appropriate or necessary, and altering the procedures for handling
certain cases .... Recognizing that Congress has been skeptical of [similar] propo-
sal[s] in the past, the committee also recommends alternatives that would drastically
reduce the availability of diversity jurisdiction .. . .The ABA strenuously disagrees
with [some] of these recommendations.
Id. at 11l; see also Legal Affairs-The Federal Courts Have a Drug Problem, Bus. WK., Mar.
26, 1990, at 76, 77. The author noted:
The Federal Courts Study Committee has its own problems. The powerful American
Bar [Association] opposes any effort to narrow access to the more esteemed federal
courts . . . .And lawyers who specialize in the arcane world of tax law are angry
about a proposal to make the U.S. Tax Court the only tribunal to hear tax disputes..
Id.
503. See Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 569 (1930)
("The creation of a legal right ... does not require for its effectiveness the imposition of statutory
penalties. Many rights are enforced for which no statutory penalties are provided .... [B]ut ... a
legal obligation is created and the statutory requirements are susceptible of enforcement by pro-
ceedings appropriate to each.").
504. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
505. Id. at 239.
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union employees alike. However, an analysis of hundreds of relevant NLRA
and LMRA decisions-covering a span of fifty-five years-leads to a dismal
conclusion: poorly reasoned and conflicting Supreme Court decisions, a pleth-
ora of intracircuit and intercircuit conflicts over procedural matters, jurisdic-
tional conflicts between the NLRB and the federal courts of appeals, and ad-
ministrative delays are all severely undermining the enforcement of individual
rights in a timely, predictable, and effective manner. This conclusion clearly
does not comport with the well-settled principle that the creation of statutory
right requires its enforcement. Moreover, this result is a substantial deviation
from the congressional intent when the NLRA and the LMRA enforcement
provisions were adopted. 0" Because Congress could not have intended such
results, it is necessary that Congress enact remedial measures to cure the ineq-
uitable administration of law that labor law litigants are currently
experiencing.
506. See supra notes 6-15 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
TABLE I. SOME SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC ATTRIBUTES: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT CASES DECIDED IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BETWEEN 1935 AND 1990 (N = 1249)
National Labor Federal Appellate U.S. Supreme Court
Relations Board's Court Decisions Decisions
Selected (NLRB) (N = 760) (N = 289)
Demographic Administrative
Characteristics Decisions NLRA LMRA NLRA LMRA
(N = 200) Decisions Decisions Decisions Decisions
(N = 666) (N = 94) (N = 247) (N = 42)









Union Refused to Bargain
Employer Refused to Bargain
Union Refused to Represent
Its Members

































































4.1 47.9 7.3 19.0
6.0 16.0 4.5 -0-
39.9 43.6 11.7 21.4
84.1"* 19.1 51.4 38.1
[ 9.0] 137.31 136.91 [40.51
97.9** 48.9 70.4** 47.6





12.8 38.3 32.8 40.5
87.2** 61.7 60.0 57.1
53.0 93.6** 66.0** 97.6**
47.0 6.4 34.0 2.4
*Significant Disparities
ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE LABOR ACTS
TABLE 2. SOME SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUAL
EMPLOYEES COMMENCING ACTIONS IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND THE LABOR-













































Disposition (Outcome) of Case:
Complainants Won
Complainants Lost
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